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The Indian Ocean, with its extensive trade and circulation networks, has 
been  characterized  as  a  major  inter­regional  arena  within  broader  studies  of 







capabilities of both intra- and extra-regional military and economic powers.
The western Indian Ocean has thus been both a fluid space of intense ex­
changes between various local communities and a much-coveted setting for suc­
cessive projects of hegemonic appropriations of human and material resources. 
The substantial flow of goods and people across it has, from time immemorial, 
attracted predatory and clandestine activities, which are today the pretext for 
member countries of NATO to maintain an impressive security presence and for 
emerging powers  such as  India and China  to display  their military and naval 
capacities.
A comprehensive understanding of  the  conditions and  implications of  this 
multiple presence requires a multidisciplinary effort that has to take into account 
the underlying, and generally silent, reality of the existence of family-based net­
works (African, Arab, Indian, Armenian, Iranian and South­east Asian) which, 
assuming an ancient heritage, have ensured the continuity of flows between the 
different countries connected by the Western Indian Ocean by resiliently adapt­




of commercial, cultural and religious interactions that extend to the Middle-East 
and  the  Indian  subcontinent,  as well  as  the  long­time  involvement  of  various 
exogenous military, administrative and economic powers (Ottoman, Omani, 
Portuguese, Dutch, British, French and, more recently, European­Americans).
On the side­lines of an inward­looking vision of Africa shared by most African 
Union member countries, which have only recently begun to develop a fledgling 
security policy and a strategy of development of the African coastline, various 






As the overall process of globalization of human affairs assumes local and re­
gional dimensions, rather than excluding them, it realigns and remodels them. It 
co­occurs and co­relates with various other competing forces seeking to reclaim 
and reactivate areas of social activity and identity, in the broadest sense. Against 
such a complex contemporary background, an important challenge for students 
and researchers of regional studies is not only to incorporate a understanding of 
the input of globalizing trends in the reshaping of major regional contexts but 




In  the particular  case of  the  long­established African  regional  studies  area, 
this  has  implied  interrogating  the  validity  of  distinguishing  sub­Saharan 
(former  “black”)  Africa  from  the  Maghreb,  traditionally  subsumed  within 
Southwest Asian (“Near” or “Middle Eastern”) studies; revising the role of the 
Mediterranean both as frontier and bridge with Europe; refocusing on Africa’s 
Atlantic  ties  to  the Americas; and of course recognising  the  Indian Ocean as a 
major pathway for Eastern Africa. It was in this spirit that in 2012 AEGIS – the 
African­Europe  Group  of  Interdisciplinary  Studies  network  –  established  the 
Collaborative Research Group (CRG) on Africa in the Indian Ocean, whose aim is 
to “promote and facilitate discussion, exchange of information, and collaboration 
between scholars in Europe, Africa and Asia” studying this topic from different 
disciplinary perspectives. This CRG exists to exchange information on research 
projects, events and activities, to enhance the visibility of the connection between 
Africa and the Indian Ocean world within the general African studies landscape, 






product of one of the main activities of this CRG: organizing AEGIS international 
thematic conferences on African  in the Indian Ocean. The second such confer­








discussions that have their starting point in academic conferences, offering a set 
of arguments based on illustration. The theme of the conference is presented here 
both from different disciplinary perspectives (social and political history, anthro­
pology, political science and cultural studies) and regarding different contextual 
case studies (Horn region, North­eastern and South­eastern coastal regions) and 
their connections to the Arabian Peninsula and Western India. Although the con­
tributions are heterogeneous,  chosen  to depict  the  rich variety of  the  theme, a 
number of common threads may be distinguished. The first is the notion that, as 
central as Africa’s Eastern coastal areas have been in the history of the region’s 
relationship with  the  Indian Ocean  trading  networks,  the  involvement  of  the 
neighbouring hinterland is not to be taken as a mere complementary footnote to 
it but rather as an integral element in diachronic and synchronic analytical efforts 
to understand both processes and situations. Another relevant aspect that some 
of the chapters draw attention to is the varied nature of the encroachments deal­
ing with the Western presence and impact in the region since the 16th century, 
urging for a more sustained look at factors such as adaptation, conflation and 
appropriation. A  third  thread worth noting  is  the  implicit  recognition  in most 
chapters that disciplinary constraints and contextual boundaries are worth tran­
scending given the overlapping characteristics of the topic.
The chapters are presented chronologically, from the 16th century to the pres­
ent day, and are contextually paired (Eastern Africa and Madagascar, the Horn, 
and South Africa). The first chapter, by Ana Roque, addresses the local and re­
gional impact of the establishment of Portuguese settlers in Sofala (Mozambique) 
in the 16th century, the specificities of their interaction with the local commu­
nities, the importance of the “non-official” strategies they adopted in order to 
be accepted by the chieftaincies, the impact of their integration in the local and 
regional networks and how their attitude framed new geographies of power in 
an area marked by political, economic, social, cultural and religious dichotomies. 
Her analysis of the Sofala region during the 16th century highlights its role in 
the African­Indian Ocean trading networks and how the economic and political 
integration of the Portuguese settlers occurred beyond the limits of the official 
control of the Portuguese crown.





trade of western Madagascar during the 18th century. The chapter traces the 
shifts in attitudes towards these brokers as their roles were formalised and came 
to be occupied by a single individual, often for many years. These brokers were 
often high-status individuals who exercised a degree of independence from the 
slave sellers, and particularly the king, to maintain the trust of the Dutch, often 
walking a fine between the two parties. Unlike their West African counterparts, 
these brokers neither  traded slaves  themselves, nor  received a  commission on 
sales, but were rewarded for their services with gifts rather than a commission. 
They were, particularly in later years, individuals who had spent sufficient time 
in Europe to become quite familiar with European practice, and some also would 
have been of mixed European and Malagasy parentage: they were cultural bro­




intersect between two research contexts: the Indian Ocean regional studies and 
the more topical Portuguese-speaking cultural and literary studies. By offering 
to create a counterpoint between literary and visual representations, and there­
by addressing the Indian Ocean as an aesthetic and epistemological paradigm, 
Brugioni (re)situates the Mozambican cultural imaginary within the field of 
Indian Ocean studies.
African-Arab connections comes under scrutiny in Manuel João Ramos’s 
chapter on the female migratory flows from the Horn of Africa and the particu­
lar kind of  relationship  that  they entail. As happens with  their Asian counter­
parts, girls and women  temporarily migrating  from  the Horn work mainly as 
housemaids in affluent Arab countries, where they tend to be denied free and 
fair labour rights, under a harsh interpretation of the kafala, or sponsorship sys­





consideration: that of the female workers’ agency and resilience in the face of the 
hardships  encountered,  and  that  of  the ways  this  situation  is understood and 
managed from the employers’ perspective.
The stereotyped clash between “the African” and “the Arab” also comes un­
der analysis in Aleksi Ylönen’s chapter on the entangled history of North-South 
16 Introduction
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relations in the Sudan. He explains how, for centuries, the greater Horn of Africa 
has been exposed to influences from across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean 
more generally. Over time, this continued exposure has shaped the contempo­
rary societies and states in the sub­region. The case of contemporary Sudan il­





ity  of  its  cultures  and peoples.  Following decolonization,  the Northern politi­
cal elite’s nation- and state-building project sought to homogenize the country 
through forced linguistic, cultural and religious assimilation, leading to varying 
degrees of direct confrontation with the Southern peoples. Ylönen considers the 
root causes of the armed conflict in Southern Sudan (part of the Sudanese state 
until 2011), identifying local perceptions and interpretations of the legacy of slav­
ery and of forced cultural assimilation imposed through a state project of extend­
ing Islam and Arab culture, but also stressing that religion must not dismissed as 
a central factor for the rebellion. He also observes that the overall situation dur­
ing the wars was complex and changing, and that cynical interpretations of the 
legacy of slavery and religion were often used to justify armed opposition against 
the “Arab north”. The chapter correlates these interpretations with the Orientalist 
image of Sudan and the aspirations of Southern Sudan’s self-determination, in­
dependence, and drift towards an East African socio­cultural and Western Indian 
Ocean economic space.
The construction of  such an economic space has  long  implied military and 
naval control. In his chapter on India’s maritime strategic and security interests, 
Denis Venter deals with the recent expansion of India’s naval capabilities and 
maritime security throughout the region, particularly through what he as defines 
as highly  asymmetrical developing  relationships with  small  states  (Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Oman) at, or near, the key points of entry into the Western Indian 
Ocean. Some of these states have traditionally seen India as a rather benign secu­
rity provider with the capacity to act effectively as a security guarantor (the case 
with Mauritius and the Maldives). But the recent needs of further strengthening 
India’s strategic posture in coastal Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula, matched 
with African littoral states’ hopes to become regional power centres, sets the stage 
for a stronger role of Indian naval forces to assist in maintaining maritime order 







The book concludes with a chapter by Megna Singh on the symbolic paradox 
of “suspended mobility” within the maritime world, by drawing on the case of 
the arrested supply ship WBI Trinity at the port of Cape Town, in South Africa, 
as she travelled from Nigeria to Dubai, and the effect this has had on the lives of 
the men caught in the ensuing judicial process (the foreclosing of the mortgaged 
vessel). The case serves as an apt illustration of the overlapping complexities of 
maritime law as it intertwines with the economy and movement of international 
labour. By addressing the dialectical tropes of suspension, stillness and waiting 
affecting peoples’ lives, Singh reminds how they may help put in broader per­
spective the hyper-valorisation of the construction of flows of trade that domi­
nate today’s global cultural discourses. 
The contributions to this volume are a representative selection of case studies 
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives that highlight the interconnectivity of 
the Indian Ocean region, from the first European entry into the ocean through 
to contemporary geopolitical strategies, and demonstrate quite effectively that 
Africa and  the  Indian Ocean constitute a political,  economic and cultural unit 
whose constituent parts cannot be dissociated from one another. 
This is certainly not a comprehensive and final book on the intertwining re­
lationship  between African  participation  in  the  regional  trading  and  cultural 
networks of the Indian Ocean and the hegemonic presence of world powers in 
the area. Its purpose is rather to contribute, with a few meaningful exempla­
ry case­studies, to assert the need for further and more inclusive investigation. 
It touches upon questions that have been independently addressed by differ­




Africa to the Indian Ocean littoral are both intricate and temporally deep. The 






The Sofala Coast (Mozambique) in the 16th Century: 
between the African trade routes and Indian 
Ocean trade 
Ana Cristina Roque




This article addresses the local and regional impact of the settlement of the Portuguese 
in Sofala, Mozambique, in the 16th century. Using the documental archive sources on the 
Sofala coast we highlight the specificity of the interaction between the Portuguese and the 
local communities, the importance of the “non-official” strategies used by the Portuguese 
in order to be accepted by the local chieftaincies, the impact of their integration into the 
local and regional networks and how their attitude formed new geographies of power in 
the area, while exposing political, economic, social, cultural and religious dichotomies. 
Focusing our attention on these aspects we make new contributions to the analysis of 
the Sofala region in the 16th century for a better understanding of its role in the African 
and Indian Ocean trading networks in the Portuguese empire, mostly based in informal 
economic and political control and thus pretty close to the concept of "shadow empire".




When arriving in the Indian Ocean in the early 16th century, the Portuguese 
were confronted with an  important  intercontinental  trade network dominated 
by Muslim merchants.  This  network  involved  the  East African  coastal  ports, 
India  and  the Far East  as well  as  inland African kingdoms and was part  of  a 
much larger, ancient Muslim network of trade, kinship and port-state complexes 
(Tibbetts, 1981; Abu-Lughod, 1989; Chaudhuri, 1990) connecting Africa, Asia and 
Europe (Fig. 1). 
Regional African  trade  routes  played  a  very  important  role  in  this  system 
because  of  the  coastal  ports  from  the  Bazaruto  Islands  up  to  the  North  of 
Mozambique. African trade goods, including gold, were exported from these 
ports to the northern Swahili towns and through them to the Indian Ocean where 
they exchanged for cotton, beads, spices and other Indian goods (Beach, 1980; 
Smith, 1983). A huge trade network covering the Middle East and the Far Eastern 
countries, dominated mainly though not exclusively by Muslim merchants 
(Sicard, 1968). 
As early as the 8th century, archaeological evidence of this long-distance trade 





region (Newitt, 1995) and that it was the reason for the first Portuguese settle­
ments on the East African coast. 
After building a fortified trading post in Sofala in 1505, Portugal expected to 
control the gold trade and thus guarantee the gold it needed to purchase Indian 
spices. At  the  same  time,  transforming Mozambique  Island  into  a  Portuguese 
port of call would guarantee both the possibility of provisioning ships on their 
way to India and providing sailors and travellers with facilities for rest and re­
covery (Boxer, 1961). 
However, expectations and reality were two very different things and in the 
early 16th century the Portuguese were finding it very difficult to replace the well 
established Muslim networks.
1 Sicard states that, before the Muslim traders, merchants from Asian origin would have used the port of Singó or 
Nshawa in the Save Delta for gold trading. This port, which the author identifies as the island of Wasika reported 
by Ibn­Madjid, would have been the key point in the Indian Ocean trade routes and also the inland African trade 
route, since going up the Save River, it was possible to reach Butua where the gold was mined. Based on Blake­
Thompson’s works he also states that the Save was navigable in small boats all the way through Mozambique at 




Fig. 1. Trade between Africa, Asia and Europe on the eve of the Portuguese expansion 
In: Fage, 1978, p. 27
Portugal, Sofala and the Indian Ocean trade network in the 
16th century
At the turn of the 16th century, the arrival of the Portuguese on the East 
African coast and the Indian Ocean foreshadowed the advent of deep changes 
in the existing trans-regional social and commercial networks and that these 
changes were viewed differently by those involved. 
For  the Muslim networks  it was  the beginning of  the end of a  long period 
of  indisputable  supremacy  in  the  Indian Ocean and  they  reacted  immediately 
by  appealing  for  armed  resistance  against  the  newcomers,  intruders  and  vio­
lent Portuguese (al­Malibari, cit. in Ho, 2004, p.222). For the Portuguese, it was 
the beginning of a process of contacts and exchanges essential for the consoli­
dation of the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean and the construction of 






In this context the establishment of the Sofala trading post in 1505 was  
the main basis for the structure of this presence in the first quarter of the 16th 
century.
The information from Vasco da Gama’s first voyage (1497-98) had shown how 
essential  it was  to  the  success of  the Portuguese plan  to  control  Indian Ocean 
trade to set up a trading post on the East African coast. Accordingly, based on 
the assumption that it would not be difficult to replace the “Moors” (the Muslim 
merchants  dominating  Indian Ocean  trading  and  social  networks)  Sancho  de 
Tovar was sent with Pedro lvares Cabral´s fleet, in 1500, with specific instruc­
tions to set up a Portuguese trading post in Sofala. The launch of this initiative 
was considered so important and urgent that a new Feitor (administrator)2 was 
appointed for Sofala even before the return of Cabral’s fleet and in the absence of 
any information confirming the establishment of the post. In fact, this new Feitor 




This setback did have the benefit of giving King Manuel time to set put the 
guidelines of his policy towards the region, stressing the need to set up trading 
posts in Sofala and Kilwa to ensure control of the pivotal African points in trade 
with the African hinterland (Sofala/gold) and the East Indian Ocean countries 
(Kilwa/cloth and beads).
The model  that was drawn up – a  trading fortress  (Fortaleza-feitoria)3 – was 







2  Feitor – Royal official responsible for the economic and financial management of the trading post and the 
collection of taxes on behalf of the king
3 The setting up of a trading fortress in the presence of a fairly hostile environment from a political point of view 
requires the pre-existence of trade in one or more sufficiently valuable products to justify such a large investment 




The  Sofala  trading  post  embodied  the  Portuguese  dream  of mastering  the 
African  gold  trade  to  provide  the  necessary  capital  for  purchasing  pepper 
(Newitt, 1995) and was therefore the first step towards building what would be 
the Portuguese Empire in the East.
Furthermore, Sofala was the reason for Kilwa’s prosperity. As a port for the 






Once the guidelines of the Portuguese policy for the region had been defined, 
it was necessary  to  implement  a plan  that  took account of   possible  scenarios 
and ways to overcome potential difficulties.4 In fact, depending on the specific­
ity of each situation, the occupation of the coast followed four different mod­
els, namely, the conquest of positions by force of arms (Kilwa), the submission 
to Portuguese sovereignty expressed in payment of a tribute (Zanzibar), the  
alliance with important partners in the region (Malindi) or the deployment nego­
tiated with the local chieftains, involving the availability of a physical space and 








However,  even after  the establishment of  fortresses,  trading posts and alli­
ances or  the  imposition of a system of  trade  licences – cartazes –  (Villiers,1986; 
Mathew, 1986) on behalf of the Portuguese Crown, the system proved to be inef­
fective.
The  absence  of  prior,  accurate,  credible  information  on  the political,  social 
and economic structure of the local communities or the size and characteristics of 
4 In this respect, the Regimento do Capitão-mór, D. Francisco de Almeida (1505) is a key document in understanding 
the main lines of Portuguese policies both for this region and the Indian Ocean in general.
5 Among the most significant examples of the use of force, we have the conquest of Kilwa and the sacking of 












had to find a different policy. On the one hand, the importance of the Muslim 
community in the region could clearly not be ignored and that the Portuguese 
should be able to cooperate, at least until they were able to replace these “Moors” 













“Moors” to dominate coastal traffic and most of the trade between the coast and 
inland kingdoms and chieftaincies (Roque, 2013, pp. 189­193).
Together with  their  local  agents  they were not only  in  control of  the  trade 
routes for African gold and Indian cloths and beads, which were the breadwin­
ners of  the coastal  establishments, but also of essential  food supplies  for  local 
residents  and many  other African products with  high demand  in  the  Eastern 
markets, such as ivory, precious woods, pearls, seed pearls, tortoiseshell, animal 
skins, amber, elephant oil, teeth of “fish-woman”, medicinal plants, slaves and 
even raw cotton (Anonymous, 1497, pp. 98-21). Cotton was a regional product ex­
clusively intended for the manufacture of textiles (Barbosa, 1516, p.18; Monclaro, 
1569, p. 547) that were so special they could only be worn by the local ruling elite 
(Barros, 1552, p. 377).
This  network  also  encompassed  other  key  economic  sectors,  such  as  ship­
building and boat charters to carry passengers and goods along the coast. In both 
cases, the communities involved benefited from a secular background, providing 
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know-how and expertise over many generations, which made them highly mo­
bile and able to adapt to changes or new situations (Roque, 2013).
The influence of the “Moors” had clearly been underestimated by the 
Portuguese Crown and it would not be easy to remove or replace them within the 
rights enshrined by the papal bulls (Rex Rerum, 1436; Dum Diversas, 1452; Romanus 
Pontifex,  1455 and  Inter Caetera, 1456) or  the guidelines of  the Regimentos  and 




not stand the test of actual encounter with the existing systems in East Africa”. It 
was therefore necessary to show some flexibility and adaptability to gain gradual 
but undisputable control.
As early as November 1506, the first results of this readjustment were report­
ed  by Manuel  Fernandes,  the  local Feitor. Hoping  to  reduce  business  that  the 
trading post was unable to control and benefit from the local influence of the 
Muslim community, Fernandes, strongly committed himself to forming a group 
of “friendly Moors and subjects of the King” – Mouros amigos e servidores d’el-Rei – 
(Fernandes, 1506, p. 692). They would act as intermediaries between the trading 
post and the hinterland kingdoms in favour of Portuguese interests. The initia­
tive had little success but his successors were still keen on preserving and even 




Far from meaning they were giving up on their goals, the attitude of the 
Portuguese was in line with common practice among local chiefs. It showed an 
awareness of a situation that required changes and adjustments with immediate 
impact on  the  trading post and  the survival of  the people  living and working 
there. In this context, the availability of suitable goods in demand in the local 
and regional African markets was as important as ensuring the regular supply of 
food to the trading post  (Roque, 2012).
When it came to alliances, the difficulty of keeping local indigenous people 
and “Moors” apart combined with impossibility of considering them separate­
ly in business. This latter aspect was particularly important in the purchase of 
provisions. Although  royal  instructions demanded  that  the  fortress  should al­









In  the  diplomatic  approach  to  the  local  chieftaincies  and  kingdoms,  the 
Portuguese carefully thought through the system of alliances so as not to jeop­
ardise  the provisioning of  the  trading post.  In  turn,  this  strategy also allowed 
them  to develop personal  relationships with  the most  important  chiefs  in  the 
Sofala  region  and  to  join  regional  and  local  trade  networks.  This  resulted  in 





their own acceptance. As a result, in the first quarter of the 16th century, many 
Portuguese were already living in the inland regions.
Some of them, who engaged in diplomatic or commercial activities, even went 
to  live  in  the  courts  of  the  local  chiefdoms  such  as  the Kingdom of Quiteve.6 
Others, such as criminals banished from Portuguese settlements, invested at their 
own risk in backcountry trade (Roque, 2012). Some of these convicts eventually 
achieved prestigious positions in local and regional trade networks, where they 
earned a living, and, later, the status of official intermediaries in trade with the 
same Portuguese who exiled them (Naufrágio da Nao São Thomé …1589, p. 29). 
One of the most interesting characteristics of the Portuguese Sofala fortified 
trading post was its people’s ability to survive by blending in socially and cultur­
ally with the local communities (Roque, 2013). This process was particularly im­
portant from the mid-16th century. This was when the gold trade in the Zambezi 
Valley began to polarize attention and resources and Sofala experienced a pro­
gressive disengagement from the Portuguese Crown in favour of Mozambique 




Even  though  the  reasons  for  this  loss of  interest  are not analysed here, we 
should note that  this position stemmed from a clear marginalisation of Sofala. 
6 See the case of Rodrigo Lobo, in the late 16th century, who was granted by the King of Quiteve with more than a 







of exile, where criminals and convicts were sent and outlaws could easily escape 
from the Portuguese administration’s control and offer their services to the local 
chiefs (Roque, 2013, p. 201).








convicts sentenced to exile, often ran away from the trading post and went to live 
among the local indigenous population (Lopes, 1515, p.88).
This “marginalisation” contributed to the progressive weakening of their ties 
to the Portuguese Crown’s authorities, giving them space to expand their influ­
ence and act on their own.
All  these men were  responsible  for most of  the diplomatic  activities  and a 
preliminary survey of the backcountry and its people and potential resources. In 
fact, the importance of these deportees and renegades cannot be overemphasised 
in the way that it affected immediate perception of the region and its inhabitants 
and the image of them that was passed on to the European world. Irrespective 
of the offence leading to their exile, these men were good explorers, adventur­
ers, interpreters and diplomats. Acting on their own or as representatives of the 
Portuguese authorities, they were mainly responsible for the first reconnaissance 












empire" was acting in parallel with the official representatives of the Portuguese 
crown. The Portuguese in this  informal empire, operating outside areas under 
formal Portuguese administrative control, took on the dual roles of actor/indi­
vidual and actor/vehicle for Portugal’s political and economic interests. Either 
role might be prevalent at any one time.
The policy followed by the first Sofala captains had the merit of bringing the 
Portuguese trading post to local chiefdoms while also offering opportunities for 
fruitful trade on the sidelines of the monopoly the Portuguese Crown wanted. 
And, while the imposition of that monopoly became difficult because it clashed 
with the interests of those who had no intention of giving up their rights to seek 
personal profit by engaging in business (Newitt, 2005), it provided a business op­
portunity to all those who, with capital, ambition and few preconceptions, were 
willing to try their luck in the intricacies of the regional market. 
In  this  scenario,  the  captains did not  lack  the means  to  invest, while most 
people at the trading post did not waste the opportunity when, for lack of money, 
the administration paid them their salary in cloth.9 Trade and profit seemed to be 
within everyone’s reach and soon many others joined these first group of poten­
tial traders, who were regarded as smugglers by the Portuguese administration. 
Thus, by necessity, imposition or will, many Portuguese explored the backcoun­
try and tried their luck, looking for personal wellbeing but helping to give Sofala 
a peculiar status among Portuguese settlements in East Africa.





8 The history of the Portuguese expansion is littered with examples of exiles who were used in the first 
reconnaissance of unknown regions. On the East African coast, the best known example was António Fernandes 
who reconnoitred the Sofala hinterland between 1511 and 1515 before being appointed Portuguese “ambassador” 
to the Quiteve’s court. The results of his travels were known at the time through Gaspar Veloso (1512) and João 
Vaz de Almada  (1516) and were  later  studied by Tracey  (1940), Godlonton  (1940 and 1945), Lobato  (1954­1960) 
Dickinson (1971) and Roque (2012). However, 16th century documents report on many other situations where 
convicts  had  an  important  role.  See  e.g., Quaresma,  1506,  p.  624­626,  Regimento  de Cid  Barbudo,  1505  (?)  or 
Fogaça, 1507, p. 26­28.
9 Referring to the possible drawbacks of this situation, in 1510 Afonso de Albuquerque stated that people should 














renegades,  fugitives,  convicts  and outlaws was  supplemented by  survivors of 
shipwrecks who chose  to  live  in  the backcountry and often,  though acting on 
their own, became the main mediators of Portuguese trade in the region.
In this context, the actions of some Afro-Portuguese families were quite mean­
ingful, particularly the first generation of children, known as “local born people”. 
As for the renegades or exiles, marrying indigenous women often meant leaving 
the trading post and settling elsewhere. In all cases, the Save river basin and the 
islands south Sofala Bay were some of the preferred areas owing to their natu­
ral characteristics and resources and the proximity of the Portuguese settlement. 
Once they had settled in and benefitted either from family relationships and in­




In the late 16th century, for instance, António Rodrigues, an exiled native of 
Sofala, settled in the south with homes in both the Bazaruto islands and on the 
mainland near the “rivers of Monemone”. From these two places he controlled 
the production, distribution and marketing of goods and foodstuffs and the ship­
building and boat charter business. He was also the only locally recognised au­
thority for issuing travel permits for people and goods in the area. Although he 














presence or influence in the region. Anonymous or not, these Portuguese moved 
in areas where Portugal had no official deployment and where, on being accepted 
by local chiefdoms, they came to hold privileged positions that would be crucial 
in connecting these chiefdoms with the Portuguese administration.
This diaspora was primarily responsible for the expansion of Portuguese in­
fluence in marginal areas to the ones directly frequented or formally occupied 
by  representatives of  the Portuguese Crown, as witnessed  in 1589 by Captain 
Estevão da Veiga, survivor of the shipwreck of the Nau S. Thomé. 
In  his  long  journey  from  the  Terra  dos  Fumos  to  Sofala,  the  only  help  he 
was able to find came from some villagers who had Portuguese names and 
spoke  Portuguese  because  there,  as  he  noted,  “sometimes,  though  not  very 
often, Portuguese traders came to buy ivory” (Naufrágio da Nau São Thomé..., 
1589). Most of these merchants acted on their own in the areas where they had 
previously settled, as the captain could see later when arriving in Inhambane, 
Monemone, Bazaruto or Funbaze.
Thus, despite the fact most of the Portuguese trading vessels took on board 




language of commerce in all those areas with a Portuguese presence or influence 
was indeed significant.
Final considerations
More than the King’s official guidelines to be implemented by his representa­
tives in the Portuguese settlements in East Africa, it was this diasporic movement 
and  the  actions  of  these Portuguese  that  constituted  the main basis  for  estab­
lishing contacts and trading relations with local chiefdoms and kingdoms, and 
their progressive knowledge of the territory and potential regional resources that 
otherwise would have been very difficult to obtain. In fact, these men were truly 
10 See, for instance the case of António lvares Teixeira. Coelho, 1698, fl.47
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responsible for the beginning of an epistemic cultural exchange process based on 




ow empire” working  to  strengthen  relationships with  local  authorities, which 
were essential to the existence of the few Portuguese settlements and integra­




In East Africa, as the Portuguese Crown was focusing its attention on the 
Zambezi Valley, in an almost parallel process, the Portuguese from Sofala were 
moving into the hinterland, gaining prestige and respect among the local chiefs 
and becoming owners of most of the islands. Little by little, they managed to 




In fact, even if “the Sofala business” fell short of the Portuguese Crown’s ex­
pectations, this same business, with easy, guaranteed profit, very soon fell into 
the hands of the Portuguese and, albeit under the brand name of exile and mar­
ginality, it came to take on a prominent role that eventually benefited the inter­
ests of the Portuguese Crown.
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The Role of “Brokers” in the Dutch Slave Trade in 








The European slave trade in Madagascar in the eighteenth century was the theatre 
of an important clash of cultures where Malagasy brokers played an important role  
in overseeing the commercial exchanges between the two parties. In this unpredictable 
environment, both Dutch merchants and Malagasy sovereigns relied on these interme-
diaries who not only served as interpreters, but also as mediators in any conflicts that 
might arise during their stay. Over the years their position, though strongly linked to the 
political power of the Sakalava sovereign, proved to be one of independence and personal 
benefit, while trying to satisfy both parties. 




Summer 1694: The Dutch East India Company2  ships  Standvastigheid  and 
Tamboer are anchored on the northwest coast of Madagascar, trading slaves. The 
Dutch merchants are complaining about a certain English­speaking deputy of the 
Malagasy king named “Lou Lou” who is defined as “the king’s snitch and a ras­
cal […] he is full of gossip and cunning subterfuges [but] His Majesty had a high 
esteem for him and for this reason we stayed friends.”3 They meet him again two 
years later on the ship Soldaat and he is qualified as “a small, very agitated little 
man, not the most ignorant, and very irritable.”4 In 1699, on the ship Peter & Paul, 
the Dutch encounter the same intermediary and they fear difficult communica­
tions with this “little guy with a big mouth.” However, upon promising him gifts, 
Lou Lou ensures the friendship of the king’s entourage. At the end of their stay, 
the VOC merchants qualify him as “a useful trading tool, which we can influence 
[…], without his aid it would not have been possible to secure this many slaves.”5 
The  previous  paragraph  illustrates  the  important  role  of  intermediaries  in 
the slave trade, as both the Malagasy sovereign and the VOC officers tried to 







the Dutch merchants, trying to exploit their unique position. 
As a framework for this research, we chose the Sakalava6 Kingdom of Boina, 
as it was the most important slave-exporting Malagasy community for most  
of  the  period  and  one  for which  there  is  relatively  abundant  source material, 
dozens of VOC ship’s logs of slaving expeditions.7 Although these mostly cover 
the period between 1672 and 1779, we have limited ourselves roughly from 1730 
to 1770, for practical reasons concerning the availability of sources from different 
2 Hereafter referred to as VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie). This commercial multinational was founded 
in 1602 and it held the monopoly on all Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope until its dissolution in 1799. 
3 Brons, Een kort berigt wegens den quaden uijtslag den slavenhandelinge aen’t Eijlant Madagascar, 14 Jan 1695. Nationaal 
Archief [NA], VOC 1560, without folio.
4 Chalumeau, 2004, pp. 8–9.
5 Ship’s logbook of the Peter & Paul, 1699. NA, VOC 4043, f. 1106.
6 At the end of the seventeenth century, the Sakalava community was split into two different branches: The 
Kingdom of Menabe and the Kingdom of Boina. In this article, the term “Sakalava” always refers to the latter. 





kers’ presence. We have concentrated primarily on Dutch VOC sources, though 
we have also studied French and English documents, in particular for specific 
comparisons with other Malagasy slave-exporting regions.
The VOC sources on Madagascar have only been partially exploited, mainly 
by scholars investigating one specific region (such as the Dutch Cape Colony),8 or 
by researchers studying the Indian Ocean region in a larger context.9 Following 
James C. Armstrong’s article about the European slave trade in Madagascar, 
things came to a standstill and the island has been virtually ignored by VOC his­
torians, as the slave trade within its empire has only recently been reassessed.10 
Furthermore, although some ship’s logs have been the subject of detailed pub­
lication, they fail to fully explain the difficulties surrounding trade, which re­
ally was a clash of different cultures and interests.11 Only Andrew Alexander has 
studied Dutch­Malagasy trading in greater detail, but his research is limited to 
one slaving expedition in the second half of the eighteenth century.12




the English often omitted their existence.
Accordingly, the VOC ship’s logs are practically the only useful source and 
one might be sceptical as to whether these documents provide enough detail for 
us to analyse the role the intermediaries played in the slave trade.13 Nonetheless, 




The Dutch ship’s logs are reliable contemporary sources of information about 
trade and have been used by other specialists in eighteenth­century Madagascar, 
such as Stephen Ellis. For this period, we often possess multiple reports of the 
same voyage, as it was essential for the VOC to provide the next expedition with 
8 Worden, 1985; Shell, 1994.
9 Barendse, 2002, 2009.
10 Armstrong, 1983. On the slave trade and slavery in the VOC: Vink, 2003; Van Rossum, 2015.
11 Chamuleau, 2004; Westra & Armstrong, 2006. Sleigh and Westra (2013, pp. 30–31) indicate the importance of 
brokers trade.
12 Alexander, 2007.
13 Using only English and French sources, Jane Hooper (2010, p. 114) confirms in her thesis that we know very 




valuable  information about  the political  and economic  situation  in Boeny Bay 
and Bombetoka Bay. This is further emphasized by the fact that we often have 
different testimonies about the same intermediaries. Of course, by limiting our­






The  use  of  temporary  local  intermediaries was  relatively  rare  in  the  VOC 




the VOC Empire, when gifts were exchanged and gun and cannon shots were 
fired as they entered the castle.16 The Dutch presence In Madagascar, however, 








African example in our research, while taking into account some fundamental 
differences, such as a permanent European presence protected by fortresses and 
often with interpreters. This was not the case in Madagascar.18 
A final remark has to be made regarding the choice of the words “broker” 
and “intermediary” in this article. In the original documents, the intermediaries 
that the Dutch had to deal with were named in different ways: tolk, geleijdsman, 









makelaar, strandwachter, or even lieveling.19 The differences between the meanings 
of these titles, given by the Dutch, seem to be very subtle, and it is difficult to 
know their exact place in Malagasy society. The descriptions given by historians 
such as Kuitenbrouwer, who identifies the presence of middlemen in Dutch Java 
in the nineteenth century, also do not cover their Malagasy counterparts.20 For 
the sake of consistency, we do not consider the intermediary or broker as a third 




up different worlds and, in the words of Philip Havik and Toby Green, “made 
connections where  there had been none” together with “having a  foot  in both 
worlds.”22
Unfortunately, historians have focused less on brokers in the pre­colonial era, 
which explains the difficulties surrounding the term, especially regarding the 
phenomenon in a region where research on the subject is practically nonexis­
tent.23 Accordingly,  this  article  cannot be placed  either  in  the discovery phase 
when the first contacts were made or in a colonial context as was the case with 
most European possessions on the Indian subcontinent, in Insulindia, and even 
in West Africa where the need for interpreters also existed. This study must in­
stead be considered a first attempt to unravel the role that these crucial mediators 
played in the slave trade. Before we discuss their position in greater detail, we 
will consider the context of our research. 
VOC in the Indian Ocean region and the slave trade
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Dutch presence in the Indian 




and  Cape  Town  was  founded  in  1652.  Labour­intensive  agriculture  was  the 
19 In general we can attest that until the 1740s, the Dutch always speak of tolken (interpreters), when describing 
the Malagasy intermediaries. However, from the 1750s onwards, the term makelaars (brokers), is more and more 
used in order to refer to these people, that is to say, the officials that oversee trading activities in the vicinity of 
the shore. It is not clear what exactly triggered this change, because their role appears unchanged over time. 
20 Kuitenbrouwer, 1982, pp. 99–101.
21 Klein, 1999, p. 120.
22 Havik & Green, 2012, pp. 2–3, p. 8.







launch new slaving expeditions.25 The proximity of Madagascar, and its reputa­
tion of being the “slaving grounds” for Arab and Swahili merchants, meant that 
it formed the most important slaving reserve for the VOC during this period.26 














When the first Dutch slaving ship arrived there in 1672, they found the slave 
trade already firmly established by the Antalaotra community.29 Upon arrival, 
the Dutch made use of existing slave trading networks, as happened on the West 
African coast.30 This practice continued when a Sakalava community  from the 
south conquered these ports and founded the powerful and centralized kingdom 
of  Boina  in  the  1680s.31  The Dutch  trade  remained  relatively  regular  until  the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, when the presence of pirates halted further 
expeditions for nearly thirty years. From 1732 to 1779, slaving expeditions re­
sumed, but often with intervals of several years, and almost always concentrated 
on the northwest coast.32 The fierce competition from other slave traders and the 
declining political power of the Sakalava in the 1750s resulted in the VOC starting 
to concentrate on other Malagasy regions in order to get their hands on slaves. 
Even the East African coast began to attract their attention, with low prices and 
a great abundance of captives.33 The last Dutch expedition to the Malagasy coast 
took place in 1786. 
 
Madagascar with some commercially active ports in the  
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
28 Campbell, 2005, p. 51.
29 A Swahilised merchant  community permanently established  in  the northwestern ports of Madagascar. They 
had important trade links with the Comoros, Swahili coast and Arabian Peninsula. Rantoandro, 1983, pp. 199–200.
30 Klein, 1999, pp. 105–106.





The first contacts and Dutch interpreters
During trade between the Europeans and the Malagasy, there was a practical 
need to overcome the linguistic and cultural barriers in the months they had to 
interact with each other. When the first Dutch arrived in Madagascar in 1596, they 
landed at Antongil Bay and St. Augustine Bay. In these commercially peripheral 






as interpreters on subsequent voyages. On their second expedition in 1598, the 
Dutch were accompanied by a certain Abdul “who understands something of 
this [Malagasy] language.”37 
As Madagascar  only  played  a  secondary  role  in  the VOC  commercial  net­
work, there was little incentive to overcome the existing language barrier.38 As 
early as 1603, Frederik de Houtman had created a Malagasy­Dutch dictionary,39 




first intermediaries. It was only with the establishment of regular trading con­
tacts in the middle of the seventeenth century that translation became an issue 
that the Cape authorities wanted to overcome, as they saw that all  the slaving 
expeditions in the 1660s ended in failure.41  It was therefore decided to take an 
interpreter, a female slave called Anna, on the first Dutch slaving voyage to the 
northwest coast in 1672.42 
34 Ship’s journal of the Voorhout,  1677. NA,  VOC  4013,  f.  974.  In  certain  regions,  this  continued well  into  the 
eighteenth century: Ship’s journal of the Elisabeth, 1742. AN, 4JJ/74, p. 9.
35 Mollema, 1935, p. 137, 191.
36 Mollema, 1935, pp. 173–174.
37 Keuning, 1942, pp. 28–31. Abdul seems to have been a slave from Banten who was taken from the first voyage 
back  to Holland. He  served  as  a  translator who  “speaks  good  Portuguese,  good  Javanese  and  good Malay.” 
Bertrand, 2011, pp. 226–227. 
38 They “borrowed” the slave trade regulations from the WIC (Dutch West India Company) active in West Africa 
in the same period, as this trade resembled the transatlantic slave trade: Van Dam, 1930, 1.2, pp. 668–670.








which came from Madagascar with a certain Simon d’Arabier on board, who 
served  as  a  translator  for  the Arab  and Malagasy  languages.43 He was  subse­
quently employed on the Voorhout in 1676, during which Simon was “very apt 
to treat with the local inhabitants.”44 The commercial success of the expedition, 
and the positive feedback he received from the ship’s officers, encouraged the 
Cape authorities  to  employ Simon as  an  interpreter on  three  subsequent voy­
ages before his death in 1683.45 By then, the important influx of Malagasy slaves 
at Cape Colony from previous expeditions meant that “the loss of the deceased 
interpreter Simon the Arab could be adequately compensated with the Malagasy 
slaves present here, who speak our Dutch  language  fairly well.”46 As a conse­
quence, on most slaving expeditions, a Malagasy slave from the Cape served as 
an interpreter.47 




a time when a regular network with the Cape Colony was firmly in place. From 
this  time onward,  intermediaries  assisting European  traders became a normal 
presence, at least in Boeny Bay. This development was essential to the VOC’s 
ability to trade as “dealing with the indigenous population [of Madagascar] re­
quired some experience and a sophisticated bargaining strategy.”48 







44 Instructions of the Voorhout, 1676. WCA, C 2337, f. 69. See also: Armstrong, 1983, pp. 232–233; Westra & Sleigh, 
2013, pp. 31–32. 
45 Letter from Batavia to the Cape, 14 Oct 1684. WCA, C333.
46 Letter from the Cape to Batavia, 12 Feb 1684. WCA, C1374. Although we know nothing about the criteria that 
were used to choose interpreters, it is certain that proficiency in both the Dutch and Malagasy languages was an 
essential prerequisite as well as overall good behaviour.
47 On the rare occasions that expeditions were organised in Batavia, it proved difficult to find a Malagasy 
interpreter: Instructions of the Binnenwijzend, 23 Apr 1732. NA, VOC 985. 




to take control of the most active slave exporting region of the island.49 Between 
1683 and 1686, he conquered the entire northwest coast of Madagascar, including 
Boeny Bay and Bombetoka Bay. Instead of excluding the Antalaotra community, 
he left them in place and took control of their commercial networks.50 The trade 
in captives was essential to the monarchist system, which was dependent on the 
influx of firearms, ammunition, gunpowder and silver coin.51 Accordingly, a kind 
of mercantilist system was put in place, because no European could trade with­
out the formal agreement of the king.52
How did the slave trade in the Sakalava kingdom of Boina differ from that 




firmed the northwest coast as the foremost slave exporting region of the island. 
This  made  the  Sakalava  kingdom  the  political  and  economic  superpower  of 
Madagascar in the first half of the eighteenth century, while also receiving tribute 
from surrounding regions.54 For other regions, the slave trade remained some­
what irregular and of secondary importance to the local sovereigns.








on the coast to ensure the slave trade was properly executed in accordance with 
his rules. 
49 Kneitz, 2014, pp. 97–98.
50 According to Rantoandro, they took on the role of intermediaries, but it is difficult to know the exact origin of 
the Malagasy intermediaries. Rantoandro, 1983, pp. 207–209.
51 The same thing was witnessed on the West African coast: Strickrodt, 2015, p. 134.
52 Randrianja & Ellis, 2009, p. 67; Ellis & Randrianja, 2000, p. 49.
53 Ellis, 2007, pp. 448–450; Cabanes, 1982, pp. 170–171.
54 Ratsivalaka, 1995, I, pp. 109–112.





The Dutch, being aware of the fierce competition between foreign merchants 
in Bombetoka Bay,  started  to visit  other Malagasy  regions  from  the 1740s on­
ward. After the death of King Andriamahatindriarivo around 1755, the Sakalava 
kingdom was divided and subsequently weakened by external and internal pres­
sures, and the sovereigns had more and more difficulties in assuring a regular 
flow of slaves to the coast.57 We have reason to believe that this strengthened the 
power of  the Antalaotra merchants, who regained much of  their power  in  the 
1770s, especially under the rule of Queen Ravahiny. We will see how this chang­
ing political and economic situation was reflected in the status of the intermedi­
ary. 
The first intermediaries of the Sakalava (before 1730)
Although the first intermediaries were the result of fortuitous encounters with 
shipwrecked sailors, between roughly 1685 and 1730, the existence of Europeans 
as intermediaries can best be explained in the context of piracy, as the island be­
came an important refuge for buccaneers. At several points along the east coast, 
pirates and their offspring even established themselves as political powers amidst 









to attract fortune seekers. 
Real intermediaries seem to be have been absent under Antalaotra rule in the 
1670s. This community generally spoke good Portuguese and their role as a mer­






60 Ship’s logbook of the Ter Aa, 1705. NA, VOC 10812, without folio; Westra & Armstrong, 2006, pp. 88–89.








merce in the freshly conquered Antaloatra community and possibly influenced 
by a lack of experience of direct trade with European merchants.63 
Although commis Jeremias Brons of the Standvastigheid indicated in 1694 that 
these Sakalava spoke some English, we see that the first intermediaries who 










For the services he provided, Lou Lou can accordingly be identified as the 
first real intermediary in the Dutch slave trade, at least about whom we pos­
sess  detailed  information.  Under Andiantoakafo  (reign  c.  1710–c.  1732),  only 
one Dutch vessel, the Leidsman, traded in Boeny Bay.66 No real intermediary can 
be identified, although the Dutch praise the help of a certain Andian Simonalij, 




fered.68 However, can he be qualified as a broker? 
In order  to  fully comprehend the status of  the  intermediary within  the dy­
namics of the slave trade, we need to take into consideration certain specific cri­
teria that can be found in the ship’s logs. In this article we see an intermediary as 
62 Ship’s logbook of the Voorhout, 1677. NA, VOC 4013. 
63 Ship’s logbook of the Tamboer, 1694. NA, VOC 1544, f. 1050­1051.
64 A commis is a VOC merchant. Brons, Een kort berigt wegens den quaden uijtslag den slavenhandelinge aen ’t Eijlant 
Madagascar, 14.01.1695. NA, VOC 1560, without folio. 
65 Snelgrave, 2008 [1735], pp. 61–62.
66 This period represents a slump in Malagasy trade: Worden, 1997, p. 54.
67 Westra & Armstrong, 2006, p. 95. He is identified by Stephen Ellis as sovereign Ratsimilaho of the Betsimisaraka 
community: Ellis, 2007, p. 452.




a high ranking official. However, they were most likely to have had an elevated 
status and a favourable position without holding any real political power, as we 
might see with some rijksbestierders who are identified from the 1740s onward.69 
Andrew Alexander, talking about St. Augustine Bay in the 1770s, states that the 
Rijksbestierder’s role was that of the primary negotiator with the king, whereas the 
makelaars negotiated with the local Malagasy community. 
However, it is difficult to compare different Malagasy regions, and a 
Rijksbestierder can be best identified as the right hand man of the Sakalava sove­
reign, or the official with whom West African sovereigns on the Slave Coast sha­
red their control over the slave trade.70 Accordingly, he was given some gifts, as 





The identification of a brokers’ status within the Sakalava community is pro­
blematic. They had  to  live  close  to  the  shore  in order  to welcome  foreign  tra­
ders, and needed some commercial experience in the slave trade in order to 
know its dynamics. The fact that they were paid for their services, at least by the 
Dutch, is also essential. Although Alexander believes they were not language 
proficient, we consider that fluency in a European language would have been a 
fundamental prerequisite for obtaining their status, together with being accusto­
med to European culture.72 West African courtiers, for example, always spoke a 
European language and they offered their services to the Europeans.73 
These brokers should not, however, be confused with the king’s close cour­




69 For example: Ship’s logbook of the Meermin, 1762. NA, VOC 4229, f. 379. His role seemed to have been that of a 
“primary mediator” according to Andrew Alexander (2005). However, there is no evidence of this in the Boina 
Kingdom. 
70 Law, 1991, pp. 206–207. 
71 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761, WCA, C2250, f. 116-117. In 1741, the Brak had to use gifts for a number 
of people: “2ᵉ stem Andian Woana”, “gunsteling Joema”, “1e minister Andian Manoedoe”, “two courtiers Andian 
Inatoew and Mangsaka”. 





difference from the brokers.75 Lastly, Jane Hooper identifies an “interpreter or an 
ambassador” in the English slave trade on Madagascar. It is not quite clear who 














we introduce the different intermediaries that were encountered in chronological 
order and discuss their status, personality and background as perceived by the 
Dutch. 
In  1732,  the VOC ship Binnenwijzend encountered three different interpret­
ers: Don Jan Sandpinder, Crismis, and Anthonij. Don Jan, who spoke “good 
Portuguese”, seems to have been the principal intermediary, and he was the one 
favoured by  the  commis who  indicated  that he was  the most  “political”  one.79 
Crismis80 was identified as a broker who spoke “crooked” English and subse­
quently assisted the ships Huis ten Donk in 1733, and De Brak in 1741 and in 1743, 
when  he was  the  third makelaar.81  In  1752,  the Dutch  encountered  him  again. 
This time he was identified as a septuagenarian, but his role as an official inter­
mediary seems to have been over, as the king assigned three different brokers: 
Jan, Rhemeinte, and Jek.82 The next year, however, we find Crismis as a broker,  
75 Ship’s logbook of the Schuijlenburg 1752. NA, VOC 18015, without folio.
76 Hooper, 2010, pp. 114–115. 
77 For example: Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743. NA, VOC 4157. 
78 Law, 2004, p. 132; Klein, 1999, p. 104.
79 Ship’s logbook of the Binnenwijzend, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio.
80 Other spellings include Krismus, Krismis, and Crusmusse.
81 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743. NA, VOC 4157, f. 156–157.
82 Ship’s logbook of the Schuijlenburg 1752. NA, VOC 18015, without folio.
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together  with  Lourens  and  Rhemeinte.83  After  this,  he  was  never  mentioned 
again, although he might have died considering his age. 
Antony Cheraha  (or  Seraha,  or  simply Anthonij) was  the  third  interpreter 
for the Binnenwijzend, He spoke “good” Portuguese” and was described by the 
Dutch as of “Jesuit physiognomy and extremely cunning.”84  In 1741, Anthony 
was labelled as being the “King’s favourite broker.”85 He would meet a tragic end 
in 1752, when the Schuilenburg was trading at Bombetoka Bay. “Recently, broker 
Antony was attacked, and killed in an unfortunate manner, after which the assas­
sins took with them his wife, children, slaves, goods and other inhabitants, and 
we have been unable to retrieve them.”86













This table was compiled by studying dozens of ship’s logs found in the Nationaal Archief  
in The Hague and in the Western Cape archives in Cape Town.
Political instability after the death of Andriamahatindriarivo, and the subse­
quent decline in Sakalava power, initially had no effect on the role of the brokers. 
In 1760, we find the usual broker, Laurens (together with Remeinharo), which 
83 Ship’s logbook of Drie Heuvelen, 1753. NA, VOC 18014, without folio.
84 Ship’s logbook of the Binnenwijzend, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio.
85 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 186–187.







than four brokers for the Dutch, among whom we find Noeme and Mahasinoe, 
together with multiple deputies, which might attest to the monarch’s weakening 
power.90 Things seem to have changed fundamentally in the mid­1770s, when the 
Dutch dealt exclusively with the Antalaotra as intermediaries.91 The importance 
of the Malagasy interpreters in the Dutch slave trade is reflected in the continued 
use of the same people as brokers in the eighteenth century, as illustrated in Table I. 
How does this compare to similar trade in the Western Indian Ocean region? 





seen as an  interpreter and the “courtier des étrangers, connu de tous nos François 
qui fréquentent cette Isle [Anjouan].”92 Although concrete details needed to make 
a thorough comparison are missing, we are inclined to believe that Abdala oc­
cupied virtually  the  same role as  the Malagasy  interpreters  in Boeny Bay and 
Bombetoka Bay. In their voyages to the east coast of Africa in the 1770s, the Dutch 
did not encounter any intermediaries.93 Other Malagasy regions also had their 
intermediaries  as  early  as  1672, when  the  crew of  the Dutch  ship Pijl  discov­
ered an English­speaking Malagasy at St. Augustine Bay.94 This continued in the 
1740s, when the French found a certain James Martin, who spoke and even wrote 
English and Portuguese, although his role is difficult to distinguish in terms of 
political status, as he is labeled Rijksbestierder.95
Unfortunately, the ship’s logbooks are silent about the origins of the interme­
diaries. Their names are Europeanised in most cases, with Don Jan Sandpinder 
being the most notable case: He was a Portuguese nobleman.96 Antony Seraha 
88 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761. WCA, C2250, f. 109.
89 Ship’s logbook of the Meermin, 1762. NA, VOC 4229, f. 378.
90 Ship’s logbook of the Zon, 1769. NA, VOC 4257, f. 183
91 The Antalaotra are identified as “moors.” Ship’s logbook of the Zon, 1775. NA, VOC 4279, f. 931.
92 Ship’s logbook of the Penthièvre, 1743. AN, MAR, 4JJ/116, p. 60. 
93 Ross, 1986. 
94 Hubert Hugo, Cort extract, 24 June 1672. NA, VOC 4009, f. 261.
95 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743. NA, VOC 4157, f. 156–157; Monet to the Archbishop of Paris, Bourbon Island, 13 
Apr 1742. Archives de la Congrégation de la Mission, Manuscript 1504, piece 25.
96 This might have been a name given by Portuguese to identify him easily. The English gave titles such as “Duke 
of York” to certain Malagasy interpreters in St. Augustine Bay: Hooper, 2010, pp. 122–123. 
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was said to have spent ten years in Lisbon, which is an extremely interesting ref­
erence as it is the only one indicating a prolonged stay in Europe, a phenomenon 
which seems to have been more widespread in West Africa. Plasse explains that 
in the 1760s, there were multiple courtiers nègres who had been in Europe, such as 
the nephew of the viceroy who had resided in Amsterdam for a long time.97 These 
brokers were probably not Europeans, as they are usually named explicitly, as in 
1733 when the VOC ship Huis ten Donk traded with “Louw […] a Swiss […] taken 
by the French in 1708 on [the] Companies’ ship Overwinnaer and sent here. He 
now acts as beach guard on Fomatoeke [Bombetoka Bay] on the orders of King 
Baba [Andriamahatindriarivo].”98 In most of the African coastal regions, brokers 







status, though their importance and high status in Madagascar were attested to 
on different occasions.102 In 1743, when two intermediaries were drunk and for­




only punished by having his livestock confiscated, which was a typical punish­
ment for Malagasy nobles.104 Some brokers even became viceroy or rijkbestierder. 
Yet another example shows a certain freedom of movement, as in 1742, broker 
Jan fled from St. Augustine Bay to the Sakalava Kingdom of Boina after a failed 
military expedition to obtain slaves.105 Subsequently, in 1753, a certain Jan (the 
97 Plasse, 2005, pp. 41–42, 54.
98 Louw should not be confused with Lou Lou from the 1690s. This  is probably sailor Lourens Lossinge from 
Basel, who embarked on this ship in 1707. Ship’s journal of the Huis ten Donk. 1733. NA, VOC 2266, f. 5186. 
99 Thiébaut, “La creation d’une élite franco-malgache à Madagascar au XVIIIe siècle,” forthcoming. 
100 His name also closely resembles the word for “Christmas” in both Malagasy and Swahili.
101 Ship’s logbook of the Zon,1769. NA, VOC 4257, f. 183
102 Everts, 2012, pp. 61–63.
103 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743. NA, VOC 2585, f. 210–211.







By  this  time,  the  VOC  was  well  accustomed  to  the  conventions  of  trade. 
However,  the  trading  environment  remained  somewhat  unpredictable, which 
is reflected by the varying success of the different expeditions.107 We should note 
that interactions between the Malagasy sovereign and the VOC merchants were 
conducted on the basis of equality, as was the case in West Africa.108 To illustrate 
the different phases of the slave trade, upon arrival foreign ships were greeted by 
some canoes, normally bringing a Malagasy broker – sometimes called a strand-
wachter – on board, who offered his services in assisting the merchants during 
their entire stay.109 Most of the time, two or three individuals were continuously 
employed on different tasks. Again, we can see an important resemblance with 
the West African slave trade, where William Snelgrave was always accompanied 
by interpreters during his stay.110 
The first task of these brokers was to inform the Sakalava king of the arrival 
of the Dutch traders and to help them assemble a reasonable gift. This is what 
the French called a coutume, some kind of trading rights, officially to honour the 
king, but  in  fact  to “open”  the negotiations on slave prices. Unlike some west 
African kingdoms, there was no real export tax per slave ship.111 In 1741, broker 
Crismis gave advice on the sort of gifts that would please the king in order to 
be  able  to  conduct  trade  in  slaves.112  For  this,  the European merchants had  to 
visit Marovoay,113 where they were again assisted by a broker, who they called 
geleidsman.114 At the king’s residence, a “counter gift” was given by the Sakalava 
sovereign, often consisting of one or more oxen. This was followed by long, wea­
rying price negotiations, which were carried out entirely by the king himself and 
we do not find evidence of intermediaries interfering in these discussions. Until 
106 Ship’s logbook of Drie Heuvelen, 1753. NA, VOC 18014, without folio.
107 Alexander, 2005, p. 14.
108 Klein, 1999, p. 111.





112 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 187–188.
113 The Sakalava capital is situated several days’ walk from Bombetoka Bay.
114 Ship’s logbook of the Schuilenburg,  1752. NA, VOC  18015, without  folio.  In  1743,  as many  as  three  brokers 
accompanied the Dutch to the Sakalava capital: Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743, NA, VOC 4157, f. 138–139.
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the prices were fixed and freedom of commerce declared, which could take sev­
eral weeks, nothing could be traded except for minor provisions such as poultry, 
eggs, and vegetables.115
It is not always clear how translating was carried out during these negotia­
tions,  as  the  Sakalava king  and other  chiefs did not  speak  any European  lan­
guage, or only knew a few words at best.116 This contrasts with their counterparts 
on the northeast coast, who often spoke good French. The sovereign of Anjouan, 
Saïd­Mahmet,  spoke  very  good  Portuguese  and  acceptable  French,  and  some 
West African sovereigns, such as Opubo Fubara Pepple, the king of Bonny, could 
speak sufficient English to make themselves understood by European traders.117 
In the case of Sakalava, the assistance of the Dutch interpreter is often explicitly 
mentioned, and in 1741, De Brak encountered the French interpreter “Pool” and 




This construction was the responsibility of the brokers and when it was fin­
ished, the actual trading could finally begin.119 Although the Sakalava sovereign 
could offer many dozens of slaves for sale to foreign traders, private merchants 
– mostly Antalaotra – accounted for the majority of the slaves traded. In general, 
no captive could be sold under the fixed price, unless their age differed or if they 
had physical defects. It was the duty of the intermediaries to direct the sellers, 
who might be deputies of  the king as well as private merchants,  to  the Dutch 




115 The penalty for trading slaves without royal permission was death: Ship’s logbook of the Huis ten Donk, 1733. 
NA, VOC 2266, f. 5182.
116 Andriamandisoarivo, who greeted the merchants of the ship Soldaat with “Goedendag,” explained to them that 
the deserter Andries had taught him some Dutch words. Chamuleau, 2004, p. 11.
117 The king of Anjouan exclaimed: “Piti-prince, Piti-païs, Piti-Roy, mais bon-gens, bon cœur, bon foy, et toujours bon 
service pour le François.” Ship’s logbook of the Penthièvre, 1743. Service historique de la Défense at Toulon, Ms. 10 ; 
Snelgrave, 2008 [1735], pp. 71–72 ; Saugera, 2012, pp. 83–84.
118 Chamuleau, 2004, pp. 19–20; ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741, NA, VOC 2585, f. 213; Idem of De Brak, 1743. NA, 
VOC 4157, f. 142. Rafiki is the Swahili word for “friend.” I thank James C. Armstrong for this observation.
119 Alexander, 2007, p. 50. 
120 In West Africa the local sovereign as well as private merchants also traded their captives to the same Europeans: 
Law, 1989, p. 47. 
121 Alexander, 2005, p. 45; 2007, p. 54 





world and brokers intervened if there were complaints about the sale, locals’ 
behaviour or anything else. They mediated disagreements with the local popula­
tion, as happened in 1732, when broker Don Jan received complaints from the 
Dutch concerning firearms that were initially accepted by the Malagasy but af­
terwards returned. This broker ensured that trading items were more readily ac­
cepted by the Malagasy and not given back.123 The same thing happened with the 




of slaves offered for sale, while the sovereign tried to obtain some gifts from the 
Dutch to encourage him to trade more quickly.125 In 1760, the commis complained 
to the brokers that work on the factorij was advancing too slowly.126 On the other 











because someone had already been beheaded for not offering slaves for trade.130 
Their role was also to assure the sale of the king’s slaves, encouraging the Dutch 
to buy old and less valuable slaves, because these belonged to the sovereign.131
123 Ship’s logbook of the Binnenwijzend, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio.
124 Ship’s logbook of the Schuilenburg, 1752. NA, VOC 18015, without folio. 
125 Sleigh & Westra, 2013, pp. 29–32. 
126 For example: Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1760. WCA, C2250, f. 111. 
127 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 287. At the same time, these brokers made daily demands for 
portions of strong arak from Batavia. 
128 Ship’s logbook of the Meermin, 1763. NA, VOC 4229, f. 367.
129 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761. WCA, C2250, f. 118–119.
130 Ship’s logbook of the Binnenwijzend, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio. 





all run off when the ship arrived.132 Accordingly, the brokers might have been in 
a dependent situation vis-à-vis the Sakalava sovereign.
Relations between the Sakalava king and the VOC  
merchants
The role of the brokers can be better understood if we focus on the dynamics 
of the slave trade. One of the main tasks of the brokers was to secure communica­
tions between the Sakalava kings, residing at their inland capital, and the Dutch, 
staying at the shore. Although trade benefitted both parties, their respective goals 
were different: The VOC merchants sought to buy as many young male slaves as 
possible for a fair price in a short space of time, whereas the Sakalava sovereign 
tried to get rid of all his captives, while trying to stall trade in order to receive 
more gifts.133 Somewhere in the middle we might find the broker, who had to 
find a compromise that would satisfy both parties. In this, the king had the home 
advantage. Most of the time, the Dutch merchants did not have any experience 
in the Malagasy slave trade, and had to find practical solutions in a sometimes 
hostile environment. Alexander explains that the Dutch were engaged in a heav­
ily dependent relationship with the Malagasy.134 
This can best be seen in the light of competition, when the intermediary might 
send slave sellers to the European trading party offering the highest price.135 In 
1741, the brokers explained to the Dutch: 
If you don’t buy everything that we bring to you, young or old, man or woman, 
then we shall not bring any more slaves for sale and we will send them all to the 
French. It is a favour that we send slaves first to you and afterwards to the French.136 
When they kept on refusing old or unfit slaves, the brokers came to them say­
ing, “you liars, don’t we offer you any slaves? And is our king not a mighty one 
and is he not fair?”137 The Dutch finally gave in and bought some old and partially 




134 Alexander, 2005, p. 29. 
135 However, some brokers could show loyalty, such as Don Jan who refused to trade with the French, unlike his 
colleague Crismis. Ship’s logbook of the Binnenwijzend, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio. 
136 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741.NA, VOC 2585, f. 243.










Independence of the intermediary
The actions of  the brokers, who seem to have been relatively  independent, 
were mostly dictated by the prospect of economic gain. There is evidence that 
on every slaving expedition the Dutch gave gifts to the brokers and although no 
salary was negotiated, they knew that they would receive these offerings. This 
was mostly in order to encourage them, for example in 1752, when the Dutch 
gave a musket  to every  intermediary,  “in order  to bind  them  to us and make 
them favourable to our cause,” promising them a more important gift if the slave 
trade was successful.142 On other occasions, gifts were given to thank them for 
their completed services. As illustrated in Table II, this compensation fluctuated 
and changed per expedition, but appears to have been approximately equivalent 
to the price of an adult male slave. Although sometimes, as was the case in 1743, 
even the wives of the brokers were given a present, compensation could also be 








138 See for example: Instructions of the Westerwijk, 3 Nov 1685. NA, VOC 4022, f. 183–185.
139 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761, WCA, C2250, f. 113.
140 Silver coin. 
141 Ship’s logbook of the Zon, 1769. NA, VOC 4257, f. 384–385.
142 Ship’s logbook of the Schuilenburg, 1752. VOC 10815, without folio.
143 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761. WCA, C2251, f. 2; Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743, NA, VOC 4157, f. 150–151.
144 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1743. NA, VOC 4157, f. 156–157.






Table II: Compensation received by broker Crismis on three different voyages 
(compared with the price of a male slave).
YEARS  GIFT PRICE OF A MALE SLAVE
1732 1 firearm, 1 silk 2 firearms and 5 ounces 
of gunpowder
1741 2 firearms, 6 ounces of 
gunpowder, 10 ounces 
of bullets, 30 flints, 4 
simple rough 
2 firearms, 2 ounces of 
gunpowder, 14 ounces 
of bullets, and 10 flints. 
  1752 1 piece of simple rough  2 firearms, 8 ounces of 
gunpowder, 4 ounces of 
bullets, and 25 flints.
Sources: Ship’s log of the Binnewijsent, 1732. NA, VOC 11257, without folio; Ship’s logbook of De 
Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 321;  
Ship’s logbook of the Schuijlenburg, 1752. NA, VOC 18015, without folio.
 
Although these gifts seem to have been sufficient incentive for brokers to to go 
back and forth between the two parties in order to get the most benefit possi­
ble, they remained relatively independent in their actions; from the Dutch mer­






147 Ship’s logbook of the Neptunus, 1761, WCA, C2250, f. 123–124.
148 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 287.
149 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 287.




him.151 The ship’s logbook of the De Brak, 1741, shows a perfect example of their 
strategy:
[…] now we [the Dutch] want to leave, but they [the brokers] try to stall us because 
our ‘counter gifts’ haven’t been satisfactory enough for the natives, because they 
do not honour their words as we have often encountered that they try to persuade 
us in the beginning and even forced our hand to accept from their wives or relati­
ves as well as some native officer or friend a bowl of milk or a fowl, though after 
which they bother us directly or the other day to pay a gift and by this end we try 
to swindle them with a bottle of arak, but they wouldn’t be satisfied until we added 
some piece of cloth.152 
Both parties tried to get the better of the situation, as was the case in West 
Africa or indeed in any commercial exchange.153 
Although a useful trading tool, the intermediaries could sometimes be a real 
obstacle to trade. Again on the expedition of De Brak in 1741, problems persisted 




West Africa, where Marie Grand, a courtier of the French “est un nègre moins men-
teur que les autres.”155 The image given by Jean­Pierre Plasse of the West African 
brokers fits perfectly with the Malagasy ones:
Il faut avoir toujours un nègre courtier par rapport à la langue du pays, lequel entend 
les langues d’Europe comme le Français, l’Anglais et le Hollandais et auquel on donne 
une bagatelle pour sa peine. Tous ses semblables sont pour l’ordinaire un peu fripons 
[sic]. C’est pourquoi il faut prendre garde dans les marchés. Ailleurs, ils sont assez bons 
gens.156
Conclusion
Because linguistic and cultural differences existed in the commercial interac­
tions between the Malagasy and the Dutch, both parties tried to overcome these 
barriers. The Dutch did this by employing their own translators, the Malagasy by 
151 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 325.
152 Ship’s logbook of De Brak, 1741. NA, VOC 2585, f. 297.
153 Crété, 1989, p. 121. 









assisting  the VOC merchants  in  their  relationship with  the Sakalava and  their 
sovereign. They became indispensable trading tools for the VOC in order to get 





for their position, we argue that these intermediaries were able to exploit their 
position within the possibilities that lay in their reach. In particular, they were 




rying out the king’s orders and meeting Dutch demands, while trying to get the 
best out of their situation. They were of fundamental importance to both parties 
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“Behind so many names, the sea”.  






This chapter proposes a discussion based on a critical intersection between Indian 
Ocean studies and Cultural and Literary Studies in Portuguese-speaking contexts, 
by addressing the Indian Ocean as a critical framework for interpreting literary and  
visual narratives from Mozambique. Its objective is to put forward a counterpoint between  
literary and visual representations and thereby address the Indian Ocean as an aesthetic 
and epistemological paradigm in order to (re)situate the Mozambican cultural imagina-
tion, and thus, contribute to “new disciplinary developments” (Pearson, 2011) in the 
field of Indian Ocean studies.






                             Fernand Braudel
In order to provide an appropriate introduction, I would like to start my re­
flection by underlining at least two preliminary aspects that characterise both the 
state of the art regarding transnational approaches in the Portuguese­speaking 
world, and the relevance of Mozambique in the field of Indian Ocean studies. 
Regarding the state of  the art, when it comes to  the application of  transna­
tional frameworks to the study of African literary and visual narratives, the con­
cepts related to the Atlantic space are the most established and properly theo­
rised (Gilroy, 1998; Shoat & Stam, 2012). They represent a productive alternative 
paradigm in addressing historical, social and cultural relationships.  As far as the 
Portuguese­speaking world  is concerned,  the transnational approach favoured 
by  theorisation,  originally  analysed,  for  instance,  by  leading  scholars  such  as 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001) and Miguel Vale de Almeida (2000), offers 
the opportunity to outline an alternative political, social and cultural history of 
the southern region of the Atlantic by addressing the specificity of this area as 
crucial to an understanding of the past and present of the region and the cultural 
“branchements” (Amselle, 2001) related to the “postcolonial situation” (Balandier, 




ing this very concept as one significant category of analysis in the Portuguese-
speaking critical contexts, in order to (re)think relations between Portugal and 
its former Empire (Almeida 2000; Santos, 2001; Alencastro 2000; Bethencourt & 
Chaudhuri 1998­2002, among others). 
At  the  same  time,  critical  and  theoretical  production  regarding  the  Indian 
Ocean in the Portuguese-speaking world is rather different, still representing a 
very marginal framework, even in the fields of maritime study, slave trade his­
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tory and social history  in general. Few works on  the slave  trade  in  the  Indian 
Ocean have been published in Portuguese and there are very few publications 
in the fields of anthropology, sociology or history that actually address the rela­
tions between, for instance, Mozambique and the Indian Ocean and conceptual­
ise the maritime space as a region or a unit of analysis (Alpers, 1975; Boxer, 1963; 




in different fields of research (Pearson, 2011). Especially in the field of history, 
research on the Indian Ocean has considered the different presences and con­
tacts established  in  this space­time framework over history and addressed the 
different nations, areas and regions linked through the Indian Ocean “network” 
(Kearney, 2004; McPherson, 1993; Pearson, 2003; Vergès, 2003). Although the 
Indian Ocean world  represents  a well­established  study  area  in  a  number  of 





fosters a difficult attitude of a Portuguese-speaking context in the Indian Ocean 
region. In my opinion, on the contrary, it appears to be remarkably emblematic 





studies2 provides a set of epistemologies and concepts that define the Indian Ocean 




1 The definition of Literature of the Indian Ocean within the field of African literary studies represents an ongoing 
critical debate, especially within specific critical contexts such as the francophone one. In this regard see 
“Claiming the Field. Africa and the Space of Indian Ocean Literature” by Moradewun Adejunmobi in Callaloo 32.4 
(2009) 1247–1261. Also in the so­called Portuguese­speaking African literatures, the Indian Ocean perspective it 
is not yet an established critical framework, especially in a comparative approach among narratives written in 
different languages and thus placed in distinct national contexts. 
2 For an essential bibliography on Indian Ocean Studies, see Bose 2006, Gupta, Hofmeyr & Person, 2010; Fawaz & 
Bayly 2002, Kearney 2004, McPherson 1993, Moorthy & Jamal, 2010, Pearson 2003, Vergès 2003. 
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field of chronology” (Chaundhury, 1990). In this respect, historian Sugata Bose 
(2006) has a specific definition for the Indian Ocean, which engages with the criti­
cal debate in the very field of the Indian Ocean as a study area, and promotes an 
alternative framework to define this space-time region. 
The Indian Ocean is better characterized as an “interregional arena” rather than 
as a “system”, a term that has more rigid connotations. An interregional arena lies 
somewhere between the generalities of a “world system” and the specificities of 
particular regions. (Bose, 2006, p. 6)  
According to Bose, the relationship between a regional entity and world­sys­
tem that the definition of the Indian Ocean as an “arena” attempts to promote is 
based on the need to problematise spatial constructs that seem to project a certain 
coloniality of knowledge (Mudimbe, 1998; Quijano, 2002). However, the conceptual 
definition of the Indian Ocean as an “interregional arena” and, of course, its epis­
temological developments is far from being a consensual theoretical assumption. 
In  this  respect,  the problematisation proposed by Shanty Moorthy and Ashraf 






and epistemological definition of the region. 
We propose that the Indian Ocean region possesses an internal commonality which 
enables us to view it as an area in itself: commonalities of history, geography, mer­
chant capital and trade, ethnicity, culture, and religion. This we contrast to Sugata 
Bose’s notion of an “interregional arena.” While usefully raising the possibility of 
viewing  the  Indian Ocean region as a human  theatre which occupies  interstices 
and straddles several regions, “interregionalism” runs the risk of diminishing the 
Indian Ocean region as a unique space, locking it into being a region between more 




brings us close to Devleena Ghosh and Stephen Muecke’s notion of transnational 
imaginative geography. (Moorthy & Jamal, 2010, p.4) 
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Moreover, the critical reflection from Moorthy and Jamal (2010) is based on 
a specific critical framework regarding the notion of “world-system” and thus 
suggesting an interesting theoretical articulation in the field of African studies. 
Reorienting significance and temporality features large in Andre Gunder Frank’s 
application of world  system analysis,  advocating  one,  rather  than many, world 
systems. This not only restores the Indian Ocean world to its place in the panoply 
of human history, but allows this region to be treated as a unit for analysis  in a 
contemporary world which  Frank proposes  has  always  been  international,  eco­
nomically integrated and globally interconnected. (Moorthy & Jamal, 2010, p.10) 
Furthermore, this specific articulation underlines an important epistemologi­
cal perspective  regarding  the “human dimension of  the  Indian Ocean  region” 




it possible. Moreover, to think the oceanic human is also to affirm “the rearrange­
ment of desires” within the ethico-political sphere of the humanities. (Moorthy & 
Jamal, 2010, p.14)
To sum up, the critical debate in Indian Ocean studies offers a number of 
diversified theoretical discussions and epistemologies that appear to be particu­
larly relevant in the field of African literary, visual and cultural studies, putting 
forward an original and alternative outlook  to  read and place African  literary 
and artistic narratives in a transnational and transdisciplinary framework. It is in 
these theoretical and critical articulations that contemporary African literary and 
visual narratives offer the opportunity to tackle the Indian Ocean as a “transna­
tional imaginative geography” (Ghosh & Muecke, 2007), suggesting “alternative 
epistemological experiences” (García Canclini, 2012), to (re)define the grammar 
of human knowledge and experience. 










expansion in Africa, and by heading north in space, to arrive at a paradigmatic 
place such as the Island of Mozambique, Ilha de Moçambique. 
Ilha de Moçambique and the Indian Ocean, a metonymy of 
the literary nation
Situated in the northern part of  the country and linked to the mainland by 




one of the key figures of the Portuguese imperial narrative, arrived with his fleet 
in 1498, and where the poet Luís Vaz de Camões stopped on his way back to 
Portugal from India. One important aspect is the political definition of the Island 
of Mozambique  in  the Portuguese Empire.  The  island was  in  fact  the African 











particular — o espantoso Índico — as Lobato  stated  (1989),  that  shapes  the dis­
tinctive historical,  social and cultural  features of  this “fragment of  the nation” 
(Chatterjee, 1993) and establishes the Island of Mozambique as a fundamental 











telluric  space and where  the  Indian Ocean represents a  crucial  standing point 
in order to re-think and re-define the cultural discourse on the Mozambican  
narratives of the nation. In her reflection on three key figures of Mozambican 
poetry Rui Knopfly, Luís Carlos Patraquim and Eduardo White, concerning Ilha 
de Moçambique, Rita Chaves states:
As metonymy of a larger history, each with its own geographical, historical, politi­
cal and cultural reality that Mozambique is setting, the Island will be represented 
as an incomplete mosaic, in which the pieces were lost and/or were improperly pla­
ced. The design, therefore, proves to be confusing and the exercise of the word is a 
means to revolve the ground and extract meaning from now deposited fragments 
before each gaze. (...) the attachment to the space should not be confused with the 
idealization and what stands out are the signs of a relationship which, being one of 
love, does not pacify spirits nor hides frustrations. (...) the island is organized as a 
metaphor for an identity in disquiet, a process that mixes refusal and persecution, 
far from finding in the field of subjectivity the serenity that monsoons offered to 
the difficult art of navigation. (Chaves, 2002)3
In this regard, the dimension of “disquiet, refusal and persecution” (Chaves, 
2002) is particularly relevant when reflecting on cultural and identitarian dis­
courses that are related to an idea of a homogeneous and hegemonic nationhood, 





of  this  symbolic,  political  and  cultural maritime  space­time.  Furthermore,  the 
Island of Mozambique becomes a physical and conceptual place to (re)think cul­
tural discourses and narratives placed in the Mozambican space, before and after 
independence,  pointing  to  a  number  of  representations,  ambiguities  and  con­
tradictions and thus underlining a symbolic, cultural and political ambivalence 
that becomes emblematic in questioning the present and the past, not only from 
3 Original quote: “Como metonímia de uma história maior, a de cada um com essa realidade geográfica, histórica, 
política e cultural que Moçambique vai configurando, a Ilha será representada como um mosaico incompleto, no 
qual as peças se perderam e/ou foram inadequadamente colocadas. O desenho, portanto, revela-se confuso e o 
exercício da palavra é um meio de revolver o terreno e extrair o significado dos fragmentos ora depositados diante 
de cada olhar. (...) o apego ao espaço não se confunde com a idealização e o que salta são os sinais de uma relação 
que, sendo de amor, não pacifica espíritos e não esconde frustrações. (...) a ilha organiza-se como a metáfora de 
uma identidade em desassossego, num processo que mistura recusa e perseguição, muito distante de encontrar 




other words, as Jessica Falconi points out:
On the one hand, the Island as “brothel of history” (Soupa & Saúte 1992, p.53), hellish 
place of slavery, and submission to the different dominations that passed by; on the 
other hand, in the antipodes, the image of an exemplary place of peaceful coexistence 
between peoples and cultures, emblematic of that “world that the Portuguese crea­










“Transnational Imaginative Geographies”: Mozambican 
visual and written narrative of the Indian Ocean 
As noted by Francisco Noa, the Indian Ocean is emerging loudly among the 
new voices of Mozambican poetry. Following the path of the previous, acclaimed 
generation of Mozambican poets,5 such as Virgílio de Lemos, Rui Knopfly and 
Luís Carlos Patraquim, among others, the new generation is claiming the Ocean 
as a “source and motivation” (Noa, 2012) in order to propose an “unconvention­
al” and “dispersive” identitarian and cultural discourse defined by a number of 
specific themes such as, for instance, “the sea and travel” (Noa, 2012). 
(...) The trajectory of the Mozambican poetry, from the origins to the present day, 
not even necessarily setting it as a dominant theme, but with a weight and unques­
tionable value, reveals that the sea, specifically the Indian Ocean, is not and has 
4 Original quote: “Por um lado, a Ilha como “lupanar da história” (Sopa & Saúte, 1992: 53), sítio infernal de 
escravatura, e de submissão às diferentes dominações que por ali passaram; por outro lado, nas antípodas, a 
imagem de um lugar exemplar de convivência pacífica entre povos e culturas, emblemático daquele “mundo que 
o português criou” teorizado por Gilberto Freyre (...) Tais representações fazem da memória da Ilha uma herança 
problemática,  determinando o papel  controverso que  este  lugar  ocupa no  imaginário nacional moçambicano 
(Chaves, 2002) ainda na contemporaneidade. É, pois, com estas imagens da Ilha, que as representações poéticas 
entram ora em aberta ruptura, ora em processos de negociação”. (Falconi, 2013, p. 80) 













limits and also of a restoration and reinvention of existence and destinations, either 
private or collective. (Noa, 2012, p. 14; my translation)6
In this respect, the work of contemporary Mozambican poets such as: Adelino 
Timóteo, Eduardo White, Guita Júnior, Sangare Okapi and Júlio Carrilho7 repre­






erary project  that uses  the maritime perspective as an operational standpoint  to 
re-present Mozambican specificity. It is interesting to consider, for example, the 
literary work of Borges Coelho in this light (Can, 2013; Chaves, 2008). His writing 
paints an original picture of the relationship between space and time, thus rede 
fining the so-called national cultural context through an emblematic reposition­
ing of facts and subjects in a transnational space and time framework.8 It is in its 
engagement with a complex relationship between time and space that the literary 
work of Borges Coelho points to a contextual dimension that blurs the boundaries 
of the nation, putting forward relationships and dynamics that must be observed 
6 Original quote: “(...) a trajectória da poesia moçambicana, desde às origens até aos nossos dias, mesmo não se 
colocando necessariamente como uma  temática dominante, mas com um peso e valor  inquestionável,  revela­
nos que o mar, mais  concretamente  o Oceano  Índico,  não  é,  nem nunca  foi,  um espaço vazio, mas um  lugar 
de profundos, intermináveis e consequentes compromissos e dinâmicas de natureza humana, social, cultural, 
política e económica. Mas sobretudo um lugar onde a imaginação poética não apenas recria dimensões até aí 





da existência e dos destinos sejam eles privados ou colectivos.” (Noa, 2012, p. 14)
7 For a detailed analysis of the contemporary Mozambican poetry see Noa 2014. 
8 I am referring, for example, to the two collections of short stories Índicos Indícios I – Setentrião (2005) and Índicos 




through a critical perspective that goes beyond a national geopolitical context.9 In 
other words, from a cultural and literary point of view, as Isabel Hofmeyr puts it:
We need to think of the Indian Ocean as the site par excellence of ‘alternative moder­
nities’; those formations of modernity that have taken shape in an archive of deep 
and layered existing social and intellectual traditions. (…) Understanding political 
discourse and action, then, becomes a task of understanding a complex layered pre­
colonial, colonial and postcolonial archive in which versions of modernity are ne­
gotiated in an ever-shifting set of idioms around ‘tradition’. (Hofmeyr, 2007, p.13)
An artistic counterpoint  to  these  literary voices can be  found  in  the work of 
the contemporary Mozambican artist Pekiwa  — Nelson Augusto Carlos Ferreira 
(1977) — whose sculpture seems to portray a very peculiar claim to the sea, re­
covering,  for  instance, old  remains  from  the  Island of Mozambique and  reshap­






Picture 1. Pekiwa in Abélard, Luís (Org.) (2010). Com As Maõs. 24 Artistas Moçambicanos. 
Lisboa: Babel, pp. 199.
9 On the other hand, Borges Coelho’s literary work seems to contribute to a reconfiguration of the so-called 
national context. For a critical reading of the literary work of this author, see: Chaves 2008 and Can 2011.
76 “Behind so many names, the sea”. Mozambique and the Indian Ocean
E­Book’IS • Fluid Networks and Hegemonic Powers in the Western Indian Ocean • 2017
Furthermore,  the work  of  Pekiwa  poses  a  critical  and  conceptual  question 
about an artistic practice where remains and ruins play a central role, pointing to 
a set of theoretical constellations of undoubted interest in a conceptual reflection 
on what could be defined as the aesthetics of the Indian Ocean (Brugioni, 2015).
On the other hand, striving to establish different comparisons and counter­




— an emblematic example can be found in the photographic work of Mauro Pinto 
Portos de Convergência (2003) — Ports of Convergence —  in which the relationship 
between the land and the sea is built from the point of view of its materiality and 
humanity  throughout a visual construction  in which  the monumentality of  the 
port is a counterpoint to the corporality of the man who inhabits this space.
Figure 2. Mauro Pinto, Portos de Convergência (2003; Copyright Maro Pinto). 
  
 
I would like to thank the author who kindly authorised the reproduction of his picture in this text. 
In conclusion, the dialogues that can be found addressing the Indian Ocean — 
and Ilha de Moçambique — as a theme, motivation and, thus, a new and alternative 
cultural utopia (Chaves, 2002; Falconi, 2008) in the Mozambican cultural and social 
context could be much more than these and the aim of my research is, in fact, to 
keep looking for these “silent” ties and counterpoints, inside and outside the limits 
10  In  this  respect,  the  analysis  of  the  representation  of  the  Indian  Ocean  in  Mozambican  contemporary 













(Hofmeyr et al, 2011) offers a critical situated (re)vision of the theoretical para­
digms through which Mozambican cultural representations are read and analysed, 
re-orienting the meaning and the agency of visual and written narratives rooted in 
the transnational imaginative geography of the Indian Ocean world. 
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Female migratory flows from the Horn of Africa are mainly directed to Arab countries 
and tend to take the form of temporary legal migration. Like their Asian counterparts, 
these girls and women are subject to varying degrees of trafficking and even enslave-
ment, working mainly as in-house maids in affluent Arab households, where they tend 
to be denied free and fair labour rights, under a harsh interpretation of the kafala, or 
"sponsorship" system, prevalent in Arabic countries. Although there are signs of better 
legal protection under international labour rules, the system in place and the culture 
that supports it impose a tense situation where maids are subject to everyday “structural 
violence” and employers have to bear an unwonted responsibility. The psychological, 
social and economic costs of this migration are well documented but there's still a lack 
of understanding of the trends of female agency that emerges as a direct reflection of the 
hardships of such forms of migration. This chapter reflects on the ways this situation is 
understood and managed in the hosting countries. 




Human migration and trafficking1 in the Western Indian Ocean has a long and 




Gulf, and frequently extended eastwards to the Indian subcontinent and beyond 
(Austen, 1988: 35-40; Harris, 1971; Sheriff, 1987). The general trend has been  
consistently unidirectional, in the sense that throughout the centuries East African 
populations  have  been  repositories  of migrant  forced  labour  in  the  Gulf  and 
further afield in North Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean shores (Alpers, 
1975: 185-6; Ewald, 2000; Lovejoy, 2000: 1-29; Sheriff, 1987; Vernet, 2013). The 
gradual illegalization of slave-trading coupled with the fading of the Ottoman 
empire in the early 20th century produced a lull in these migratory flows until 
the boom in oil production and export after the Second World War became cen­
tral to the radical transformation of the Gulf countries into a magnet for cheap, 
unskilled  labour  from  both West Asian  and  East African migrants  (Jureidini, 
2003: 2-3). After 1972 in particular the Gulf witnessed a growing mass migratory 
flux of temporary unskilled Asian and African labourers and within a few years 
it became the world’s leading region where the demographic imbalance between 
fixed residents and temporary migrants is highest. Up to 80% of the population 
living in the GCC countries have no proper national citizenship rights.3
Against this historical background of human trafficking in which the Arabian 
Peninsula  interfaced between Eastern Africa and Western Asia, what has been 
called  the  feminization  of  migration  has  in  the  past  thirty  years  become  a 
particularly  relevant  factor  in  the  characterization  of  a  renewed  transnational 
human trafficking set-up (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 15-7; IOM 2001; Chammartin, 
2003, 2004; De Regt, 2010: 240). It involves millions of women from very di­
1 Human trafficking is certainly a catch-all word of evanescent sense in the context of labour migration. I use it here 
with some caution and with full knowledge that its use doesn’t preclude a variable quota of voluntary agency of 
those migrants who are subject to a game with harsh rules. See Aronowitz, 2009: 1-3, and Anderson & Davidson, 
2003 (specifically on migrant female labourers: 42-53). For a review of research into contemporary trafficking in 
the MENA countries, see Calandruccio, 2005. See also Reyhan Atasü-Topcuoğlu (2014) on how the very notion 
of “human trafficking” is shaped by what he calls the “ideological closure” of anti-trafficking discourses and 
practices (Atasü-Topcuoğlu, 2014: 47 ff). Finally, see Anne Gallagher (2009: 791-2) on the disadvantaged position 
of human rights advocates facing the security standpoint during the so­called “Vienna Process” that led to the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children ­ Nov. 15, 2000, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 108­16 (2004), 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
2 Or, as Janet Ewald notes, under the shadow of its hegemony (Ewald, 2000: 77). On the competing European-Arab 
slave trading in the Indian Ocean, see Vernet, 2013: 244 ff.
3 In the Gulf, nationality is totally based on jus sanguinis, via paternal descent. Although naturalization is possible, 
it remains exceptional and generally restricted to (Arab-speaking) foreign wives of the country’s nationals. On 
the difficulties of precisely quantifying the massive foreign migration in the GCC countries, see: Cadene & 
Dumortier, 2008: 3-6. On the so-far meagre and mixed results of the 2010s policy reforms directed at job creation 
for nationals in Saudi Arabia, and in general in the GCC countries, see Bel-Air & Zahra, 2015; and Bel-Air, 2014.
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verse regional backgrounds moving to and from the Gulf to work as domestic 
labourers and also in the tourist and sex industries4. Official estimates indicate 
a steady growth in the ratio of female migrant workers (30% in the early 2000s, 
up from 8% in 1980; Calandruccio, 2005: 273; Chammartin, 2004: 10-13) and that 
at  any  one  time  there  are  around  2 million  female migrant domestic workers 
in the GCC countries (Fernandez, 2014: 3-4),5 although unofficial reports from 
credible NGOs  suggest  the  twice  and  even  three  times  these  numbers6.  They 
presently originate mostly  from  Indonesia,  Sri Lanka,  the Philippines  and  the 
Horn of Africa (Bergem, 2006: 65; Chammartin, 2004: 12-13), catering for a pattern 
of “conspicuous consumption”7 of an affluent lifestyle that is widespread in the 
Gulf countries.8
This  chapter  addresss  female migratory  trends  from  the Horn  to  the GCC 
and Lebanon, how these trafficking networks function and how employees,  
employers and traffickers cope with legal, ethical, linguistic and cultural  
constraints and barriers. It relies on data collected between 2011 and 2016 in sets 
of open interviews and informal surveys of men and women of different social 
standing during regular fieldwork research in the Amhara and Oromia regions 
(Ethiopia)  and  in Beirut  (Lebanon).  These were  complemented  by  short  visits 
to Dubai (UAE), and London (UK), surveys and exchanges using long-range 
communications  (email,  Skype,  etc.),  swiping  of  data  in  online  social  media 
forums, weblogs  and  news  sites,  reviews  of  available  literature  (reports  from 
international organizations, university theses and dissertations, sociological and 
anthropological papers, grey literature from NGOs and national institutes and 
ministries), and screening of film and video footage (documentaries, internet vid­
eos and televised newsreels). The collected data was processed through content 
analysis and partial results were rechecked by qualified informants for control.9
4 Or more frequently sliding down from (legal) in-house work towards (illegal) external house cleaning and 
nanny jobs and partial or full sex-work (see Mahdavi, 2011: 125 ff).
5 According to IOM’s lowest mean estimation, there were 14 million international migrants in the Middle East 
in 2003, or around 40% of the total population (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 1-2; Calandruccio, 2005: 268). For a more 
recent breakdown of migration in the GCC countries, see Bel­Air, 2016.
6 Estimates vary, particularly due to the high percentage of non­ or partially­documented migrants (that is, those 
who entered the country legally but lack work permits); see Fernandez, 2014: 4.
7 S. Shami, 1996: Emigration Dynamics in Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, Geneva, IOM/UNFPA, Policy Workshop on 
Emigration Dynamics in the Arab Region. 1996; in Bergem, 2006: 65.
8  On  the  degrading  power  relations  in  households  where  maids,  in  quasi­slavery  conditions,  act  as  “status 
reproducers” of their employers’ intended accession to, or maintenance of a high-status lifestyle, see Anderson, 
2000; 2004: 108-10.
9 Early outcomes of  the ongoing research were presented and discussed at  the 8th Iberian Conference of African 
Studies, July, 14-16, 2009, in the first and second editions of the Intensive Course on Europe-Africa Relations – Border 
Crossings In and Out of Africa  (Erasmus  Intensive Programme  ­ Consortium  ISCTE­IUL, EHESS and UNIOR  ­ 
July, 7­19 2014; and Master of International Studies, ISCTE­IUL, October 28 – November 5, 2015), and later at the 





to Arab countries, which mainly uses air travel, is strikingly different in charac­
teristics  and global  social  perception  from  that  of  the perilous predominantly 
male land and sea crossings that draw so much attention in the (Western-led) 
international media these days, perhaps too focused on a morbid aestheticiza­
tion of rough forms of travel and human suffering, and exploitation of collec­
tive fears of mass in-migration to Europe. Still, its scale is no less significant, 
the number of people involved being similarly astounding, and its root causes 
cannot be disentangled from those that lead to male migratory flows from the 
same region (on their use of the Libya-Lampedusa route, see Triulzi, 2013: 214 
ff). As any traveller arriving or leaving Bole airport in Addis Ababa will readily 
testify, the sheer visual impact of hundreds of dazed Ethiopian girls and women 




relevant than that of men (see Momsen: 1999: 1-2), having expanded consider­
ably in the last decades. The feminization of migration is a major concern of the 
IOM  and  other  international  agencies  because  of  the  vulnerabilities  it  entails 
(IOM,  2001). Regarding migration  from  the Horn  of Africa  to  the GCC mem­
bers and Lebanon (the preferred countries for this flow), the numbers are telling:  
between 200,000 and 600,000, depending on the type of estimates, or a third of the 
maximum female migrant population of those countries. Also, at least 50 to 60 
percent of women migrating to the Gulf and Lebanon are documented with both 
entry visas and labour contracts.10 Although perilous travel by land and sea does 
occur (to Sudan and across the Red Sea; De Regt, 2010: 251-4, 2012), the preferred 
means of travel is by air – to the extent that companies such as Emirates and  
Al-Etihad are sometimes called the 21st century slave-ships. This is, on the whole, 
understandable: travel costs are lower, the routes are safer, and (temporary)  
employability is more easily granted.
Whereas male migration from the Horn, because of its more informal, illegal 
and sinuous character, is difficult to quantify and break down by nationality 
(many Ethiopian migrants claim political refugee status by passing as Somalis 
or Eritreans, for instance), female migration is more easily quantifiable, though 
10 On a discussion of legal vs. illegal, and contract vs. freelancing options for migrant female domestic workers in 
the Gulf, see Moors & De Regt, 2008: 153-4, 162-3.
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its numbers are also often blurred by the so­called “free visa” problem (Gardner 




labourers  there,  and  that  service  as  live­in housemaids  is  the  standard option 
offered to them before departure. That is not to say that the numbers of hotel 
workers and independent cleaning jobs are not on the rise, and that a small per­
centage do no accept other menial  and even degrading occupations  (prostitu­
tion, especially), but overall the largest occupational pattern since the 1990s12, 
has been non­specialized domestic labour (i.e. performing a wide range of tasks, 
from cleaning to cooking, to caring for children, while living in the household).
In  this  labour  cum  enslaving  market,13 girls and women from the Horn/
Northeast Africa (mostly Ethiopian, but also to a lesser degree Eritrean, Somali 
and Kenyan) seem to have occupied a position that falls below Indonesian and 
Philippine  job­seekers  in  terms  of  both  preference  and  pay.14  The  questions 
regarding their relatively low marketability relate to a number of factors: racial 
discrimination (see Beydoum, 2006: 1017; Jureidini, 2005: 48-71) that reflects  
historical Arab attitudes towards imported African slaves, but also perceived 
lower skills and assumed  lower per capita  income  in  the country of origin on 
the part of the employers. Like their Asiatic counterparts, Horn (and generally 




to tackling the specific problems raised by the working conditions of live-in 
11 Part of the controversial Nitaqat, or Saudisation policy; see Bel­Air, 2014. 
12 After the fall of the DERG regime in 1991, the new Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
government removed legal restrictions on foreign migration (Fernandez, 2011: 439). On migration to the Gulf and 
Lebanon as an unintended demographic consequence of the rural interventionist development in present­day 
Ethiopia, see Gibson & Eshetu Gurmu, 2012.
13 Romina Halabi makes clear the link between the kafala and the slave trade in Saudi Arabia (Halabi, 2008: 43). 
On the legal aspects of the slide of female labour towards enslavement, in the particular case of Ethiopian maids 
in Lebanon, see Beydoun, 2006. See also Kathleen Hamill’s legal analysis of the trafficking of migrant women in 
Lebanon (Hamil, 2011). On the general concept of housemaid servitude as quasi­slavery, and on rationalizing 
exploitation, see Anderson, 2003: 35-40. 








maids (and thus hesitatingly coming in line with ILO’s regulations),16 it is widely 
accepted  that  the  actual  labour  relations,  and  the  culture  that  supports  them, 
are in general very far from abiding to these regulatory efforts (Bergem, 2006: 
70-1; Bel-Air & Zahra, 2015: 164 ff).17 In this respect, Yemen (but also Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia) stands out because of its geographical proximity to the Horn 
of Africa, and hence the lower travel costs involved (De Regt, 2010: 239; 2012; 
Yoseph Endeshaw et al, 2005: 24-6). Many migrants use the Red Sea passage via 
Djibouti and Somaliland (or fly to Saudi Arabia disguised as Hajj pilgrims),18 and 
so tend to remain undocumented (i.e. without valid resident or work permits), 
which makes it growingly difficult for them to return to their country of origin  
(De Regt, 2010: 245-8). It also stands out because the pay tends to be much lower, 
on a par with the country’s comparative poverty. Yemen is generally taken as a 
country of passage, either to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, or the Emirates; but a 
very difficult passage it is, because of the environmental conditions and now the 
war currently raging in the country.
Of  course,  for  many  female  migrant  workers  in  the  other  Gulf  countries 
the return trip may not be easily granted, due to the difficulties posed by the  
contract  terms  on  compensation  and discharge  implied  by  the  kafala  bondage 
mechanisms. Also, returning home often becomes a positive (that is, not a forced) 
choice only when the worker has saved enough money to meet her financial  




The unending flow of dramatic stories of abuse, humiliation and trauma that 
many foreign maids reportedly endure while living and working in Arab family 
households, and the myriad sad cases of reintegration problems upon their re­
turn home (Yoseph Endeshaw et al, 2005: 36 ff; Abebaw Minaye, 2012, Waganesh 
16 For a comprehensive review of the latest reforms in domestic migrants’ legal protection in the Gulf, see Varia, 
2011.
17  Of  the  four  types  of  visa  available  under  the  kafala system (for domestic labour, company work, official 
government and business partnerships), the house visa is the one most prone to trafficking and the denial  of 
rights and freedom (Blanchet, 2002: 27 ff).
18 Or fly via Kenya and Tanzania, to avoid the restrictions imposed by the Ethiopian Private Employment Agency 
Proclamation (1998), that seek to protect Ethiopian migrant workers’ rights and dignity in the Gulf (Adepoju, 
2005: 78-79, IOM, 2001).
19 Female migrant remittances are today a crucial source of income, both to their families and to the home 
country’s economy in general (Chammartin, 2004: 14-5). This is true in most cases and not only for the Horn 
countries. But even if the total amount of remittances is, comparatively, smaller than those sent by Asian workers, 
their economic impact is still of great relevance (Mohapatra & Ratha, 2011: 11-17). Still, the difficulties faced by 
migrants in Yemen are of a slightly different nature, as they often become stranded in a poor, convoluted country 
without the necessary means to return home or to move on to richer places (De Regt, 2010: 245-8).
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Zeleke et al, 2015) overshadow two other realities in the literature. These are 
the positive or  simply non­negative outcomes of  this  temporary migration  for 
those  women  that  decide  to  work  abroad  –  which  greatly  contributes  to  its 
perpetuation -, and their Arab employers’ anxieties caused by a largely unregu­
lated labour system whose insecurity and risks they have to shoulder individually 
–  a  burden  which  they  are  not  likely  to  help  change  due  to  the  patronizing 
policies that prevail in the GCC countries.
So, just as there are many deeply traumatized migrant women returnees, cases 
abound of women who have managed to become financially and psychologically 






Africa, such as Madagascar, Tanzania or Cameroon), though not different in na­
ture from those of their Asian counterparts, are nonetheless deemed harsher and 







by  the  Saudi  police  and  in  Kuwait  after  a  much­highlighted  infanticide  case 
involving an Ethiopian maid.21
It  seems  clear,  both  from  direct  observation  and  from  most  comparative 
analyses, that female migrant workers from the Horn tend to be less aware of the 
kinds of tasks required in an affluent Arab household, less familiar with modern 
domestic technology, and more ignorant of the changing nature of their contracts. 
This  is  particularly  because  they  are  induced  by  their  facilitators  and  dealers 
20 Andrew M. Gardner draws on Paul Farmer’s concept of an age-old “social web of exploitation” regarding Haiti: 
“structural violence is the natural expression of a political and economic order that seems as old as slavery” 
(Farmer, 2004:317).
21 Official estimates suggest that Ethiopians working abroad (both permanent and temporary) number between 
800,000 and 1 million. In 2008, the recorded inflow of remittances from migrants was worth over US$800 million 
(National Bank of Ethiopia’s 2006 and 2008 reports, in Fernandez, 2010: 248-9). Unofficial estimates suggest that 




ize, or that are very far from the promises made – often putting them in situa­
tions of forced labour that easily descend into virtual (or real) slavery (Yoseph 




Maids’ unwillingness to share their experiences and knowledge with their 
kin and friends back home is correlated with the psychological need to stick to 
a positive narrative of migrating to fulfil their families’ original expectations, 
to justify the heavy financial investment made – in other words, to “save face”. 
Given that this kind of migration tends to be temporary due to the terms of the 
contract, the need to weave a “success story” through letters, phone calls or any 
other  communications  means  it  is  paramount  to  ensure  adequate  social  and 
familiar integration upon return home. Such self­censorship in communications 




tions,  especially  through  institutional  and  social media,  has  caused  important 
breaches in this careful filtering of negative stories. The irregular burst of media 
attention to stories of rape, suicide, murder, etc involving migrant maids fuel 
sudden states of social panic and condemnation in the sending country that lead 
to exaggerated generalizations, based on an obvious lack of information about 
the specificities of the working and living conditions of migrants in the Gulf. The 
migrants’ response tends to be one of distancing themselves and holding on to an 
equally exaggerated positive narrative. This is duly corroborated by an increased 
need to display material signs of affluence, as evident in the pressure to send 
remittances reflected in apparent material benefits of their families, and in the 
flashy style of their clothing and accessories when they return.
This said, the kafala, or “sponsorship”, relationship has been under fire from 
various  quarters  for  some  time  now  (Western,  Indian  and  local  NGOs  being 
on the forefront of a “glocal” battle over changes in labour relations and hu­
man rights in the context of the ambiguous modernization of Arab countries). 
The most obvious claim against it is that it fosters a type of labour relationship 
between  employer  and  employee  that  falls  beyond  and  below  state  control 
and  consequently  state  protection.  This  lays  it  open  to  systematic  forms  of 
human­rights abuse and induces a socially unquestioned situation of “structural 
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as  it  is  understood  today  was  an  ad  hoc legal solution to deal with the first  
influx of migrant workers that took place in the 1950s, and was widely adopted 
in the region to cushion states from claims to fixed residency and other legal 
rights (social security, health care, etc).24 The iniquity and inadequacy of the kafala 
solution started becoming more or  less obvious during the tafra  (“boom”) that 
led to the sudden expansion of the GCC countries’ economies. The boom was  
initially  driven  by  the  early  1970s  global  oil  embargo  and  the  resulting 
demand for large amounts of temporary migrant labourers, which were and are 
mostly from the Indian subcontinent, to perform unskilled, manual work in the 
construction sector and oil industry (Osella & Osella, 2011: 10-11).
It  is a known fact that the GCC countries have one of the most unbalanced 
demographic relations between native, or permanent residents, and temporary 
migrants in the world. As mentioned, around 80% of the population is of foreign 
origin and lacks the guarantees given by birth to Arab nationals, be it in terms 
of  residency  rights,  labour  protection,  social  security  and  access  to  education 
and health services, not to mention political rights or the ability to tap into the 
otherwise rich and generous financing system for both employed and entre­
preneurial nationals. In Europe, for instance, an entry visa, being dependent of 
the presentation of  a  contract,  is  a process  that  allows  the  future  employee  to 
be independent from the employer and not necessarily tied to a particular job. 
Employees  have  the  chance  (and  inherent  guarantees)  to  quit  the  original  job 
and employer and some time to find a new one.25 On the contrary,  in the GCC 
countries  and  Lebanon  (and  also  in  Jordan),  migrant  workers  are  bound  to 
the employer  from  the  time of arrival  (their passports are often withheld until 
22 Silvia Pessoa, Laura Harkness, and Andrew M. Gardner refer to the kafala as the “antithesis of a free labour 
market” (Gardner et al, 2014: 205). On the Arab states’ complicity in establishing the parameters of such situation 
of “structural violence”, see also Gardner, 2010: 215-16.
23 Except for Yemen and Bahrain, all Gulf countries (as well as Lebanon and Jordan) also have a strict exit visa 
policy that is part of the kafala: the foreign worker is required to secure clearance from the employer, who declares 
that the worker has fulfilled the terms of the contract and his/her services are no longer needed, to be able to 
return home when his/her employment period ends; the exit visa may also be withheld if there are court charges 
or penalties due to the administration.
24 On how the segmented nature of the labour markets in the GCC countries stimulates the spread of (legal and 
illegal) migration intermediaries, both in source and destination countries, see Fernandez, 2014: 5.





point of view of  the employer,  this  is a guarantee  that workers will  comply  to 
their duties, as the employer has to pay a large amount to the brokers/agencies 
who deal with the migration process (travel costs, visa and other legal documen­
tation). From the point of view of the authorities, this is an easy way to delegate 
to  a  private  person  or  company  (the  kafeel)  the  responsibilities  of  controlling, 
managing and caring for the worker’s obligations and needs (Bergem, 2006: 
70).26 From the worker’s point of view, though, this situation offers few advan­
tages besides his/her employability. Little or no pressure is exerted on employers  
to fulfil their duties, such as adequate (or actual) monthly pay, and any other 
contractual obligations (in terms of health, weekly days off, workload, and work­
ing hours). Furthermore, little or no prior knowledge of Arabic is frequently 








the laxity or inexistence of sanctions towards employers and traffickers (Strobl, 
2009: 178-9).
It must  be  said  that  from  the point  of  view of  the  employers  the  situation 
is  also  unsatisfactory.  The    personal  responsibility  the  sponsorship  imposes 
on them is the main factor explaining the recurring, spiralling tension that  
characterizes many complaints –  fear of  the worker  running away,  fear of  the 
worker being infected by STDs (especially HIV), fear that rash behaviour on their 
part may lead to food poisoning or child molestation on the part of the worker, 
suspicion of  criminal  acts  (unauthorized use or  even  stealing of property  and 





Black’s notion of “decentred approach to regulation”, whereby governments’ monopoly on regulation is lacking, 
making regulation occur “within and between other social actors”. (J. Black (2002) “Critical Reflections on 
Regulation.” Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27, 1-35 (in Fernandez, 2013:816).)
27 On the impact of foreign maids in child­rearing in Arab countries, and more generally on Arab research on 
employer/maid relations in Arab households, see: Al Omari, 2003; Al Zikra, 2005; Khalifa & Nasser, 2015.
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is required to pay travel and visa fees in advance) with the financial aspects of 
trafficking, and in particular the so-called “recruitment fee system”. In order to 
obtain a  job  in  the Gulf,  foreign workers need  to pay  large  fees  in  their home 
country to a long chain of beneficiaries that includes recruiters, employment/
training agencies, traffickers and government departments and officials). These 
high  costs, which  can  amount  to  thousands  of  dollars,  can  often  only  be met 
by  high­interest  loans  from moneylenders  that  result  in  debilitating  debts  or 
land and house mortgages for the families, who then become dependent on the 
worker’s regular remittances. This exerts enormous pressure upon the migrants 
to 1) accept whatever job they are offered on arrival, no matter how different 
from what was promised back home, and 2)  try  to keep the  job, whatever  the 
working conditions are. Likewise, it puts the employers in a situation of neurotic 
fear  and  suspicion  against  the worker. Media  coverage  of  single  cases  fosters 
a state of societal “moral panic” (see Cohen, 2002),  that can lead (and has led) 
to embarrassing bilateral diplomatic hurdles (Jureidini, 2003: 11-2).
The mechanism  that was put  into place  throughout  the Gulf  states  to deal 
expeditiously with the expanding needs for a cheap foreign work force is itself 
a variation of very old form of labour bond in the Gulf countries. Anh Longva 
(1997: 25, 106-7) claims it originates in the ancient pearl fishing economy on  
the Gulf shores, where pearl divers’ and their families’ expenses would be  
sponsored by boat owners,  to be deducted from their wages  in  the end of  the 







As the number of migrant labourers grew exponentially, the positive sides of 
this patronage system dwindled. The personalized bond in which the employer 
bears extensive legal and economic responsibilities for the worker’s welfare is no 
longer adequate or controllable when the tight social pressure typical of small 
close-knit societies disappears, and employers suffer no sanctions for violating 




lies’ houses. In exchange for domestic work, the maid would be given protection 
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and rights that would make her almost a member of the employer’s extended 





attitudes relating to another historical type of labour bond – one that didn’t  
require an established relation of responsibility between families, slave owner­
ship. Like pearl fishers and poor maids, slaves or forced labourers were given 
patronage, protection from outside aggression and rights to food and health, but 
this time simply in exchange from the denial of their freedom and the obligation 
to work for the kafeel and his/her extended family, to make up for the financial 
investment made.
Whereas  the  kafala suffered changes throughout time as recognition of the 
mandatory nature of labourers’ rights (most of the GCC countries are signato­
ries of a variety of international treaties and regulations that grant protection to 
workers worldwide), in the case of domestic workers – and particularly female 
domestic workers living in extended family homes – the situation is still one of 
great disenfranchisement in terms of their status and rights to protection and also 
a source for various coping and reactive strategies:
•  Laws, when they exist, rarely regulate working hours, workloads, days off, 
rights to healthcare, etc.
•  In legal and often in practical terms, the worker has little or no say in  
the termination of the contract (except in the short trial period: usually the first 
three months), or in the transfer of the kafala bond from the original employer to 
subsequent employers and has no prior knowledge of the working conditions.
•  The enforcement of  the  laws  is problematic, with  few or no  inspections 
and little or no sensitivity to investigate and prosecute employers in case of 
complaints  by  maids.  The  opposite  is  generally  the  case,  as  runaway  maids 
are usually considered criminals who have escaped the bond and are thus in a 
position to be deported, and so are returned to the employer.
•  Lack of experience and linguistic or other skills is generally blamed on the 
workers, never on the kafeel. Employers are obviously not interested in the levels 
of knowledge and experience of the maids from their context of origin. They are 
28 Knut V. Bergem points out that, today, in this mostly unregulated and unbridled live­in domestic service market 
that is dependent on foreign labour, it’s simply unthinkable that Arab females be hired as maids in the Gulf, 
due to what he calls a “culture of shame” (Bergem, 2006: 66-7) – house service being considered degrading and 
irreconcilable with the social dignity due to the citizens of a modernized state, it paradoxically has guaranteed 
the perpetuation of “an archaic institution like unlegislated domestic servitude”.
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interested and invest primarily in the acquisition of the knowledge and experien­





somehow acquiring sexually-transmittable diseases. All this fosters a situation 
that easily becomes akin to forced labour, and falls under what is internationally 
defined as human trafficking and enslavement, with resulting forms of unche­
cked abuse: psychological and physical aggression, sexual assault, starvation, 
denial of medical treatment, etc (see Abebaw Minaye, 2012: 117-126; Waganesh 
Zeleke et al, 2015).
This situation promotes a whole range of misrepresentations, fear, suspicions 
and tensions that can, on unfortunately too frequent occasions (and subsequently 







they  frequently  indicate  probable  confused  and  hyper­stressed mental  condi­





varied ways  they  are  received and  treated by  their  employers,  the  fact  is  that 
one finds a number of commonalities in their experiences, hopes and complaints: 
racial prejudice, cultural misunderstanding and lack of concern for work rights 
and personal  privacy.  But  there  is  a  sense  of  personal  enrichment  that  comes 
from  living at  least  temporarily  away  from  the bounds of  the patriarchal  and 
male­dominated family environment of their home country, that, coupled with 
the attraction of material benefits (however small: usually clothing and other  
personal  accessories), makes  up  for  the  hardships,  traumas  and  loneliness  of 
29 In the context of Arab countries, Lebanon stands out as a special case, in terms of collective class action:  
with the help of local NGOs, maids have staged demonstrations in Beirut, have organized collectives that offer 
peer-support (see Pande, 2012: 398-400).
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their migratory experiences. On the other hand, when listening to Arab employ­
ers, one is overwhelmed with stories that speak of shared stereotypes: maids 
from the Horn of Africa are inepter at using sophisticated home appliances than 
Asian women, but more trustworthy when it comes to dealing with employers’  
personal valuable items (jewellery, silver and gold, in particular). They are known 
to stand up to their employers, and to take advantage of the work situation by 
playing on the fears of Arab women by using “African” witchcraft to sexually  
entice husbands or other family members, hurting or abusing children and babies, 
food poisoning, etc. And, whereas migrants often deride their female employers 
as vain,  lazy and arrogant,  they  themselves can become a subject of bewilder­
ment. Why would a racially inferior and less civilized African woman harbour, 
and surreptitiously display, a sense of moral superiority towards their employer? 
Such perplexities rarely lead to engagement in cross-cultural understanding, be 
it because of language barriers or depersonalizing attitudes. Instead, they linger 
on, feeding small talk inside families and in social circles. Furthermore, when it 
comes to trusting African maids to look after their babies and children, tensions 





abroad with  the  full knowledge  that  this  is but  a  temporary destination31  and 
that, traumatic as it may be to many, working in the Gulf may be conceived as 
a rite of passage to female emancipation from an age­old patriarchal society – in 
some cases an unintended one, in others an expected and even sought one. 
Evidently,  the  collective price  to pay,  in  the Horn of Africa  and  elsewhere 
in other African and Asian  lower­income  countries,  is  the perpetuation of  the 
deeply flawed and inhumane international labour-bondage kafala system centred 
in the Gulf countries.
Conclusion
The use of the notion of “trafficking networks” to define the myriad ways 
though which women  temporary migrate  from  the Horn of Africa  to work as 
30 As Bridget Anderson puts it: “Employing a foreign migrant domestic worker, or one from a different ethnic, 
social, or religious group, enables households to perpetuate and promote the idea of other races and social groups 
as servers and doers of dirty work that they themselves are too important to do. When the worker is charged with 
looking after children, these power relations are quite literally reproduced” (Anderson, 2001: 28).
31 She will either return home after her contract terminates, or may in some cases extend her stay, usually by 
working free­lance without  a visa; or may move on to another country (Lebanon, Europe or the US, preferably).




are long-established, state control can be scant or non-existent. Their relations 
with  recruitment  agencies  from  the  sending  countries may be direct  or medi­
ated by the migrants themselves, who act as recruiters of new workers via family 
and neighbourhood contacts or by interacting with the sending agencies. Arab 
employment agencies rarely or never have offices in the Horn countries (except 
for a few in Addis Ababa), and prefer to establish informal contacts – and share 
the benefits – with local agencies. This means that the costs of the recruitment 
and training processes (when they exist), travel expenses and legal exit and entry 
documentation are passed on to the worker (or her family) and the employer’s 
family, on both sides of the Red Sea. This set­up multiplies the number of inter­
mediaries, which in turn exacerbates the unaccountability of the system, totally 
distorting the original concept of “sponsored” responsibility in which the kafala 
is supposed to be based.32
Still, one should fend off the idea that such networks – or meshes or arrange­
ments – are strictly structured and highly regulated. The case is often quite the 
opposite – very fragmented, immensely varying, extremely personalised – which 
makes it very difficult to gauge (and to reform), and quite prone to diverse read­
ings (particularly evident in the in-country official vs NGO arguments, and in 
inter­country diplomatic interpretations). The recent history of female migration 




migrants stifle their grievances and negative experiences when communicating 
with their family and friends for reasons of self­preservation and self­image. But 
in all  it  seems  that  success  stories  tend  to outweigh dramatic and  tragic ones. 
So, the trafficking of female workers doesn’t necessarily need to be perceived 
as  coerced,  lacking agency on  the part of  the migrants  themselves,  and based 






32 On  the  three main  channels  of migration  to  the Gulf  (“public migration”,  “private  employment  agencies”, 
“illegal brokers”), see Fernandez, 2010: 251-3.
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offers little room to understand the complexity and variety of female migration 
to the Gulf countries, the evolution of the kafala bond and the social and cultural 
impact of such migration in source countries.
There are too many factors that help keep the system in place to expect ma­
jor changes and improvements, in the short run. Somehow, it suits most parties 
involved in it. International trafficking networks linking the Horn of Africa and 
the Arabian Peninsula do exist but are multi-centred and multi-layered – legal 
employment agencies, both in sending and in receiving countries, exist and are 
trackable, and to certain small extent accountable, but a great number of peo­
ple use informal contacts, and a variety of mediators. The major factor of future 
change, all over the Gulf, is the perilous mixture of falling oil prices (the GCCs 
main source of income), and a continued demographic expansion coupled with 
growing youth unemployment and changes  in  the domestic  structure of Arab 
family setups. Foreign maids are not likely ever be replaced by Arab nationals, 
but potential changes in the affluent Gulf life-style may cause reduced attrac­
tiveness of the migratory trend. Also relevant are the fast­evolving political and 
economic situations in the Horn of Africa. As Eritrea’s dictatorial regime spirals 
towards its downfall and war-torn Somalia sees little prospect of overcoming its 
immense hurdles, the appeal of migration from there to the Gulf won’t wither. As 
for  Ethiopia, despite its recent fast economic growth, it is not likely to decrease 
and will probably increase, continuing to push its growingly urbanized but un­
employed or underemployed youth away from the country. Hence, it’s not likely 
that the female migration flows from the Horn, or more generally from Africa, to 
the Gulf will drastically dwindle in the next decade.
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Confronting the “Arab North”: Interpretations 







For centuries, the greater Horn of Africa has been exposed to actors and influences 
crossing the Red Sea and sailing the Indian Ocean. The extension of these forces has had 
a profound effect in shaping contemporary societies and states in the sub-region over 
time. Contemporary Sudan is a fascinating example on how the extension of Islam and 
the elites-led emphasis on Arab identity has resulted in a society embracing Arab and 
Muslim culture. These characteristics in the territories that became the heartland of the 
contemporary Sudanese state translated into the formation of a nationalist governing 
elite promoting a particular form of Arab culture and interpretation of Islam as the main 
pillars of national identity for Sudan as a whole. However, the vast territories of contem-
porary Sudan are culturally highly heterogeneous. This contrasts starkly with the north-
ern political elite’s nation- and state-building project since decolonization, seeking to ho-
mogenize society through forced cultural assimilation. Since Sudan’s independence, the 
state elite imposing Arab culture and Islam has led to varying degrees of direct confron-
tation with groups that oppose such forced cultural and religious transformation. This 
chapter reflects on the role of interpretations of slavery and religion in armed opposition 
and its aftermath in Southern Sudan. It points to the use of particular views of slavery 
and religion in the two main insurgencies in 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, and reflects on 
their representations in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). The chapter argues 
that these interpretations are related to the Orientalist image of Sudan that connects with 
the aspirations of southern Sudan’s self-determination, independence, and drift towards 
East African socio-cultural and Indian Ocean economic space. 
keywords: Southern Sudan, slavery, Islamization, civil war, secession
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to establish hegemonic power over the territories that extend over contemporary 
Sudan. Here, as in many other places in the world, cultural influences from far­
away lands, spread through peaceful interaction or conquest, over a long period 
of time, were significant. In the case of today’s Sudan, historical narratives tend 





emphasis on Arab culture. While the extension of Islam was largely pacific, it 
also involved conquest and violence. One generation after the death of Prophet 
Muhammad, Muslim armies invaded Africa. Over the centuries, the kingdoms 
in  the  territories  that  later  came  to  be  known as northern  Sudan were  slowly 
annexed to Islam’s sphere of influence as a result of migration, peaceful assimila­
tion and conflict. In pre-Islamic times, Arab migrations to Sudan appear to have 
originated from Egypt and across the Red Sea, which set the pattern for later 
migrations (Hasan, 2003, p.11). From the 9th century onwards, economic motiva­
tions related to trade, and notably slaves that initially came from the western and 
central Bilad al-Sudan, among other commercial items, and mining of gold and 
emeralds,  drove many Arabs  to migrate  to  the heartlands  of what  constitutes 
contemporary Sudan (Hasan, 2003, p. 11, 17-18). By the 16th century this move­
ment eventually overwhelmed the kingdoms of Nubia and Alwa, while Arab mi­
grants settled in Butana and Gezira along the Nile as well as in the lowland areas 
of Kordofan and Darfur. Moving in these areas, they interacted and frequently 
intermarried with locals, which gradually produced mixed, at times culturally 
Arabized, frontier communities (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.22). 
Over time, sectors of the Arabized part of the population gained influence in 
the local communities. This was due largely to their increasing societal promi­
nence, often as  traders, which  tended  to promote  the  Islamic  religious culture 







al-Rahim, 1970, p.135-6; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.22). The gradual expansion 
of Islam then led to most societies in central, eastern, and western Sudan gradu­
ally adopting the new religion. Although mixed with local traditions and belief 
systems it became mostly celebrated in its local Sufi form.2 After the demise of the 
Nubian kingdoms in the early 14th century, notably the indigenous Sennar and 
Darfur sultanates became influential in territories of today’s central and western 
Sudan, respectively. Their spheres of influence extended from the borderlands 
of contemporary southern Sudan to the northern territories bordering today’s 
Egypt until first Sennar and then Darfur had to give way to the Ottoman invasion 
in the course of the 19th century.
The conquest by the Ottoman Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Ali is often con­
sidered the prelude to the making of a centralized polity in Sudan. Among Ali’s 
prime motivations in occupying the lands south of Egypt was to obtain slaves to 
strengthen his army. At its height, the Ottoman dominion bordered Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) and had its frontier lands extend to Darfur, southern Sudan, and the 
Red Sea coast. Yet, in 1885 the Ottoman rule collapsed before the Mahdist revo­
lution that drew heavily from the support of the Ansar (the Mahdi’s followers) 






that had been influential during the Ottoman period, giving the centralized state  
a degree of continuity. Still, the Mahdist experiment was short-lived and by 
1899 the Anglo­Egyptian army had taken control of most of northern and cen­
tral  Sudan. Anglo­Egyptian  rule,  under de  facto  British  administration,  further 
consolidated the centralized administration initially put in place by the Ottoman 
rulers under the British and Egyptian colonial elite. The slave trade was largely 
suppressed but slavery continued to exist in northern Sudan, while southern 










The process of decolonization, initiated in the 1940s, brought remarkably little 
change to the state and governance. The post­colonial state largely inherited the 
dominant  elites,  organization  and  structure  from  the Anglo­Egyptian  colonial 
state. The nationalist movement was dominated by the leaderships of the north­
ern Sufi  brotherhoods,  the Mahdists  and Khatmiyya, which had become domi­
nant forces partly due to their collaboration with the colonial masters.3 One of 
its main features, which marked both continuity and change, was the emphasis 
on national identity based on the most important self-defining features of the 
Sudanese political elite, Arab culture and Islam. Following the contours of the 
established  political  identity  perceptions  of  the  small well­educated  elite,  this 









The political elite’s hegemonic project appears to have faced most opposition 





saw forced cultural assimilation, in the historical context of slavery and perpetual 
racial inequality, as an outright assault on their own cultural dignity and values. 
This was due in part to the perception of not being treated equally by the Arab­
Muslim governing elite, and the feeling of exclusion from political power at the 
centre of Sudanese polity, as well as a sentiment of resistance towards assimila­
tion into the Arab-Muslim culture and the attempt to promote a regional iden­










provoked  resistance  among  sections of  the  southern  elite  in parts  of  southern 
Sudan, and precipitated mobilization for anti­state activities to counter the per­
ceived repressive policies.
This chapter explores interpretations of slavery and religion in the context 
of armed opposition in southern Sudan, and points to their connection with the 
aspiration  for  self­determination and an  independent polity aligned with East 
Africa. The  chapter does not  aspire  to give  a  comprehensive  account on  slav­






Slavery and Religion in the Making of “Sudan”
Over the centuries, the territories that form today’s Sudan became Islamicized. 
The  central  areas  of  this  region  also  became  gradually  culturally Arabized  in 




to Arab culture and Islam justified higher social status, and were used to legiti­





nated in the 7th century. This was the prelude for many Arabs engaging in com­
merce taking up lucrative slave trading in the region. Until the 19th century trade 
among the Sudanic kingdoms was relatively low in numbers in comparison to 
what followed during the period of Ottoman Egyptian domination. Particularly 
4 See e.g. Deng (1995a, 1995b) and Jok (2001, 2007).
5 Idris (2001, 2005) views Sudan as a “racialized state” in which social race, measured by excellence in Arab 




the  southern  fringes  of  the  Keira  (Darfur)  and  Sennar  (south­central  Sudan) 
served as major sources of slaves forming part of the overall Trans­Saharan trade 
as well as that across the Red Sea. The captives taken from the southern frontiers, 




the Arab expansion. From the 16th century onwards Sufi  orders originating  in 
the Middle East and practising mystical form of Islam based on a personal re­
lationship with God had become increasingly popular and gained influence in 




ment of sectarian organizations as power centres in the context of the political 
order of the state. These formations hosted prominent sections of Sudan’s politi­
cal elite until their later marginalization during the military dictatorship of Jaafar 
Nimeiri (1969­1985). 
The  structures  of  centralized  state  inherited by  contemporary Sudan origi­
nated  in  the  colonial period. The “Sudanese” administration  replacing  the  co­
lonial  state  during  decolonization  inherited  the  governing  apparatus  derived 
largely from the need to control the extensive territories and extract resources. 
It was centralized in Khartoum which was a strategically opportune location in 
the centre where the Blue and White Nile met. In order to consolidate their rule, 
the Ottoman Egyptians had initially chosen to collaborate with sections of the 
central riverine Shaigiyya peoples and the sectarian Khatmiyyah Sufi order based 
in Kassala, both of which seized the opportunity to benefit from cooperation 
with the colonial state. Consequently, the Ottoman Egyptian rule in these ar­
eas became strongest. However, the colonial state faced a number of revolts and 
in  the early 1880s  the harsh  rule had  resulted  in a violent anti­colonial move­
ment  by Muhammad Ahmad, who  claimed  to  be  and was  accepted by many 
as  the Mahdi. Originating  in Kordofan,  the movement drew particularly  sup­
port among the Baggara many of whom became Mahdist followers, the Ansar. 
Similarly  to  a  number  of  other  Muslim  groups  in  contemporary  Sudan,  the 
Baggara have manufactured genealogies for generations that trace their lineage 
6 On slavery in pre-colonial Sudan, see e.g. O’Fahey (1973) and O’Fahey and Spaulding (1974).
7 According to Woodward (2003, p. 96), “The politics of Islam from the eighteenth century onward was a reflection 
of the growth of the Sufi orders, or turuq (singular tariqa), who came into Sudan and steadily grew in size”.
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back to Muslim ancestors, and, despite being mixed peoples, they embrace Arab 
culture (Cunnison, 1971, p.186­96). 
The rebellion grew quickly and extended in different regions due to the 
Egyptian rule that had made life increasingly hard due to high taxation, corrup­
tion and attempts to abolish the slave trade on which many merchants depended. 
Faced by the overwhelming popular revolt, the state collapsed and was replaced 
by the Mahdist Islamic administration. However, although the Mahdists showed 
animosity  towards  the  former  regime  collaborators  and drove  the Khatmiyyah 




groups  in  the  prevailing  social  order,  but  laid  the  foundation  for  their  future 
prominence.
During  this  time  in north­central  Sudan,  the  idea of  awlad al-balad  (sons of 
the land) was adopted by the “fathers” (earlier generations) to claim a socially 
prominent position mainly among the Shaiqiyyah and Jaaliyyin. It came to be used 
as identification of belonging to the prominent state elite (Adam, Bartlett, and 
Nour, 2009, p.7), which as a whole wielded economic and political power. This 
“invention of  tradition”8 had wide  reaching  consequences  largely because  the 
educated northern elite promoted the discourse to advance the historical narra­
tives of “Arab” conquests and superiority in Sudan, and thereby claimed owner­
ship of  the Sudanese polity.  In  the course of decolonization  it  therefore estab­
lished a core of elite individuals claiming a socially defined exclusive right to 
power within the political structures of the state. Their self­proclaimed “pure” 
Arab and Muslim identity, justified by claims to generations of Arab and Muslim 
lineage, gave this exclusive group the right to power and generally disqualified 














exclusive British ruling methods followed the practice of governance initiated 
during the Turkiyyah, and perpetuated political sectarianism, tribalism, and the 




eficial in terms of wealth and status. For instance, elite sectors of the riverine 
peoples who occupied administrative positions, as well as some privileged indi­
viduals connected to the leading Sufi and sectarian orders, were able to acquire 
higher education at Gordon College, Sudan’s main institution of higher learning. 
Modern education, participation in the colonial administration and British views 
of the more sophisticated central riverine Sudanese, in comparison with the pe­
ripheral populations and borderlanders, gave  fertile ground  for growth of  the 
attitude of superiority among these elites. Moreover, the heads of the leading Sufi 
movements and sectarian orders benefited significantly from their collaboration. 
Particularly Sayyid Abd Rahman al­Mahdi  (the neo­Mahdists)  and Sayyid Ali 
al­Mirghani (Khatmiyyah), used their large social constituencies and sectarian ri­
valry to extract resources and strengthen their social status. The British feared the 
mobilization capacity of each movement that could be used against the state, and 
sought to keep their leaderships content by proportioning economic wealth and 
allowing them to exert influence over large sections of the northern Sudanese 
population.
In the social order of the colonial state which to an extent privileged Arab-
Muslim identification, it was southern Sudan that contrasted the most. The 




Islamic influences brought by officials and merchants from the north, the colonial 
masters became protectionist. Particularly following the nationalist current in the 









British effort to isolate southern Sudan as an effort to protect the “noble savage” 
from Arab and Islamic domination and slavery, has been instrumental in shap­
ing the Western approaches to Sudan. It also permitted the instrumentalization 
of the sense of difference between northern and southern Sudan by the southern 
Sudanese separatist leadership in the attempt to achieve its objectives of self-
determination and/or an independent state.  
Interpretations of Slavery and Religion during Decoloniza­




cause of the fear of Egypt successfully annexing Sudan and it falling out of the 
sphere of British influence. Sections of the educated riverine Sudanese national­
ists, projecting their Arab-Muslim self-identification as the basis for Sudanese na­
tional identity, were vocal advocators of the end of colonial rule. While the neo­
Mahdists who formed the Umma party sought  independence, Khatmiyyah and 
its political wing, the National Unionist Party (NUP), leaned towards Sudan’s 
association with Egypt. The British viewed the northern intelligentsia composed 
of the sectarian elite, and associated educated class, as the fittest to govern Sudan 
and inherit control of the administration. The decolonization process, initiated in 
1946, resulted in the “Sudanization” of public administration and security forces, 
which  in practice meant  that  they became dominated by the northern riverine 
elites and their constituencies. 
In the process of decolonization, the Southern Policy was abandoned and the 
southern provinces were re-annexed to northern Sudan. In 1947 the British con­
voked a conference in Juba to assess the attitudes of hand-picked members of 
the southern elite towards reunification with the north, which had already been 
decided on. Although the sentiments of fear and mistrust expressed by southern­
ers at the conference are apparent in its documented proceedings (RJC, 1947), the 
British eventually re-annexed southern provinces to northern Sudan despite dis­
agreements among themselves about the possible consequences.9 The southern 
representatives were  initially  assured  of  safeguards when  reincorporated  into 
northern Sudan, and the northern political forces that had been actively present 






It was the exclusive Sudanization and reunification, which primarily trig­
gered the southern fears of renewed northern domination. In the context of the 








to turn into contempt and hatred. The influx of northern administrators, teachers, 
and senior army and police officers into the southern provinces generated these 
adverse sentiments. They joined with that of impotence of gaining economic and 
political power (mainly jobs and effective representation able to secure southern 
rights), while the northern “Arabs” seemed to enjoy both of these and take advan­
tage of their privileged position in southern Sudan.
A number of authors mention the collective sentiments of fear, anxiety, and 
mistrust  towards  the  northerners  as  being  important  to  the  understanding  of 
conflict formation in southern Sudan.11 In such situations, the local leaders may 
play a significant role in encouraging and instrumentalizing such feelings, which 
serves to fuel the existing sense of insecurity towards the other (Arfi, 1998; Buzan, 
Wæver,  and  de Wilde,  1998; McSweeney,  1999).  Indeed,  the  interpretation  of 
slavery as a violent form of extreme subjugation and exploitation and the fear of 
its return in the context of northern “Arab” domination contributed to the radi­




cause the British administrators cut most of southern Sudan off from interaction 
with the northern “Arab”, and to the Western missionaries extending Christian 
and to an extent anti-northern and anti-Islamic values among the members of 
the embryonic mission­educated southern elite. The colonial administration had 
sought to build a buffer against Arabic and Muslim influences by socializing 
10 In the final stage of the Sudanization process, southerners obtained 6 of 800 administrative positions (Taisier 












Armed  with  this  understanding,  a  selection  of  members  of  the  southern 
Sudanese elite became antagonistic towards what was viewed as northern riverine 
“Arab” domination. Apart  from perceivably marginalizing  southerners during 
Sudanization,  the  new  rulers  discarded  the  earlier  promises  of  political  safe­
guards and possible federal solution for southern Sudan. By the mid­1950s the 
antagonism had  turned  into  hatred,  particularly  in  areas  in  the  southernmost 
Equatoria Province following the  farcical trial of a local member of parliament, 
Elia Kuze, and when southern workers  in the Nzara agricultural scheme were 
laid off while more northern personnel was simultaneously hired. In 1955, a 










In 1958, a military coup resulted in the end of the brief democratic experiment 











serve the attempt to cement the governing Arab-Muslim elite’s domination in 
southern Sudan. 
Yet, the Abboud regime’s measures were unable to annihilate the armed op­
position, which began to receive increasing external support in the early 1960s. 
Some  of  this  assistance  came  from  Christian  organizations,  with  Equatorian 
priest Father Saturnino Lohure becoming an important figure in channelling re­
sources (Gray, 2002, p.120). The regime’s policy to expel Christian missionaries 
from southern Sudan (1962­1964) followed the perception that missionaries were 
agents of foreign powers. This led to foreign Christian players becoming active 
in supporting the southern opposition. The repression, but without sufficient 
strength to end the rebellion, and the external support, allowed the expansion of 
political opposition into a number of armed factions and non­armed resistance. 
The antagonism towards the northern “Arab” state was an mobilization impor­
tant factor and fuelled the rebellion. Another crucial element was external sup­
port, which strengthened the armed opposition. 
In the course of the conflict, various opposition factions controlled areas and 
their communities in southern Sudan. Still, it was Joseph Lagu, who had defected 
from the army and founded his Anya­Nya rebel command, that controlled much 
of the arms flows to the opposition, who unified the rebel groups under his lead­
ership and the later Southern Sudan Liberation Front/Movement (SSLF/M). In 
May 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri had taken power in Sudan in an Arab socialist 
officers’ army coup. He increasingly curbed external support for southern reb­
els by improving relations with the southern neighboring states, intensified the 
counterinsurgency effort and promised development in southern Sudan. Both 
through Lagu’s unification of the rebel command and Nimeiri’s successful coun­
terinsurgency policy the way for a negotiated settlement became possible.13
Finally, in 1972, the government and the SSLF/M agreed on peace in Addis 
Ababa with Ethiopian mediation. This became a  reality  largely because of  the 
SSLF/M’s weakening position and Nimeiri’s Arab socialist approach, which for 
the first time officially recognized the different southern way of life that was re­
flected in the policy on language and religion. The Addis Ababa peace agreement 
granted southern Sudan self­government and  limited autonomy by uniting  its 
three original provinces  (Bahr al­Ghazal, Equatoria,  and Upper Nile)  into one 
region, and ensured that English became recognized as the “principle language” 
of  the southern region (AAA, 1972, Chapter  II, Article 6.). Although it did not 





was implicit that southern self-government could buffer Islamic influences and 
protect  southern  rights.  The  1973  permanent  constitution,  in  turn,  recognized 
Christianity and other “noble spiritual beliefs” (Part II, Chapter I, Article 16), and 
the constitutional validity of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Part I, Article 8) (PCS, 
1973). The Addis Ababa peace agreement can be seen as a political settlement that 
sought to protect southern Sudan from the perceived northern “Arab” domina­
tion. But in the end the Southern Region remained subject to the arbitrary and 
unchecked political influence of the leadership of the dictatorial national govern­
ment, which was a major factor leading to its eventual failure.
The Second Insurgency in Southern Sudan
The second rebellion in southern Sudan emerged in the context of abolition 
of the Southern Region and its institutions. President Nimeiri had personally in­
fluenced the southern leadership throughout the 1970s,14 and dissolved the re­





A military conspiracy among officers, who claimed dissatisfaction over the politi­
cal developments, triggered mutinies, which escalated into a rebellion.15
By  the  early  1970s  Islamic  resurgence was penetrating northeast Africa.  In 
this regional context, soon after a failed 1971 allegedly communist coup attempt 
and the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the government initiated a policy shift. 
By the mid­1970s, Nimeiri considered that the northern sectarian political elite, 
which for the first time had lost power in 1969 and had been driven into exile, 
needed to be accommodated. The sectarian leadership had found refuge in the 
Gulf States, and had staged aborted coups with external backing. Clearly, substi­
tuting the northern elite organizations with southern Sudan as an unprecedented 
regime constituency had been insufficient to consolidate the regime against po­
litical instability caused by the exiled northern political factions. While it had be­
come apparent that in the regional context of Islamic resurgence embracing Islam 
would be beneficial, Nimeiri found support from the Sudanese Muslim brothers 
who had formed a minority party formation of Islamic Charter Front (ICF) in the 
14 See e.g. Collins (2008, pp. 112, 115, 133, 134).





pragmatist, embarked on “national reconciliation” with the most influential and 
potentially threatening northern sectarian opposition factions, and invited them 
to return to Sudan but deliberately marginalized them to maintain control. The 
regime  began  favouring  the Muslim  brothers  as  its  new  constituency  and  se­
cured backing from Saudi Arabia and the United States while it became increas­
ingly inclined to abolish the Southern Region. 
The Muslim brothers advocated Sudan’s Arab and Muslim identity. The 
National Islamic Front (NIF), founded by Hassan al­Turabi in 1976, and increas­
ingly politically influential, was among the most eager northern elite organiza­
tions  to assimilate  the peripheries  through active  Islamization. As  such,  it op­
posed any special recognition of southern Sudan, and perceived any concessions 
to the southerners as the state giving in to separatism and outright secessionism. 
However,  this was  not  new  since  the  sectarian  parties  had  already  been  con­
cerned about the possibility of southern secession since decolonization, and gen­




In this context, certain Islamist sections of the northern elite thrived. Receiving 
financing from the Arabian Peninsula and diaspora, and controlling much of the 
banking and economic sector in Sudan, Turabi’s NIF grew in power and influ­
ence. Under increasing pressure, Nimeiri made concessions to Islamist elements, 
notably regarding the issue of southern Sudan. Having been involved in the poli­






ernment control of the oil fields. Seeking to capture the oil-rich territory, the gov­
ernment distorted the administrative boundaries and in 1980 Nimeiri created a 
new Unity State, but southern politicians discovered the attempt to manipulate 
the regions’ borders and denounced it. A dispute over the oil issue flared up and 
eventually became an important factor in influencing Nimeiri’s decision to abol­
ish southern self­government.16





Securing external support mainly from Ethiopia, the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) led by John Garang emerged as the most power­
ful among the competing southern armed factions. The revolutionary SPLM/A 
manifesto detailed a number of grievances, which were mainly related to north­
ern  “Arab” political  and  economic domination.  Following  the  outbreak  of  the 
rebellion, Nimeiri first abolished the southern autonomy that formed part of the 
1973 Sudanese constitution in an unconstitutional move, and in September 1983 
declared Islamic shari’a law in the whole country. These constituted symbolic 
steps subjugating southern Sudan and propelling state­led Islamization. The two 
measures fuelled the war as they caused re­emergence of fears of violent north­









behind-the-scenes support from Turabi, further politicized religion as an effort 
to  implement  its “National Salvation Revolution” that entailed the building of 
an  Islamic  state  through  societal  transformation  (Voll,  2000, p.165­6). The NIF 
regime took radical measures to eradicate opposition, using religion in its coun­
terinsurgency campaign while seeking to Islamize defiant populations, and de­
clared jihad against the insurgents. It sought to forcefully assimilate local pop­
ulations into Islam, including in some regions to systematically eradicate local 
cultures.17 For instance, in southern Kordofan this effort consisted of eliminating 
those opposing the state, displacing the civil population ostensibly supporting 
them, and seeking  to  Islamize particularly  the  internally displaced who made 
their way to the government administered “peace camps” where they were sub­
jected to harsh treatment.18
The SPLM/A sought to capitalize on this situation by repeatedly highlighting 
in its propaganda how government politicized religion was an extension of its at­









sisting “Muslim” and “Arab” government’s violent repression. Highlighting the 
continuing group­based inequality and marginalization to which southern Sudan 
was subjected, it succeeded in presenting the fight against forced Arabization and 
Islamization as synonymous with the liberation of southern Sudan from north­
ern domination. This was instrumental in influencing the interested and power­




ly in the peacemaking in Sudan. The external players most active in the peace 
process, mainly the US and a selection of European states (namely Norway, the 
UK, Italy and the Netherlands), had for long assumed the importance of histori­
cal narratives of slavery and religious subjugation as the main explanations of 
understanding political instability and armed conflict in the country. This was 
due to an extent to the Western historiography, with its orientalist overtones 
(Spaulding and Kapteijns, 1991), which has often depicted southern Sudan and 
its peoples as the victims of northern oppression. Both slavery and religion are 
inherent in the subjugation narrative, transmitting into the attitudes of external 
actors towards the main protagonists of the war in Sudan and influencing their 
relations with and approach towards the warring parties and the conflict.
Indeed, powerful narratives of slavery’s legacy of unequal status between the 
Arab­Muslims and southerners continue to appear. For instance, Jok (2007) ar­
gues that due to continuing racist attitudes in northern Sudan, the black south­
erners have had no chance of becoming full members of the “Arab” in­group and 
exercising equal rights despite adopting the cultural prerequisites, including cus­
toms, language, and religion. Others have also pointed to this persisting social 
marginalization based on physical appearance, ethnic background and cultural 
attributes (Idris, 2001, 2005; Sharkey, 2003), which has generated grievances and 
fed antagonism. Moreover, relevant to grievances related to lower social status, 







tion projects in the North” (p.138). Such attitudes have fuelled perceptions of 
“Arab­Muslim” imposed social inferiority of southerners.
The dominant Western discourses on religion and conflict in Sudan often 
emphasize  the use  of  religion  as  a political weapon.  In  them,  Islam has  often 
been singled out as having played a prominent role in inciting violent conflict, 
particularly  as  a  political  tool  of  the  Islamists.  The  National  Congress  Party 
(NCP, the former NIF) government’s use of religion has been apparent as part 
of  its  counterinsurgency  campaigns particularly  in  the  early 1990s against  the 













In the final stages of the peace negotiations leading to the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), the SPLM/A leadership found itself in a strong position. 
It was backed by the powerful Western states, especially the US, which largely 
positioned themselves against the Islamist regime in Khartoum, and could use 
the “Arab” domination narrative in order to try to influence these actors for fa­
vourable negotiation outcomes. Despite little evidence of slavery in contempo­
rary Sudan, at least in the sense and magnitude that had occurred in the 19th 
century,19 it became a topic that the SPLM/A could exploit and that eventually 




however,  highlighting  the  protracted  violent  domination  and massive  human 





tributed to the otherwise favourable terms for the SPLM/A in the CPA, including 
the  clause  for a  self­determination  referendum and  the possibility of  seceding 
from Sudan (CPA, 2005). 
In  contrast,  the  Sudanese  governments  have  generally  used  “Arab”  and 
“Muslim” labels to gain external support especially from Arab States. They have 
used the historical links and cultural affinities between northern Sudan and the 
Arabian Peninsula, and the current NCP government has been no stranger to ex­
ploiting these generally warm relations. Among the latest manifestations of this 
is Sudan’s involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervening in the civil war in 
Yemen, which has resulted in economic support to improve the ailing finances 






bin Laden and allegedly participated in the assassination attempt of Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak in 1995, the US blacklisted and imposed sanctions on 
Sudan.  This  led  to  further  deterioration  of  already  problematic  relations,  cul­
minating in a political confrontation in which the US and its Western allies ap­
peared increasingly to be siding with the SPLM/A and other Sudanese opposi­
tion forces. In these circumstances of mounting international pressure, Khartoum 
attempted to improve its position by seemingly changing its posture. Particularly 
the US was keen on Sudan’s volte-face, and welcomed Sudan’s newly expressed 
willingness to assist in intelligence on Islamist terrorism after the 1998 embassy 
bombings in East Africa and the 9/11 attacks attributed to al-Qaeda. Khartoum’s 
cooperation and the warring parties’ seeming willingness to reach a negotiated 
end to the conflict facilitated the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development’s 
mediation efforts over which especially the US exerted significant influence.20 
The  long and occasionally stagnated peace process, originating  in  the mid­
1990s, and involving a series of agreements notably in 2002­2003, eventually cul­
minated in the signing of the CPA in January 2005. A vast document,  the 259­











that  religion  and  customs  should not determine  access  to public  employment 
(CPA, 2005, p. 5). It also restricted Islamic shari’a law to the capital, Khartoum 
and exempted non-Muslims from its penalties, while recognizing Arabic as the 
national  language and English as  the  language of government business  (CPA, 
2005, p.23, 25­6). These provisions can be seen as important because they posed 
an attempt to remedy the perceived marginalization, exclusion, and subjugation 
of southerners (and others) in Sudan as a whole. But in this regard the CPA also 
became an ultimatum to the northern governing elite to end marginalization and 
discrimination, because failing “to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive op­
tion especially to the people of South Sudan” (CPA, 2005, p. 2) would allow them 
to vote for secession in a self-determination referendum to take place after a six-
year (2005­2011) interim period (CPA, 2005, p. 8). 
The transition period was to assess the former warring parties’ capacity to 
overcome their differences and to work together within the framework of one 
state in which the region of Southern Sudan would again exercise autonomy. 
This  autonomy was  guaranteed  by  the  stipulated  SPLM majority  in  Southern 
Sudan’s newly created political institutions (while it became a minority partner 
at national level), and crucially the SPLA becoming the formal regional security 
apparatus in charge of protecting Southern Sudan. This formalized the SPLM/A’s 
one­party domination of the region (mirroring the NCP domination in Northern 
Sudan), while giving it security safeguards which the earlier Addis Ababa agree­
ment and Southern Self-Government Act had not. Both parties committed to 
“making unity attractive” for the Southern Sudanese, including celebrating civic 
liberties and religious  tolerance, and promoting economic development, while 
the Southern Sudanese could opt for secession in the self­determination referen­
dum in case unity was not made attractive during the six-year transition period. 
This way, the discourse of subjugation and religious domination continued play 
a part in the political dynamics during the interim period. 
The CPA was heavily influenced by the southern and Western views of the 
conflict, the history of violence and massive human rights violations. Following 
the sudden death of SPLM/A’s supreme leader John Garang in July 2005, seces­
sionist elements within the movement close to the new leader Salva Kiir gained 
relative importance. Their objective of gaining independence contributed to the 




im period the SPLM/A governed Southern Sudan with an iron fist to ensure the 
desired outcome of the vote for self-determination. Expectedly, the referendum 
brought an overwhelming 98.33% vote for secession, with 97.58% voter turnout 
(SSR,  2011),  and  Southern  Sudan  became  the  independent  Republic  of  South 
Sudan on 9 July 2011.
One important factor considered during Southern Sudan’s referendum, seces­
sion, and international recognition was the economic viability of the new state. 
Politically, many believed rather naively that the SPLM/A-dominated order 
would be sufficient to end armed conflict and maintain stability, and that the 
SPLM/A elite would be equipped to successfully lead the country. Economically, 
South Sudan was seen as a viable state because approximately 75% of Sudan’s 
oil reserves were located in its territory. Little consideration was given to  the 
fact that its oil needed to be piped through Sudan and subjected to Khartoum’s 
control and  transit  fees, and overlooking  its overwhelming dependence on oil 
exports (98% of the official budget) and a potentially chronic case of “Dutch 
disease”21 in the absence of any significant agricultural and industrial sectors. 
However, alternative plans for exporting oil were made. These were accel­
erated by the crisis in which South Sudan accused Sudan of siphoning off its 
petroleum revenues and imposing excessive transit fees. This eventually led it 
to stop oil exports from its territory and the fighting of a brief but destructive 
border conflict (Ylönen, 2012). The plans to find alternative solutions for export­





One idea which embodies this attempt was to ship oil on barges up the Nile 
to Uganda from where it could be transported to Kenya for export. Another ver­
sion of this was that oil could be transported by road in trucks either to Uganda 
or directly to Kenya from where it could be shipped out. Yet, due to infeasibility 





21 “Dutch disease” is meant to describe the overwhelming dependence on oil exports relative to other sectors of 









In this context, building a pipeline to the Port of Lamu in Kenya became an ob­




Ababa are good in part due to Ethiopia’s role in mediating in the South Sudan 
civil war. Ethiopia and Djibouti are also  in  the process of building a  transport 
corridor which they hope to eventually to extend from the Red Sea to the Atlantic 
through South Sudan (Mail & Guardian Africa, 2015). This may offer landlocked 
South Sudan yet another route to the sea in the future.
However, the current crisis in South Sudan which initially unfolded in 2013 
has pitted the country between the supporters of President Salva Kiir and the 
former Vice­President Riek Machar.  The  armed opposition under Machar  has 
threatened to occupy the oil fields, while Khartoum has likely supported the reb­
els at least in the eastern part of South Sudan (SSNA, 2013) partly in response to 


















Sudan has suffered from protracted war since its independence. The two lon­
gest rebellions in the country in which millions of people perished took place in 
southern Sudan. The role of the legacy of slavery and religion in these insurgen­





nomic power and  to gain support  from Arab states. They have  largely sought 
to maintain  the  social  organization  based  on  socio­culturally  hierarchical  and 






the armed conflict, especially in southern Sudan. First, the type of social subjuga­
tion marked by the legacy of slavery and politicization of Islam imposed as part 
of northern (state) domination has been mostly confronted in southern Sudan as 




the case in the formation of the first rebellion in southern Sudan during decolo­
nization, the case of the second insurgency is less clear. Rather, it seems that the 
later southern Sudanese armed opposition, particularly the SPLM/A, was more 





Christianity played a role in both rebellions. Islam’s prominent role in organiz­
ing society in northern Sudan, and the politicization and use of religion to de­








that although religious differences of individuals may not cause rebellion, the as­
sociation of religion with power, marginalization, and domination in the society 





with heavily Orientalist attempts to influence external actors and approaches to 
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India and Africa: Maritime Security and India’s 






In the 2010s, in conjunction with an expansion of India’s naval capabilities, there has 
been a significant extension of India’s maritime security relationships throughout the 
Indian Ocean region. Much of the emphasis has been on developing relationships with 
small states (Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Oman) at, or near, the key points of entry 
into the Western Indian Ocean. Arguably, the extreme asymmetries in size have made the 
development of such relationships relatively easy, as there is no question of competition or 
rivalry. Some of these states have long seen India as a benign security provider and have 
maritime policing needs that India can usefully fulfil. In some cases, India may effectively 
act as a security guarantor, as is arguably the case with Mauritius and the Maldives.
But gaps inevitably remain in India’s strategic posture and New Delhi needs to further 
strengthen its hand in coastal Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula. Also, littoral states 
on the African seaboard look towards regional power centres for assistance in maintain-
ing maritime order and addressing security challenges. Countries with enhanced mari-
time capabilities like India, South Africa, Australia, and the US could assist by not only 
co-operating amongst themselves, but also by taking other littoral states on board as part 
of multilateral efforts towards the maintenance of maritime order. A challenge for New 
Delhi is to maintain perceptions of India as a benign and non-hegemonic power in the 
Indian Ocean region as it moves towards achieving great power status. 





the western Indian Ocean region over the next 10 to 15 years. But first the region 
has to be defined. 
Defining the Western Indian Ocean
Covering  an  area  of  some  68.5 million  km²  and  bounded  by  land masses  on 
three sides (Africa, Asia, and Australia), the Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest 
ocean. The greater oceanic region, though complex, forms a distinct geographical 
area. In comparison to the world’s other oceans, defining the exact boundaries of 
the Indian Ocean has been something of an imprecise science and has been a long­
standing source of disagreement (Luke & O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 9). Sithara Fernando 
(2011, p. 23) adds a fourth land mass, Antarctica, in which case the total ocean area 
increases by several million square kilometres.
Figure 1: Parameters of the Western Indian Ocean
For the purposes of this chapter, the ‘Western Indian Ocean’ can be delimited 















•  longitude 88°E, running roughly through Kolkata (Calcutta) on India’s 
east coast, down to latitude 60°S.
According to this delimitation, the Western Indian Ocean region comprises the 






toral and island states, as well as three territories in an entirely different category, 
controlled by extra-regional states: Réunion and Mayotte (both France) and the 
British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), including the Chagos archipelago and the 
atoll of Diego Garcia (United Kingdom). Moreover, the region also includes nu­
merous  other  island  territories,  such  as  Lakshadweep  (India),  Socotra  (on  the 
entrance to the Gulf of Aden, Yemen), and Tromelin Island, the islands of Juan 
de Nova, Bassas da India, and Isle de l’Europa (in the Mozambique Channel, 
France), which constitute valuable exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and strategic 
outposts (Schofield, 2007, p. 3).1
Maritime Security and the Threat of Somali Piracy in the 
Western Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean is, once again, becoming an arena for geostrategic rivalry 
of  some  sort  (see  Brewster,  2014,  pp.  5­11;  Shambaugh,  2009,  pp.  137­157).  In 
fact, the region is emerging as one of the 21st century’s leading strategic theatres,  
1 The broader Indian Ocean ‘Rim’ consists of 29 littoral countries and 6 island states. The Indian Ocean ‘Region’ 
can either be limited to the Rim countries, or it can be expanded to include landlocked countries dependent on 
the Indian Ocean. Thus, the number of states that comprise the Indian Ocean ‘Region’ can vary from a minimum 





Relations  between  the  three major  powers  of  the  region,  India, China  (the 
People’s Republic of China, PRC), and the United States, continue to evolve in 
complexity, heightened by the rise of India and China and a possible decline in 
US power in the region. However, the perception of US strategic decline warrants 
caution and should not be taken too literally. Of the three powers, indeed of all 
the world’s leading powers, the US alone has the ability to project significant 
and sustained force into the region. It is a capability which, to 2020 at least, other 
powers can only aspire to. Furthermore, the US presence is viewed positively by 
India, which recognises it as a bulwark against Chinese expansion and assertive­




all or most of the risks involved. India’s naval expansion is a case in point, as it 





security (Chaturvedi & Okunev, 2012, p. 1; Hartley, 2012, p. 5).2 However, now 








mental issues: land degradation, access to fresh-water resources, the exploitation 
of fishing stocks, climate change, the illegal disposal of nuclear waste, environ­
mental refugees and urban expansion and deterioration (Chaturvedi & Okunev, 
2012, p. 1; see Hughes, 2011, pp. 41­45; UN Secretariat, 2008; UNEP, 2005).
2  For overall GDP figures and GDP figures per capita, see World Bank (2015), and IMF (2015). 
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Figure 2: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC)
Of the three temperate oceans of the world, the Indian Ocean is probably the 




ity, international trade and global energy flows. From whichever direction, entry 




responses of regional navies are, ensuring the safe and efficient passage of these 
cargoes. Indeed, there are also countries outside the immediate region depend­









but  it  should  also  be  appreciated  that  “maritime  strategy has  a  [clear]  peace­
time dimension” (McCaffrie, 1996, p. 7; see also Groenewald, 1997, p.1). Maritime 
strategy is idiosyncratic; in fact, it is fundamentally and significantly different 
from any other purpose -- it is unique. To quote Jack McCaffrie (1996, p. 4) again:
Navies have always been noted for  their versatility and,  in particular,  their util­
ity in situations short of conflict. This versatility comes from the characteristics of 
reach  (including  sustainability),  adaptability  (including  the  capacity  to  threaten 





the world of today, however, the luxury hardly exists of making clear-cut distinc­
tions between traditional ‘military’ security issues (naval threats and challenges), 
hard, ‘non-military’ security issues (arms, narcotics and human trafficking, pira­
cy and terrorism at sea and the protection of shipping, SLOCs, fishing stocks, sea-
bed minerals and offshore oil and natural gas resources) and soft, ‘non-military’ 
security issues, such as providing energy security, safeguarding port and ship­
building facilities, delimiting extended maritime spaces (EEZs), enforcing legal 
and regulatory mechanisms in maritime zones (maritime management), protect­
ing the maritime environment, preventing pollution and dumping of toxic waste 
and securing dual-purpose oceanographic data (Roy, n.d., pp. 1 & 2). Thus, mari­
time security basically deals with  the prevention of  illicit  activity  in  the mari­
time domain, covering national, regional and international efforts to enforce such 
security. Current global realities have  introduced a range of maritime security 
challenges in the Indian Ocean region as the roles of non­state actors have direct 
and fundamental effects on the evolving situation. This is a serious development 
as the rich Indian Ocean maritime trade, which includes much of the world’s 




Figure 3: West-East-West SLOCs Traversing the Indian Ocean
Recent economic turbulence worldwide suggests that a prudent and cautious 
approach to the matter of maritime security is required everywhere. Indeed, 
when economic growth is charging along and prosperity seems assured for all, 
voices of protest and disquiet usually  tend  to  fade, especially  in authoritarian 
regimes (Lingle, 1997, p. 55). But the present political discord in some countries is 
symptomatic of the converse of that contention. It is difficult, of course, to predict 
what the next stage in the world economy will have in store, but it is fairly obvi­
ous that economic growth will, of necessity, rely to a very large extent on the use 
of SLOCs (Cozens, 1998, pp. 1­2). What, then, are the latent and potential areas of 
friction which could surface to threaten freedom of navigation or otherwise im­
pede the free flow of trade in the SLOCs of the Indian Ocean area? The following 
represent some areas of insecurity (see Valencia, 1998): 
•  Transnational disputes may arise from perceived irregularities by a littoral 
state in the practice of the right of ‘innocent passage’ through territorial waters 
by foreign ships. A littoral state may merely suspect ‘activities inimical to its in­
terests’. 
•  Marine pollution is a major source of concern. An estimated 25,000 tonnes 




longitude 88°E. The effect on local communities and traditional fishing villages 
could be catastrophic and thus has political and security consequences. 




•  Maritime territorial disputes and inter-regional tensions could be exacer­
bated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
which now permits littoral states to impose national development interests in the 
ocean arena (EEZs), an extension of jurisdiction that has opened up a Pandora’s 
Box of volatile issues.
There  are  also  some  tasks not  readily  appreciated or understood,  grouped 
under the collective title of ‘maritime confidence-building measures’ (see Grove, 
1996, Chapter 5): (1) transparency measures, such as visits by naval vessels, shar­
ing general information on doctrine, policies and force structures, joint publish­
ing of tactical and operating doctrines (that is, replenishment at sea, RAS), ex­
changing of personnel, and joint observation of naval exercises; (2) co-operation 
measures, more generally search and rescue (SAR) and humanitarian operations; 
and  (3)  incidents­at­sea  agreements,  addressing  particular  regional  concerns, 
such as surveillance, fisheries, anti-piracy, anti-narcotic and illegal migration 
traffic, and dealing with activities usually tending to be bilateral in nature, but 
could also be extended to a multilateral forum such as the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS). 
The fact that these measures are suggested as necessary illustrates a degree of 
‘uncertainty-based planning’ in the Indian Ocean. This is not to suggest the begin­
nings of an arms race, but rather the convergence of at least two important moti­
vators. First, since the ratification of UNCLOS III, governments are acutely aware 
of the importance of their rights and sovereignty over their respective ocean terri­
tories and EEZs. Second, in order to exercise these responsibilities countries need 
‘sea-securing resources’; in other words, ships capable of exercising sea power. It 
is into this arena that Indian Ocean navies and others need to insert sea­control 
platforms as a contribution to reducing insecurity at sea, thus demonstrating a 
3 Underwater oil exploration and production in the north-western Indian Ocean takes place in an offshore 
oilfield, Bombay High (65km long, 23km wide, 75 metres deep), 176km off the coast of Mumbai in the Gulf of 
Khambhat off the Indian west coast, opposite the shores of the Indian states of Gujarat and Maharashtra (Rao & 
Talukdar, 1980, p. 487). British Petroleum (BP) joined India’s Reliance Industries in a partnership on 23 oil and gas 
production­sharing contracts. This includes the KG­D6 block, spread across more than 50,000km² in the Krishna 





firm resolve to maintain and preserve good order at sea. The costs of disrupted 
trade flows are probably incalculable, but nevertheless enormous, and the effects 
are unpredictable, but nonetheless deleterious to all in the Indian Ocean region 





India’s Strategic Interests in the Western Indian Ocean
In recent times, India has adopted an expansive maritime strategy. Driven by 
great power aspirations and by strategic rivalry with China, India is expanding 
its naval capabilities and security relationships throughout the Indian Ocean re­







Among  the changes  in  Indian strategic  thinking  in  recent years has been a 
partial reorientation in India’s strategic outlook in the maritime domain. Clearly, 
Indian strategic thinking has traditionally had a continental outlook. For thou­
sands of years, military threats to India have been perceived as coming primar­
ily from the northwest,4 reinforced by the country’s experience in the 20th cen­
tury when any direct military  threats  (from  Japan, Pakistan,  and China) were 
land-based. The continuing threats on India’s western and northern borders and 
from domestic insurgencies has led to the Indian Army holding an undisputedly 
dominant position within the Indian military establishment. However, there is 
a developing view among some Indian strategists of India as a maritime power: 
that India’s peninsular character and geographic position gives the Indian Ocean 
a preponderant influence over the country’s destiny (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 11-
15 & 23-35; Brewster, 2010a, p. 1; Menon, 2009). As Subhash Kapila (2012, p. 1) 
points out:
4 However, this is not to suggest that the Ottoman (Turkish), Portuguese, Dutch, French and British military 




The Indian Ocean stands aptly named because India’s peninsular geographi­
cal configuration… places [it in a] unique commanding position on the Bay of 
Bengal on the eastern flank of the Deccan Peninsula and the Arabian Sea on the 
western flank. In strategic maritime terms, India is in a position to dominate the 
vast expanse of maritime waters from … the Gulf of Aden … all the way down 
south to the outermost extremities of the … [Southern Oceans].
Some Indian leaders have also drawn a close connection between India’s 
maritime ambitions and its destiny as a great power. As former Indian Foreign 




even more so as a maritime power, and consequently as one that is of significance 
on the world stage.
Thus, one could argue that any significant geographical expansion of Indian 
influence can only take place in the maritime domain. As Rajiv Sikri (2009, p. 
250), a former Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, commented: 
“If  India aspires  to be a great power,  then  the only direction  in which … [its] 
strategic influence can spread is across the seas. In every other direction there are 
formidable constraints.”
India’s standing as the most populous state in the Indian Ocean region and 
its central position in the northern Indian Ocean have long contributed to beliefs 
about the country’s destiny to control its eponymous ocean (the ocean to which 
its name was given). According to some, there is now a well­established tradi­
tion among the Indian strategic community that the Indian Ocean is, or should 
be, ‘India’s Ocean’. Many in the Indian Navy see it as destined to become the 
predominant maritime security provider in a region stretching from the Bab­el­
Mandeb to the Malacca Strait, and also having a significant security role in areas 
beyond (Scott, 2006, p. 99). This view was amplified by former US Secretary of 
Defence Robert Gates affirming that the US was “… look[ing] to India to be a 
partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond” (Murphy, 
2009). And, according to Donald Berlin (2006, p. 60):
New Delhi  regards  the  Indian Ocean as  its backyard and deems  it both natural 
and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant 




Hemisphere at an early stage in America’s ‘rise to power’.
Many Indian maritime strategists see predominance in the Indian Ocean as po­
tentially also delivering significant influence in East Asia. Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
the 19th century American naval strategist, is frequently cited by Indian strategic 
thinkers, including a statement (incorrectly) attributed to him: “Whoever con­
trols the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the 
world will be decided on its [the Indian Ocean’s] waters”.5
During the Cold War, India’s ability to pursue its maritime ambitions was se­
verely constrained and for decades following independence the Indian Navy was 
known as the ‘Cinderella’ of the Indian armed forces. However, increased en­
thusiasm for maritime power has been accompanied by an expansion in India’s 
naval  capabilities;6  since  the mid­1990s  the  country  has  embarked  on  a major 
programme to develop a ‘blue-water’ navy with significant increases in naval ex­
penditure. India’s armed forces budget grew at an annual rate of 5% from 2001-
2005, at around 10% from 2005-2008, and to a massive 17.63% in 2012/13, but fell 
back to a rather modest 5.31% in 2013/14, primarily due to economic constraints. 
Yet, under the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, the defence budget has again been boosted by 12% for 2014/15. 
At the same time, the Navy’s share of the increasing defence budget has risen 
from 11% in 1992/93 to 18% in 2008/09, and now seems to have stabilised at 17.8% 
for 2013/14. Still, in relation to the overall defence budget it faced a resource cut 
of 2.6% in real terms. Nevertheless, initial increased capital expenditure had en­
couraged plans for significant changes in the Indian Navy’s force structure, with 
an emphasis on sea­control capabilities (see Miglani, 2014; Brewster, 2014, p. 13; 
Behera, 2013a; Behera, 2013b; Brewster, 2010a, pp. 2 & 3). Already, the Navy is 
undergoing substantial expansion with 40 ships and submarines, including two 
nuclear submarines and two aircraft carriers, either on order or already commis­
sioned. The target is to have a 165-ship fleet by 2022, consisting of 60 surface com­
bat craft, submarines and three aircraft carrier groups with a total of 400 MiG­29K 
aircraft and attack helicopters (Potgieter, 2012, p. 3). As some India observers are 
keen to point out, with two aircraft carriers in operation by as early as 2012/13, 
5 A slightly different version of this quotation is: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The ocean 
is the key to the Seven Seas.” This quotation is often attributed to Admiral Mahan but, in reality, is of doubtful 
provenance. The earliest reference to this quote in English appeared in an article, “Will the Indian Ocean Become 
a Soviet Pond?”,  in the Atlas World Press Review magazine of November 1979 – an article originally written by 
Italian  journalist, Guido Gerosa,  entitled La flotta sovietica presidia nuovi mari,  and  translated  from  the  Italian 
publication l’Europeo (Milan) of 6 August 1970.
6 For a general discussion of India’s maritime strategy and capabilities, see Buzsynski (2009, pp. 73-93); Holmes, 
Winner & Yoshihara (2009); and Naidu (2000).
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“the balance of power  in  the  Indian Ocean …  [would have]  tilt[ed] decisively 
in India’s favour” (Rai, 2009, p. 7). And, according to Admiral Arun Prakash, 
the former Indian Chief of Navy Staff, India aims to exercise selective sea con­
trol of the Indian Ocean through task forces built around the projected three air­
craft carriers that will form the core of separate fleets in the Bay of Bengal, the 




In conjunction with an expansion in naval capabilities over the last decade or 
so, India has been quietly expanding its influence throughout the Indian Ocean. 
The Navy has been active in developing security relationships that are intended 
to enhance India’s ability to project power and restrict China’s ability to develop 
similar  security  relationships  in  the  region. Given  that  the  Indian Ocean  is  in 
many ways an enclosed sea, the Indian Navy has placed particular emphasis on 
the ‘choke points’ at entrances to the ocean around southern Africa (including the 
Mozambique Channel), the Arabian Peninsula (including the Strait of Hormuz 
and the Bab-el-Mandeb) and the straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
through  the  Indonesian archipelago  (the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits). 
According to the Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine, “… [control] of the 
choke  points  could  be  useful  as  a  bargaining  chip  in  the  international  power 
game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality” (IMOD­N, 
2004,  p.  64).  The Navy has  also  sought  to  institutionalise  itself  as  the  leading 
power in the Indian Ocean through such initiatives as sponsoring the multilateral 
IONS, to which the navies of all Indian Ocean littoral states are invited (Brewster, 
2010a, p. 3).7
But India’s naval ambitions have not been without its critics. Given the long­
standing  lack  of  co­ordination  in  strategic  planning  in New Delhi,  the  Indian 
Navy’s activist role in the Indian Ocean has often been way ahead of the views 
within  the  other  armed  services  and  the  government.  There  is  long­running 
tension between the Indian Navy and the Ministry of External Affairs over the 
Navy’s assertive regional policy, including over the 2008 decision to partici­
pate in anti-piracy operations off Somalia (Unnithan, 2008; Thaindian News, 20 
November 2008). According to some, the Ministry of External Affairs repeated­
ly turned down requests from the Indian Navy to conduct naval interceptions. 





It is not clear to what extent these tensions merely reflect bureaucratic caution 
or a more fundamental disagreement over the Indian Navy’s regional strategy 
(Brewster, 2010a, p. 4; Maitra, 2005). Others are sceptical about the ability of India 
to transform itself from a continental to a maritime power. Varun Sahni (2005), 
for example, warns that the Soviet Union’s failed attempts to become a naval 
power in the 1970s and 1980s should act as “a cautionary … [note] for India’s 
Mahanian navalists … [and] a grim warning of what happens to a continental 
state that harbours overly grandiose maritime ambitions”.
However,  over  the  last  decade  or  more  the  US  has  actively  encouraged 
India’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean region. In March 2005, the Bush 
Administration announced that it would “help India become a major world pow­
er in the 21st century”, adding that “… [we] understand fully the implications, 
including the military implications, of that statement” (US Department of State, 
2005). In fact, the US has focused on assisting in the expansion of India’s power 
projection capabilities and its role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, with 
the former US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stressing that Washington 
welcomes  India  “taking up …  responsibility  to  ensure  security  in  this part  of 
the world” (Dikshit, 2008). US encouragement for the development of India as a 
regional naval power in the Indian Ocean has been compared to Britain’s strat­
egy in the late 19th and early 20th century when it found itself challenged by the 
growth of German naval power. Britain then forged partnerships with emerging 
naval powers, the US in the Western Hemisphere and Japan in the Pacific, al­
lowing them a measure of regional hegemony, while the UK concentrated its re­





India’s ‘Emeralds’ in the Indian Ocean
Over the last decade or so, India has developed good security relationships 
with many  states  throughout  the  Indian  Ocean,  with  particular  emphasis  on 
the maritime  choke  points  of  the Mozambique  Channel  in  the  south­western 
8 In 2007, the US Navy released a maritime security strategy that still stressed the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as 
the principal centres for regular US military presence – but now, the Indian Ocean was added as a key strategic 
focus. This reflects in part the importance the US attaches to the Gulf, but it also illustrates how central the 
integrity of sea lanes and their multifaceted connections have become to US strategic planning. In the past ten 
years, India-US security co-operation has expanded markedly, and naval co-operation centres on the Indian 
Ocean is its most active component. In the same period, India’s attitude towards a permanent US presence in 







To  be  sure,  the  south­western  Indian  Ocean  is  the  gateway  between  the 







to favourable tax arrangements.9 Former Mauritian Prime Minister Paul Bérenger 
described the bilateral relationship as “umbilical and sacred” and security rela­
tions as “intense” (The Hindu, 2 April 2005; Baruah, 2003), while former President 





under  which  India  has  transferred  patrol  boats  and  helicopters  to  Mauritius 
(including  the  supply  of  a  patrol  vessel  in  2010)  and  provides  training  to 
Mauritian personnel and officers for the Mauritian National Coast Guard and 
Police Helicopter Squadron (effectively, the Mauritian navy and air force). Since 
2003, the Indian Navy has provided maritime security through periodic patrols 
of Mauritian waters,  including anti­piracy patrols  in 2010 (Deccan Chronicle, 24 
November 2009; Ramachandran, 2007b). India also backs Mauritius’ territorial 
claims to Diego Garcia which was separated from Mauritian administration in the 
1960s (Vyas, 2001). Mauritian political leaders have publicly indicated on several 
occasions that India would be permitted to establish naval facilities on Mauritius 
if it so wished (Harrison & Subrahmanyam, 1989, p. 263) and there are claims that 
India already operates a signals intelligence station (India Defence, 7 July 2007). 
In 2006 and 2007 there were reports of discussions between the Mauritian and 
Indian governments over  the  long­term  lease  to  the  Indian government of  the 
Agalega islands (which lie between the island of Mauritius and the Seychelles), 
9 Between April 2000 and January 2010, Mauritius was the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) into 




ostensibly  for  tourism  (Sidhartha,  2006a;  Sidhartha  2006b).  It  has  been  specu­







and the Seychelles, littoral states in and around the crucial Mozambique Channel, 
the SLOC used by shipping transiting the Cape of Good Hope (Brewster, 2010a, 
p. 9). The security of the Seychelles was highly contested during the latter half 
of the Cold War as the US and the Soviet Union competed to maintain or estab­
lish a security presence in the islands. At the same time, India was seen by the 
Seychelles as a benign regional protector. In the early 1980s, Seychelles’ leftist for­
mer President Albert René sought commitments from then Indian Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi to intervene in case of an attempted coup. Although Gandhi de­
clined to provide any public assurances, India did contribute two helicopters and 
training for the Seychelles security forces (Harrison & Subrahmanyam, 1989, p. 
263). The Indian Navy has also assisted with maritime security in the Seychelles 
EEZ under a 2003 defence co-operation agreement in terms of which it provided 
anti­piracy patrols  in early 2010 (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 76­79).10 Moreover,  in 
2005  India donated a patrol boat  to  the Seychelles,  reportedly  in a hurried ef­
fort to pre-empt offers of Chinese assistance (Ramachandran, 2007a). Also, in 
July 2007 the Indian Navy opened an electronic monitoring facility in northern 
Madagascar  at  the  head  of  the Mozambique Channel  (Ramachandran,  2007b; 
India Defence, 7 July 2007) and apparently had been granted ‘limited’ berthing 
rights in the island for Indian naval vessels (Pubby, 2007).
The  Indian  Navy  has  also  acted  as  a  maritime  security  provider  for 









11 For a wider discussion of India’s strategic ambitions and role in south-eastern Africa, particularly in 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya, see Brewster (2014, pp. 85-89 & 92-93). 
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What is more, India’s maritime security relationships in the south-western 
Indian Ocean are buttressed by growing maritime security relations with France 
(Brewster, 2014, pp. 79­80) and South Africa. Since 2001, the Indian Navy has con­
ducted annual exercises with the French Navy, which operates out of Réunion 
and Djibouti. India has sponsored the ‘IBSA Trilateral Security Dialogue’ be­
tween India, Brazil and South Africa, pursuant to which trilateral naval exercises 







mine or pre-empt Indian’s relationships. Again, according to the former Indian 




so-called Chinese ‘thrust’ towards these island states presages Sino-Indian naval 




lenge India’s maritime security role elsewhere in the south-western Indian Ocean 
(Brewster, 2010a, p. 10).
India historically exercised a special political and economic role in the north-
western Indian Ocean. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, British India was 
the dominant economic, political  and military  force  in  the  region. The Trucial 
States  (now  the United Arab  Emirates)  and Aden  (now Yemen) were  admin­
istered  from  British  India  and  British  Indian Army  garrisons  were  stationed 
throughout the Persian Gulf until 1947. However, India’s influence in the region 
diminished significantly following independence and, although New Delhi gen­
erally  adopted a pro­Arab  foreign policy,  its  ties  in  the  region were  regularly 
strained as a result of the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan’s close political, eco­
nomic and military ties with many states in this region continue to this day. Some 
argue that the ability of India to extend its security presence in the north-western 
12 This includes an announced US$700 million investment by China in a special economic zone in Mauritius.
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Indian Ocean has also been  constrained by  the US predominance  in  the Gulf, 
leaving little room for New Delhi to develop its own relationships, and that the 





lationship with  the US and,  since 2003,  India has entered  into  several defence 
agreements with the Sultanate dealing with training, maritime security co­oper­
ation, and joint exercises (India Defence, 6 April 2010; Jha, 2009). The Indian Air 
Force uses the Thumrait air base for transit purposes and Oman has offered the 
Indian Navy berthing facilities in support of anti­piracy patrols (Dikshit, 2009). 
The  Indian Navy has also  sought  to play an active  role  in  the  containment of 
Somali­based piracy and since October 2008 has one or two vessels in anti­pira­





Diego Garcia), and the Maldives, both sitting north-south astride the major east-
west SLOCs between the Middle East and East Asia. India has long regarded the 
Maldives as falling within its South Asian sphere of influence. In 1988, with the 
apparent blessing of  the US and Britain,  India  sent  troops and naval  forces  to 
the Maldives to support former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom against an 
attempted coup by Sri Lankan mercenaries. Since that time, India has supplied 
the Maldivian armed forces with equipment and training and the Indian Navy 
has provided maritime security. In August 2009, a security agreement was for­





ters at Gan, although it is unclear to what extent the Indian Navy will establish a 
13  This  perception  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the US military  relationship with  India  is  the  responsibility 
of US Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, while the US security presence in the north-western Indian Ocean 
is  administered  by US Central Command,  based  in Qatar  (which  also  has  responsibility  for  the US military 






plans  to station aircraft and naval vessels at Malé  in  the central Maldives and 
at Haa Dhalu atoll in the north (Dutta, 2009). As part of the agreement, India is 
building a system of 26 electronic monitoring stations across the Maldives archi­
pelago, apparently to protect the Maldives’ large EEZ from illegal fishing activi­
ties (Chandramohan, 2009).
An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?
To what extent should India’s maritime security relationships in the Indian 
Ocean be seen as the beginnings of an Indian sphere of influence in the region?15
The discourse on an Indian sphere of influence beyond South Asia is some­
times identified with Lord Curzon, the former British Viceroy of India who, at 
the beginning of the 20th century, advocated the adoption of a ‘forward policy’ 
to secure India’s strategic position. Curzon’s so-called ‘forward school’ argued 
that India’s security demanded, amongst others, control of maritime routes and 
key ports en route to India, including Aden and Singapore.16 In many ways, the 
policies of the British Raj represented a significant departure from Indian tradi­
tions which had little history of territorial expansion or military and political 
adventure beyond the limits of the sub-continent. George Tanham’s (1996, p. 73) 
study of India’s strategic culture in the early 1990s characterised Indian strategic 
thinking as being “defensive” and “lack[ing] … an expansionist military tradi­
tion”. Indeed, any affirmation of an Indian security sphere beyond South Asia 
largely ceased following independence. After 1947, India effectively withdrew 
to the Indian sub-continent and asserted what has been called ‘India’s Monroe 
Doctrine’ according to which New Delhi would not permit any intervention by 
any ‘external’ power in India’s immediate neighbours in South Asia and related 
islands (Brewster, 2010a, p. 15). While India’s attempts to exclude other powers 
from South Asia had only limited success, New Delhi’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ was 
used to justify military interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the 1980s 
(see Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008, pp. 997-1011).




15 On an Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean, see Brewster (2014, pp. 35-37).
16 This included the creation of territorial buffer areas to insulate direct contact with other empires, including 
Afghanistan in the west, Tibet in the north, and Thailand (Siam) in the east, and for British India to take an active 




[the Indian Ocean] is the vital sea”, asserting that “Indian interests have extended 
to the different sides … of the Indian Ocean [and], based as they are on the in­
escapable  facts  of  geography, have become more  important  than  ever before” 
(Panikkar, 1945, pp. 84 & 94). In a similar vein, Keshav Vaidya (1949, pp. 91, 101 







about a ‘natural’ sphere of influence extending well beyond South Asia. This is 
related to a desire to move beyond India’s traditional strategic preoccupations 
in South Asia and re-engage with its extended neighbourhood; in other words, 
to rectify what former Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh called 
India’s unnecessary acceptance of “the post-Partition limits geography imposed 
on policy” (Mohan, 2003, p. 205). Eric Margolis (2005, p. 70) perceptively remarks 
that what is “driving India’s naval strategy is the concept that the vast Indian 
Ocean is its mare nostrum …. that the entire triangle of the Indian Ocean is … [its] 
rightful and exclusive sphere of interest”. As David Scott (2006, p. 120) empha­
sises, “… [to] shape the Indian Ocean as India’s ocean is India’s ‘Grand Strategy’” 
for the 21st century. Thus, from the turn of this century, the Indian Ministry of 
Defence began describing India’s ‘security environment’ as extending from the 
Persian Gulf  in  the west  to  the Strait  of Malacca  in  the  east  (IMOD, 2001),  an 
area which Jaswant Singh called India’s “sphere of influence” (Rajghatta, 2001) 
and what former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004) has somewhat more 
diplomatically referred to as India’s “strategic footprint” (Brewster, 2010a, p. 16).
While there is obviously an aspiration in New Delhi to develop an expanded 
Indian strategic space, it is not at all clear what this might mean in practice. There 
is little doubt that India’s approach to spreading its influence in the region differs 
significantly from Lord Curzon’s, and it seems unlikely even in the long term 
that India will regain the regional hegemony exerted by British India. However, 
short of hegemony, India could express regional dominance through the devel­









in the region, with the exception of the Islamic factor arising from the Pakistan 
conflict. India is often perceived as essentially a benign power and not a would-
be hegemon, in contrast with other external powers such as the US. While India 




there are sometimes also noticeable overtones of hierarchy in India’s dealings 
with the region, particularly in New Delhi’s overt opposition to regional relation­
ships with China (see Brewster, 2014, pp. 194­196; Brewster, 2010a, pp. 16­17).
In the longer term, India’s role in the Indian Ocean will likely be determined 
(and limited) by the extent to which its naval expansion plans come to fruition. 
Drawing on the experience of the US in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th and 
20th centuries, James Holmes (Holmes, Winner & Yoshihara, pp. 50-52) identifies 
three basic roles which the Indian Navy could play: first, a ‘free-rider’ navy, in 
which  the  Indian Navy can play a growing role  in maritime policing and hu­
manitarian functions, while the US continues to play a dominant role; second, a 
‘constabulary’ navy, in which the Indian Navy would, sparingly and with tact, 
intervene in littoral countries to advance the common interest of South Asian 
states; and third, a ‘strong-man’ navy where it seeks to establish hegemony in 
the Indian Ocean and has the capability to mount a forward defensive posture 
beyond the Indian Ocean. Holmes concludes that the ambitions represented by 
the Indian Navy’s expansion programme in the coming decades would give it 
the capability to act somewhere between a ‘free-rider’ navy and a ‘constabulary’ 
navy (Brewster, 2010a, p. 17). Undoubtedly, challenges in the maritime domain 




It should be noted that the potential for an Indian sphere of influence in the 
Indian Ocean is also subject to some important caveats: although India has ambi­
tions to expand its strategic space in the Indian Ocean, there are real questions as 
to whether these aspirations will be achieved. India has a long history of its stra­
tegic ambitions surpassing its capabilities, of strategic goals and military expan­




sustainability of India’s high economic growth rate. India’s security partners in 
the Indian Ocean (with the possible exception of the Maldives) will likely main­
tain other important security relationships as well and will not easily grant an 
exclusive security role to India. And, most importantly, the US has every reason 
to maintain a major regional security presence, particularly in the north­western 
Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 17).
Nevertheless, India’s aspirations to expand its strategic space in the Indian 
Ocean region are clearly related to its broader ambitions to be recognised as a 
great power, ambitions that may, if anything, grow in coming years. Certainly, 
many would see a sphere of influence as a natural appendage of great power 
status. One study on India’s regional plans (Pardesi, 2005, p. 55) concluded that:




From a geopolitical perspective, spheres of influence are seen as a normal 
part of ordering the international system. According to Saul Cohen (1973, p. viii) 
“… spheres of influence are essential to the preservation of national and regional 
expression … the alternative is either a monolithic world system or utter chaos”. 
The key feature of a sphere of influence is not just the ability to project power, but 
an acknowledgement of a hierarchical relationship in which the great power pro­
vides security to lesser powers in return for an acknowledgement of its leadership 
role (Brewster, 2010a, pp. 17 & 18).17 Many Indian strategists see China’s political 
and security relationships in South Asia and its putative ‘String of Pearls’ strat­
egy as part of a cohesive policy of ‘encirclement’ or ‘containment’ of India that 
justifies the development of a ‘defensive’ sphere of influence by India. As Arun 
Prakash (2006, p. 11) argued: “The appropriate counter to China’s encirclement 
of India is to build our own relations, particularly in our neighbourhood, on the 
basis of our national interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbours.”
As it expands its influence in the Indian Ocean region, India also has had to 
accept the continuing role of the US in the region. The US, particularly with its 
base  at Diego Garcia  and  its naval  facilities  in Singapore  and  the Gulf,  seems 
likely  to  remain  the predominant naval power  in  the  Indian Ocean  region  for 
many years to come. However, there are indications that the US is willing to cede 
17 For an incisive analysis of India as the natural centre of gravity and its leadership role in a regional security 




north-eastern Indian Ocean. For its part, India’s willingness to co-operate with 
the US in achieving its ambitions is not as paradoxical as it may seem. As former 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1955, p. 64) once conceded, the US (in de­
veloping its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century) 
relied on Britain, the then superpower, to enforce the Monroe Doctrine until the 
US was sufficiently strong to do so itself. Similarly, India may have good reason 
to co­operate with the US while it builds its own naval power (Brewster, 2010a, 
p. 18).18 
Yet, with the exception of the US, India will likely wish to co-operate with 
extra-regional navies in the Indian Ocean only as long as they recognise India’s 
leading role in the region (Pardesi, 2005, p. 53). The apparent willingness of Japan 
to recognise India’s role as the ‘leading’ maritime security provider west of the 
Malacca Strait forms a not insignificant element in the developing India-Japan 
security relationship (see Brewster, 2010c, pp. 95-120). How Australia fits in this 
picture is also not entirely clear. Australia’s naval power ranks second only to 
India’s among the littoral states. There is no suggestion that India is seeking to 
expand its strategic space into the south-eastern Indian Ocean and there is little 
reason for it to do so as the junction of the Southern and Indian Oceans is not a 
maritime  choke point  (Brewster,  2010a, p.  19). Nevertheless,  there  is  a  ‘strong 
mutual interest’ for Australia and India to enhance maritime security co-opera­
tion (Australian Government, 2009, p. 96), particularly in areas such as maritime 
policing (piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, human trafficking) and di­
saster management (see Brewster, 2010b, pp. 1­9).19 
A Brief Outline of Security Threats in the Western Indian 
Ocean Region
Multiple sources of insecurity afflict many of the countries that rim the Indian 
Ocean. These challenges include terrorism in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India; state 
failure, civil war and insurgency in Yemen and Somalia; high­volume drug­traf­
ficking via Pakistan and Iran; and piracy and armed robbery at sea around the 
Horn of Africa and in the Arabian Sea. Not all of these security concerns have 
occurred at peak intensity at the same time, and thus it is arguable that they have 
been addressed ‘insufficiently’ and on an ‘if-and-when’ basis. Even so, these risks 
18 For an  insightful discussion on US­Indian co­operation  in  the  Indian Ocean region, see Brewster  (2014, pp. 
171­179). 





Persian Gulf remains the global market’s most important source of crude oil, 
while the northern Indian Ocean constitutes a key sector of the globe’s ‘West-




evolve, it is conceivable that the conflated pressures of political insecurity, in­
surgent conflict, terrorism, illicit trafficking of all kinds, and piracy and vessel 
hijacking outstrip the international and regional community’s ability to effective­
ly respond to such issues in a sustained manner. Decision­makers should now 
confront the logic of adopting a ‘management’ approach to these challenges. Yet, 
successful management of security challenges of this magnitude, complexity, 
and inter­connectedness requires policy coherence, imagination, sustained par­
ticipation, and considerable resources. Amidst the existential pressures of geo­
political fragility, internal political upheaval, insurgency, famine, and inter­state 
tensions, there is now a growing danger that the specific threats from terrorism, 
human trafficking, arms smuggling, and piracy will not get the resources and 
policy attention they require, and could therefore increase further in the near-
term and beyond.
As offshore oil and gas exploration and production evolves along Africa’s east 
coast from Mozambique northwards to Somalia, improved private and govern­
ment maritime security have to be put in place, especially in the coastal waters of 
northern Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya. And as offshore industries expand, 
infrastructure, port facilities, and support shipping will  likely be tempting tar­
gets for armed robbery, piracy, kidnappings, and sabotage for a range of actors, 
including organised  criminal gangs,  terrorists,  and  insurgent groups  (some of 
which have yet to emerge or be identified). Also, historically, the settlement of 
territorial disputes has been one of the most protracted areas of geopolitical con­
flict. In most instances, disputes are benign, rendering them virtually dormant 
but, even so, they have the potential to become flashpoints in the coming years.
There appear to be a daunting number of maritime security threats and chal­
lenges in the Indian Ocean region, both extant and potential,20 and insufficient 
resources to address them. Indeed, the mere fact  that  the Indian Ocean region 
20 These parts of the Indian Ocean region are categorised by Lloyd’s Market Association of London, which 
provides professional and technical support to Lloyd’s underwriting (insurance and, specifically, shipping) 





constitutes the world’s largest swath of maritime space that is prone to piracy 
and terrorism of some sort, signifies that the region will arguably remain the 
maritime area with the greatest array of security challenges for the foreseeable 
future.21 However, while  the  resources  that  a very  large and diverse group of 
states have devoted  to  addressing  these  challenges have never been adequate 
to the task, the largely successful coalition­building measures (CBMs) and joint 
task­force deployments have been impressive. With appropriate leadership from 
the US and the European Union, these multilateral efforts can be built upon in 
future. Other key states such as Australia, India, the UAE, Oman, Pakistan, Iran, 
and South Africa should come forward to forge regional multilateral solutions 
to address piracy, hijacking, human trafficking, terrorism, illegal fishing, and 
the integrity of EEZs. While not all these states and powers will be (or can be) 
grouped to address every challenge, opportunities for security co­operation and 
confidence-building in the region do exist (Herbert-Burns, 2012b, pp. 23 & 38-39).
Figure 4: The Somali Piracy Threat in the North-Western Indian Ocean
The oceanic area now threatened by Somali pirates is vast (more than 2.5 mil­
lion  square miles)  and  security  of  this  space  can never  be  assured,  even with 
hundreds  of  warships.  The  35  to  45 warships  collectively  provided  by many 
states that are routinely deployed in the international recognised transit corridor 
21 For various perspectives on the piracy conundrum, see Herbert­Burns (2012b, pp. 23­39); Luke (2012a, pp. 31­








economic prosperity, especially to secure the flow of crude oil exports. This real­
ity should be matched with far more robust and sustained naval patrolling by 
Oman and the UAE, while Western powers that have replenishment capabilities 





Those states with sufficient warships, such as the US, the UK, China, France, 
Germany, Japan, and Turkey, could provide additional frigates and destroyers 
to extend the patrolling footprint deeper into the high-risk area, guided by im­
proved maritime domain awareness and intelligence.
Ever since the piracy threat began to grow in 2008, maritime domain aware­
ness has improved considerably due to the efforts of the UK Maritime Trade 
Organisation  (UKMTO),  the  Maritime  Security  Centre­Horn  of  Africa  (MSC­
HOA), and various combined task forces. Even so, more could be done to harness 
the surveillance and threat­reporting capability of all the merchant vessels in the 
high-risk area, which could potentially expand the intelligence-gathering capaci­
ty for military forces by an order of magnitude. In the longer­term, an internation­
ally supported financial programme to boost the naval and coastguard capacity 
of countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, and 





tegic significance, as it is most concerned with the ocean as a geostrategic space 
as opposed to a regionally significant one. India’s traditionally land-oriented 
strategic vision has expanded in the past two decades to place greater weight 
on  its maritime environment,  and  the  Indian Ocean  is now  looked on as part 





of the inner ring of India’s security environment. Being the pathway to interna­
tional trade, the Indian Ocean is strategically and economically more important 
than ever before (Schaffer, 2011, pp. 1 & 2).23 Quite evidently, India is dependent 
on substantial  seaborne  trade and,  consequently,  its  security  interests have an 
important maritime dimension. Security and trade (commerce) have long been 
linked, and navies have long ago ceased to be military platforms only and have 
become  tools  for  the  protection  of  trading  vessels  and  the  policing  of  SLOCs 
(Pandya, Herbert-Burns & Kobayashi, 2011, pp. 2 & 4). 
But, the Indian Ocean is also a potential arena for competition with a rising 
China and a setting for security co-operation with the US. In the past, India re­
garded with  suspicion any  country or development  that  challenged  its  ability 
to dominate its maritime space. As India’s economy has grown, and as it has 
become more integrated with the world economy, this perspective has shifted. 
For  the past decade, New Delhi has  recognised  that  it  cannot dominate on  its 
own, and has come to regard the US presence as neutral or even beneficial to its 
interests. However, India’s big strategic concern in the Indian Ocean is China, 
and New Delhi has been watching China’s growing presence with great suspi­




In  internal  government  deliberations  in New Delhi,  these  factors  enhance  the 
strategic importance and bureaucratic clout of the Indian Navy, which has been 
consistently  built  up  since  1990. Although  the Navy  accounts  for  a  relatively 
modest share of Indian military spending (18% for 2012/13), it gets a significantly 
larger share of new procurement, some 72%. However, Indian officials speak of 
its mission in language reminiscent of their American counterparts: ‘naval diplo­
macy’, also with a focus on humanitarian operations like tsunami relief (Schaffer, 
2011, pp. 1 & 2). Clearly, the rendering of assistance during natural disasters 
(tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding) have spawned a multitude 




23 In 2010, the growing share of trade in India’s economy stood at around 43%. Rapid economic growth, exceeding 
8% per year since 2003/04, depends on a steady and secure supply of energy. Imports of oil and gas represent 
some 70%, and about two-thirds of this cargo has to come in by sea. Crude oil is India’s largest import, about 
US$100 bn per year and one-third of all imports, while refined oil is its largest export at about US$29 bn per year.




Figure 5: Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean Region
Other security threats in the Indian Ocean have also achieved a higher profile 
in the past decade. Piracy in the Arabian Sea and around the coast of Somalia in 
the Horn of Africa, to India’s west, has become the major menace.25 However, 
almost paradoxically, India’s approach to the Indian Ocean is primarily as a solo 
player, and so far it has been wary of direct involvement in multinational enter­
prises such as international anti­piracy operations. It has sought other ways to 
co-ordinate with the other nations concerned: co-operation rather than joint op­
erations. Anti­piracy ought to be the major arena for international organisations 






25 Somali piracy has dropped off dramatically in recent times and there has been no attack on a commercial vessel 
in over two years. Piracy seems to have been suppressed, but not stopped – it may well return at some stage in 
the future. Therefore, the international maritime presence remains vital to maintaining this welcome reduction 
in pirate attacks; see Agence France Press (Paris), 8 April 2016.
26 For a detailed discussion on the IOR­ARC and the IONS, see Oman Tribune, 4 November 2012; The New Delhi 




attract a greater degree of attention, but it is noteworthy that the Indian govern­
ment has emphasised its responsibility not just for security but also for disaster 
management, ocean resources, and environmental issues, signalling New Delhi’s 
desire  to  build  a  broad­based  set  of  relationships  around  this  vital waterway. 
Neither of these organisations, however, alters the basic judgement that multi­
lateral  organisations have had  a  relatively modest  impact  on how New Delhi 
addresses Indian Ocean issues, and that India’s absence from the multinational 
anti-piracy task force limits the impact of that multilateral effort (Schaffer, 2011, 
pp. 1 & 2).
To  sustain  its  current  economic  growth  and  achieve  its  great  power  ambi­
tions, India sees the Indian Ocean region as critical to securing its strategic inter­
ests. India’s interests in the Indian Ocean region are heavily focused towards im­




ect its influence across the Indian Ocean. Given that India sees itself as a major 
power with strategic interests across the Indian Ocean, and that its requirements 
for access to natural resources are set to grow, it is likely that New Delhi will aim 
to significantly expand its influence across the Indian Ocean in the coming years 
(DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011, pp. 1 & 10). Undoubtedly, maritime strategy is play­
ing an ever­increasing role in Indian strategic thinking (see Prakash, 2007a, pp. 
157­176). As India reaches for great power status, it is turning more and more to 
the Indian Ocean as a means of expanding its strategic space. Although it cur­
rently co-operates with the US, India has long-term aspirations towards attaining 
naval predominance throughout much of the Indian Ocean (Brewster, 2010a, p. 
19). Also,  the  rise of  India will play a key  role  in  the gradual  co­operative  in­
tegration of  the various countries and peoples of  the  Indian Ocean basin. The 
long-term result will be a more prosperous and globally more influential region 
(Berlin, 2006, p. 84). 
In the 2010s, in conjunction with an expansion of India’s naval capabilities, 
there has been a significant extension of India’s maritime security relationships 
throughout  the  Indian  Ocean  region. Much  of  the  emphasis  has  been  in  de­
veloping relationships with small states at or near the key points of entry into 
the  Western  Indian  Ocean  (including  Mauritius,  the  Seychelles,  and  Oman). 
Arguably, the extreme asymmetries in size have made the development of 
such relationships relatively easy: there is no question of competition or rival­
ry, for example. Some of these states have long seen India as a benign security  
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provider and have maritime policing needs that India can usefully fulfil. In some 
cases, India may not only be a co-operative security provider, but may also effec­
tively act as a security guarantor, as is arguably the case with Mauritius and the 
Maldives (Brewster, 2010a, p. 20). But gaps inevitably remain in India’s strategic 
posture and New Delhi needs to further strengthen its hand in coastal Africa and 




not only co-operating amongst themselves, but also by taking other littoral states 
on board as part of multilateral efforts towards the maintenance of maritime or­
der (Ghosh, 2004, p. 10).  
But, in reality, things look slightly different. India is by far the dominant litto­





need to re-equip the Navy was seemingly addressed by acquiring four corvettes 
and three submarines for delivery by 2007, as part of an arms deal package of 
some R70 bn concluded in 1998/99 (Engineering News, 23 November 2005). As late 
as 2010, however, Vice Admiral Refiloe Mudimu, Chief of the South African Navy, 
expressed apprehensions about the ability of the Navy to effectively “patrol and 
protect” even South Africa’s territorial waters (Heitman, 2010, p. 10).27 Although 
a senior naval officer tried to put a positive spin on the situation by noting that 
maritime security around the African continent “… is being addressed by means 
of the AU 2050­African Integrated Maritime Security Strategy” (Teuteberg, 2012), 
this is in all likelihood yet another paper tiger – given the AU’s poor track record 
and the strategy’s extensive projected timeline. Given continued limited mari­
time resources and the fact that a dramatic positive change in terms of maritime 
resource allocations in the near to medium­term is rather remote, the situation 
‘in the water’ is not likely to change soon (see Van Rooyen, 2012, pp. 13-14; Van 
Rooyen, 2011, pp. 22­23).28 
27 It was reported at the time that the South African Navy’s capabilities remained rather limited; that it would 
have difficulty in contributing to anti-piracy operations off Somalia; that budgetary constraints would allow for 
only one frigate and support ship to be put to sea at any given time; and that such a deployment would deplete 
the entire 2011 annual operational budget (allAfrica.com, December 2010 & January 2011).
28  Although  the  South  African Navy  has  since  commenced  limited  anti­piracy  operations,  it  is  restricted  to 




In  the  coming  years,  therefore,  India  needs  to  develop much  stronger  co­
operative security relationships with the larger littoral states, particularly South 
Africa and Australia. There  is much scope for security co­operation, especially 
in the maritime domain. However, the implications of India’s strategic ambi­
tions in the Indian Ocean still need to be worked through. To what extent, for 
example, might India expect implicit acknowledgement of a leadership role in 
Indian Ocean security and/or support in any attempts to exclude China from the 
region? In future, a challenge for New Delhi is to maintain perceptions of India 
as a benign and non­hegemonic power in the Indian Ocean region as it moves 
towards achieving great power status. A strong and influential India means a 
more multipolar world, and this is consistent with Chinese interests. However, 
as China increasingly regards India as its main Asian rival, Beijing sees India’s 
power projection in the Indian Ocean as a disconcerting development.
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A Notice to Motion: Exploring states of stillness 
while waiting on the arrested vessel WBI Trinity 







The paper focuses on the theme of waiting during maritime arrest and the effect this 
has on the lives of men who are caught up in it. Here we present the case of WBI Trinity, 
a supply ship, arrested to foreclose a mortgage, at the port of Cape Town, during its  
voyage from Nigeria to Dubai. Focusing on a ‘dialectic of stasis and movement’ (Bissell 
and Fuller) and using moments of bodily stillness and movement as a trope, our research 
highlights a policy of waiting and shows how the sailors inhabit forms of stillness.
keywords: seafarers, mobilities, maritime arrest, waiting, stillness, humanism 
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We are not the first to observe that while money and goods are increasingly mobile, 
human bodies are subject to forms of border control that restrict, filter and stratify 
their mobility often by means of detention and delay. While the passage of wealthy 
travellers with  the  right passports  is  streamlined by biometric  technologies and 
other forms of databasing, efforts to control the mobility of labour are redoubled 
by these same means. (Neilson and Rossiter, 2010, p 11)
“Waiting is something Castandes Lourdino is used to. In India,” he says, “if you go 
to a government office they make you wait for hours. Even at the train stations, you 
will see people waiting endlessly on the platforms”… then as an afterthought, “I 
am very comfortable sitting on my chair and keeping watch for hours.” (Castandes 
Lourdino, interview, July, 2014).
It was September 2014 and we were sitting on the deck of the WBI Trinity, a 
supply vessel which docked at the port of Cape Town one cold morning in June 
and had been stationary ever since. Or rather, had been in limbo as the ship and 
its all-Indian crew were enmeshed in a complex web of transnational economic 
shipping structures they had no control over. It had been four months and the 
men still had no idea when they would set sail again. From when I first encoun­
tered  some of  the  crew members  speaking  in Hindi  at  the port,  I  became  en­
meshed in their story, their waiting. Having gained permission to access the port 
of Cape Town for my PhD research,  I had spent a  few months understanding 
the functioning of the port. I made journeys on tug boats and filmed the towing 
in of container ships, the workings of the container terminal, the constant flux of 
things arriving and leaving. Once I stumbled upon the case of the arrested vessel 
with the Indian seafarers, I decided to portray the gaps in the smooth flows of 
traffic at the port. While thinkers like Bauman (2000) have used “fluidity” and 
“fluid modernity” as the leading metaphor for the present stage of modern era, 
we must be aware that flows are not smooth in society. The idea that everything 
is connected and sails smoothly through these conduit points needed to be dis­
rupted. 
By proposing an alternative way of engaging with the metabolic flows of en­
ergy and the moments of interaction, where the global and local meet in myriad 
messy and magical ways, the paper focuses on the notion of suspended mobility 
and the effect this had on the lives of men caught up within this space. Being from 
India myself and based in Cape Town, I identified with the crew on board and it 









In this paper, I try to expand the writings within the ‘new mobilities regime’ 
that looks at “how the global mobility of people and things change the world to­
day” and “how these movements are designed, formed and controlled” (Witzgall, 
2013, p. xxv). I do this by linking the complexities surrounding contemporary 
oceanic mobilities to the concept of a ‘post humanist condition’ (Biemann, 2008, 
p.57). My  research  presents  the  case  of  the WBI Trinity,  a  supply  vessel,  sail­
ing from Nigeria to its homeport Dubai, which was arrested at the Port of Cape 
Town for a period of six months from the 9 June to 6 December 2014. This is 
done through my engagement with the crew on board: eight Indians and one 
Indonesian man. The research focuses on problems of social isolation, uncertain­
ty of movement and the erosion of temporal and spatial boundaries. This is pre­
sented in an analysis of observational footage, interviews with the seafarers, field 
notes, photo collages and legal facts provided by a shipping law expert, Graham 
Bradfield, head of the Shipping Law Unit, University of Cape Town. 
The argument in the paper addresses two main themes. First, it shows how 
neo­liberal  policies  relating  to  the  shipping  industry  immobilize  people  and 
how this immobility is linked to a broader subaltern experience. The shipping 
industry  “needs workers  from developing  countries  to  compromise  their  em­
ployment  conditions  to  remain  competitive”  (Borovnik,  2011, p.  59).  Secondly 
it unpacks the period of waiting and how the ‘men-in-waiting’ inhabit forms of 
stillness. Reflecting on Jean Francois Bayart’s (Bayart 2007) argument that wait­
ing has become central to the subaltern experience, I borrow from the writings of 
Craig Jeffry (2010) on the idea of  ‘unstructured time’ and the notion of ‘timepass’ 
amongst unemployed youth in North India. Following this I frame the experi­
ence of the Indian seafarers in waiting by using David Bissell’s phenomena of 
the “variegated affective complex” where he suggests that the period of ‘waiting’ 
entails a “mix of activity and inactivity” and describes waiting as a “corporeal 




emotional switching on and off to the world: emotions of numbness and despair 
combined with a forced injection of hope for movement. I conclude by showing 
how ‘waiting’ allows us to expand on the critique of neo-liberal policies within 
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the maritime world and how  it  links  to  the  concept of  the  ‘posthuman condi­
tion/space’ that reflects on the paradoxical inhuman conditions offered under the 
name of globalization: “confinement within a world of systematized mobility” 
(Biemann, 2008). 
The Arrest of WBI Trinity
My research began in June 2014 when I encountered a few crewmembers of 
the ship, speaking in Hindi as I made my way through the ‘Landing Wharf’ sec­
tion of the port of Cape Town. For the crew on board, the trouble began the day 
they sailed into Cape Town and the vessel was served a ‘notice to motion’ - a 
court order barring it from continuing its voyage to Dubai. The notice stated:
Please take notice that the applicant intends applying as a matter of urgency to the 
above Honorable Court on the 09th day of June 2014 at 16h00 or as soon thereafter 
as counsel for the applicant may be heard for an order in terms of the draft delive­
red evenly herewith (Affidavit, 2014, p 1).
“A notice to motion is a request to the court to grant an order to authorize the 
arrest. When the court orders the arrest, that order is taken by the sheriff and 
served on the vessel followed by the vessel coming under the sheriff’s control” 
stated Bradfield, the Maritime Law expert. He further informed me “the port 
authorities are notified so they don’t let the vessel leave unless there is court 
order permitting that. The affidavit provides the legal requirements that have to 
be met in order to arrest a vessel” (Bradfield, interview, 2014). The company that 
owned the WBI Trinity, Work Boat International, owed another maritime entity, 
SIMGOOD, a Malaysian company, more than US$4 million. And according to 
the law, maritime creditors can pursue claims anywhere the ship is located. Case 
No: AC 14/ 2014, the affidavit was addressed as a matter between: SIMGOOD 1 
PTE limited and MV "WBI Trinity", Workboat International DMCCO, Master Of 
The MV "WBI Trinity" in the ‘High Court of South Africa, in the Western Cape 
Division. The captain of the ship, Maria John, told me: 
Our company name is Workboat International. The company is based in Dubai. 
The owner is Indian but he is settled in Canada. This vessel is a supply vessel 
and operated in Nigeria. There is another party SIMGOOD, a Malaysian company, 
who has to be paid $4.8 million with interest. They have some pending business 




money is paid we cannot sail. That’s why they arrested us. We don’t know all the 
details. (Interview by MS, July 2014)
In the following six months, I spent time with the crew and discovered more 
about their situation and the background of  their  journey. Citing clauses from 




1998; ITF 1999, Alderton et al 2004). Describing the experience of stranded, un­
paid, Turkish seafarers aboard the arrested vessel ‘Obo Basak’ in a French port in 
1997, Erol Kahveci in Neither at sea nor ashore: the abandoned crew of the Obo Basak 
(Kahveci 2005) throws light on the treatment of modern day seafarers who are 
frequently left unpaid and abandoned when a ship operator gets into financial 
trouble or is arrested pending legal proceedings. 
Another affidavit the captain showed me further clarified the background of 
the arrest. It stated that the “applicant had chartered the MV ‘SIMGOOD 1’ to 
Workboat International DMCCO, the Second Respondent in these proceedings” 
(Affidavit, clause 11). The payment of the charter hire was to be made within 
30 days of presentation of the invoice (Affidavit, clause 13.6) but was not paid. 
Interest on all outstanding amounts was to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum 
(Affidavit, clause 13.7). Further it stated, “It will be noted from what is set out in 
the previous paragraphs and from annexure “TR3” that the outstanding hire to­
tals USD 4,854,508.61 (Affidavit, clause 20). Emphasizing the debt, it stated “the 
applicant claims interest on the capital amount in the sum of USD 2,390,642.03 up 
to 31 May 2014 and interest will continue to run at USD 1,568.15 per day until date 
of payment (Affidavit, clause 28, 2014). Further, I noted that the two companies 
were officially registered and based in Malaysia and Dubai. The affidavit stated: 
“The applicant is SIMGOOD 1 PTE Limited, a company duly incorporated and 
registered in accordance with the company laws of Malaysia and carries on busi­
ness, inter alia, as an owner of vessels at Level 15B, Main Office Tower, Financial 




116, AL Arti Piaza, United Arab Emirates” (Affidavit, Clause no. 2, 2014).
The clauses explain how the case was anchored in various international lo­




island in East Malaysia, an offshore financial centre and a tax-free haven. The 
applicant’s legal representatives were based in Singapore as stated in clause 3.1: 
“Mr Raymond Ong, the principal of CTLC Law Corporation of Singapore, is the 
legal representatives of the applicant in dealing with enforcement of the claims 
to which this application relates”. While the applicant’s legal representatives 
were based in Singapore, the “dispute resolution between the parties was to take 
place in Mumbai, India and subject to the law applicable there (which is to say 
Indian law) (Affidavit, clause 13.8). WBI Trinity was based  in Dubai while  the 
port of its registry was Panama. Its details on official papers stated: “WBI Trinity, 
Reg. Owner: Workboat International DMCCO Dubai U.A.E, Vessel Type: Tug/




there are many registers that don’t require that link or require it in very tenu­
ous forms and these are the open registers” (Bradfield, interview, 2014). Tony 
Lobo,  the managing  director  of Workboat  International  told me  that most  of 
their business was in the Middle East and this was the first time that they had 
sent  their vessel  to Nigeria and “got  into  trouble”.  “Our company  is based  in 
Dubai because Dubai is a global financial centre, centrally located between the 
East and the West, providing tempting business incentives in terms of a no tax 
policy” (Tony Lobo, interview, December, 2014). Lobo further stated: “Nigeria 
has a quota for Nigerian workers onboard and we didn’t get any work for two 
years and hence the vessel was on its way back to Dubai” (Interview, December, 
2014).  Sanjiv Kumar,  the  oiler  onboard, was  of  the  opinion  that  the  company 
should have never let the vessel go beyond the Middle East. He stated, “It’s best 
if the vessel is close to home” (interview, August, 2014). The Indian seafarers also 
agreed that they liked Dubai and that it ‘felt almost like home’. 
In an attempt to unravel this specific case, we need to understand the condi­
tions or prerequisites for the arrest of vessels. Global shipping movements are 
easily tracked so once there is a legal maritime claim against a vessel there is ‘no 
real running away’. Neilson and Rossiter write that according to the Port State 
Control and  International Maritime Organization  the convention on port  state 
control allows the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to “verify that the 
condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of inter­
national  regulations  and  that  the  ship  is manned and operated  in  compliance 





states have the right to detain substandard ships” and are expected to “publish 
lists of detained vessels on the relevant MOU websites” (2010, p 15). Bradfield 
informed me  that maritime creditors or  the company  that  is owed money can 
pursue those claims anywhere the ship is located. He said that from a legal per­
spective there might be slight differences in the circumstance in which you can 
arrest from country to country and in that sense South Africa is what is termed 
an “arrest friendly jurisdiction”. “It is easier to get arrested here than many other 
jurisdictions but in this specific case of WBI Trinity would have been arrested in 
any port” (Bradfield, Interview, 2014). Writing about the different kinds of “di­
versions, stopovers and waiting” within “progressive linear forms of mobility” 
such as trade ship voyages, Gillam Fuller states:
Port state control becomes mixed with border control. Both employ detention or 
delay as the primary means of checking mobility and producing governable mobi­
le bodies from seemingly ungovernable flows. Combined with logistical methods 
of operation that can slow as well as speed voyage times, the net effect is to create 
hierarchized zones of mobility. (Fuller 2007)





ty is offered” (Bradfield, interview, 2014). He further speculated that Workboat 
International must be in “financial difficulty” or “heading to insolvency” or “their 
security must have lapsed due to non-payment of the premium” (Bradfield, in­
terview, 2014). I was told that smaller vessels, mostly fishing trawlers, that do not 
have insurance or access to bank guarantees would normally be arrested. ‘The 
landing wharf’, a site of arrested vessels at the port of Cape Town, where WBI 
Trinity stands, is one of the main sections of the harbour. Rusting fishing trawlers 
that have been arrested surround WBI Trinity. One can extend the concept of 
Foucault’s ‘Heterotopia’ beyond the ship and the prison to the site of the entire 
‘landing wharf’. During one of my visits to the ship, Sanjiv, pointed out of his 
cabin window and said: 
Do you see all the ships on this jetty? They are all arrested vessels! They are all stu­




sels are arrested vessels! We cannot really communicate with the other seafarers. I 
went to ask them about the shore power and they said, “No English! No English”! 
We are prisoners who cannot even talk to each other! (Interview, August, 2014)
While Marx described the category of labour as ‘energy’, ‘unrest’, ‘motion’ 
and ‘movement’ (Nicholas De Genova, 2010), Neilson and Rossiter (2010) exam­
ine the role of logistics as an important factor in the “stasis” or “slowing” of mar­
itime transport. The last century has seen ships became automated and crews on 
board diminish. The life of a seafarer at sea means extended periods of stasis but 
this is intensified by the “growing practice of slow steaming”(2010, p 5). Neilson 
and Rossiter write that “as a way of meeting the rising cost of fuel” the ships are 
made to take long haul “loops” or “delays” in their journeys and this creates the 
“presence of phantom ships parked in the world’s most affordable waters”(2010, 
p5).
During my first few encounters with the seafarers on board I learnt that two 





and Rossiter state that “a seafarer who begins work for a voyage ‘signs articles’ 
that oblige him to complete a  journey  from and to certain ports and to accept 
penalties if he willingly fails to do so. The terms of these ‘articles’ also place limi­
tations on the seafarer’s right to strike and freedom of movement” (2010, p13). In 
the affidavit facilitating the arrest of WBI Trinity, the ship was cited as “the first 
respondent”, the company the “2nd respondent” and the “master of the vessel” 
as the “3rd respondent” in the case. The affidavit stated: “The third respondent 
is the Master of the MV “WBI Trinity” currently on board and in command of 
the vessel. The master’s name and particulars are not known to me or to the 
applicant” (affidavit, 2014, p. 1). The captain was the oldest member of the crew 
and the most stressed. He explained his situation to me: “The company office 
in Dubai only communicates with me and I am responsible for passing on the 
information to everyone else. However, the company doesn’t send us messages 
through the Internet since they don’t want these people to know our messages. 






feature of admiralty jurisdiction. Bradfield explained why the ship is cited as a 
respondent in the case to me:
Outside admiralty you always cite parties who are natural persons or corporate 
entities in law suits. That idea of proceeding against a piece of property is that you 
pursue your claim against the property and that’s your best chance to be paid un­
der these circumstances. This arises because the ship incurs debts all along its trade 
routes by not paying suppliers and these organizations don’t have the resources to 
pursue their claims but by going to the country of origin of the owners of the ship 
so it gives them an opportunity the next time the ship comes past to arrest it and 
have their claim settled (Bradfield, interview, 2014).
The main underlying problem for the seafarers who found themselves trapped 
in this fight for money between the shipping corporations was that their salaries 
had not been paid and they could not fly back home due to the lack of money. 
Also, they had left India with a plan for earning a monthly salary for the period 
of their agreed contract which was between six to nine months, varying from 
person to person. Their company had informed them that the sheriff who had ar­
rested them was responsible for the payment of their salaries. The sheriff played 
an important role as the ‘on-the-ground’ person the crew interacted with. He was 
responsible for supplying the crew with provisions. Speaking of the sheriff’s re­
sponsibilities, Bradfield informed me that “the sheriff is looking after the seafar­
ers but he will recover his money. He works for a private company that runs this 
work as a business” (Bradfield, interview, 2014). If the ship were to be auctioned 
and sold, the sale price would form a fund and any claimant against that ship 
could claim money. Further, I was informed that if the money was insufficient 
to pay everyone in full,  the claims would be ranked and certain claims would 
be preferred over others.  Bradfield stated, “At the top of the ranking would be 
the sheriff’s costs followed by the seafarers’ claim to their salary”(Bradfield, in­
terview, 2014). Even though the seafarers’ salary ranked relatively high in the 
payment list, it was the private company and their employee, the sheriff, who 
would get paid first. If the seafarers were to even think of returning home, it 
would terminate their contract and they would return home without any mon­










sible  to  construct  such knowledge  from below,  or  is  this  only  the purview of 
elites?” (1995:133) All the seafarers on WBI Trinity came from working class fam­









expressed his stress about not having received his salary for three months:
Back home in Goa, I have a wife, an 11­year­old daughter and a 5­year­old son. 
My wife calls me from home. We don’t even have money to call on the phone. We 
have asked the company for money many times or even an advance from our sala­
ry but they haven’t given us any money. Our company tells us that SIMGOOD, the 
company that got us arrested, has to pay our salary but we haven’t received any 
news from the sheriff who arrested the vessel. (Jeroni, interview, September 2014)
The crew could have pressurized the owner to fly them back home but they 
























agent in Mumbai we are required to pay the first one month salary to the agent. 
Now we have a relationship with this company. It’s best we keep this relation­




believed there wasn’t a guarantee that another company would employ them. 
Their concern was that the ship owner would label them as ‘troublemakers’ and 
tell other shipowners not to employ them. Also they were far from home with 
no financial resources. Their plight was desperate even though their conditions 





During one of my visits before dinner Abhi told us that this was not the first 
time he had been  in a situation  like  this, on board an arrested vessel. “It hap­
pened to me once before,” he said, “in Iraq. It was 2006, 2007, I had joined as a 
fresher and the owner of the ship was Iraqi. There was a problem with an agree­
ment and they kept us there for six months. They didn’t know English and we 




cuffs on us and they had more security for us than a prime minister. Six cars in 
front and six cars behind us and we were in the middle. They didn’t even stop 
at the red light while driving. For the final hearing they arranged for an Arabic 
to Hindi interpreter. Our passports and seaman books were returned to us after 





‘Borders’ as zones of control are a key consideration for research into mobil­
ities. As the world gets more fluid in its movements, new forms of borders have 
been created and dispersed in a mobile and globalized world. According to Van 
Houtam et al (Houtam 2005) we need to revisit the “static notion of the contain­
er-border”. What exists now is instead a network of “complex and varied patterns 
of both implicit and explicit bordering and ordering practices” (p. 78). Expanding 
on the forms of ‘bordering practices’ they list other existing forms of border con­
trols. They state these as “modes of location, tracking and surveillance, textual 
locatability in the form of ID cards, or more archaic devices such as the passport” 
(p. 79). Other historical and contemporary ways to filter movements can be seen 
through the various “toll systems”, “stopover” and “brakes” (Virilio 2006). These 






effects”(Marvin 2001). They describe these as “transit conduits connected at a va­
riety of hubs (major seaports, teleports, railway stations, e­commerce hubs etc.) 
where adjustment occurs” (p. 27). While capitalism allows for the selective flu­
idity of borders, ‘power’ lies at the core of the emerging field of mobility studies 
as indicated by Sheller & Urry (Urry 2006). Urry further advocates that a “notion 
of power” and “social  inequality” must be  linked  to “network capital” within 
mobility studies (Larsen 2007). There is literature to show that the people most 
affected by these disparities within the era of accelerated mobility are those vul­
nerable people who form a part of “the complex debates on migratory practic­
es and refugee mobilities” (Martin 2011, 194). This state of waiting in undocu­
mented migrants exists in many different contexts. In his editorial Waiting, Craig 
Jeffery (Jeffery 2008) writes about Finn Stepputat’s study of Guatemalan refugees 
and shows them trapped in a state of “infinite waiting”. Stepputat quotes C. S. 
Lewis’s description of grief to describe what he calls a period of unending, un­
structured time: “like waiting: just hanging about waiting for something to hap­
pen. It gives  life a permanently provisional feeling… almost pure time, empty 
successiveness” (1992, p 110). 
Other parallel descriptions of waiting within this context include Greta 




to uncover a somewhat similar culture of suspense-filled waiting. She uses the 
term  “suitcase moods”  to  describe  the  condition  of women who  sat  on  their 
suitcases  the whole day, waiting, unsure of  the possibility of  returning home. 





this state of stasis. He states:
Stillness in these situations is divested of its cosmopolitan connotations of respite 




These travel conditions inflict a form of violence on the stilled body of the migrant 
in movement – what might be termed turbulent stillness. (2011, 199)
Adding to these debates on refugee ‘lock-outs’, is the invisible world of labour 
mobilities, in which workers endure the period of “chronic waiting”, a term used 
by Craig Jeffery (2008, p71) to describe how people have little control over their 
movement.
Trapped in a period of waiting 
“The very familiarity of waiting has obscured it”(Schweizer 2005: p. 778).
While everyday practices of waiting in the Third World countries are accept­
ed as a part of the everyday ‘corporeal experience’, one must highlight a slow 






to the phenomenon of ‘waiting’. It forms an unquestionable part of the everyday 
lives of people especially in smaller cities, towns and rural India. Bissell states: 
“waiting is a specific kind of relation to the world” (2007, 284). Most of the sea­
farers accept the period of endless waiting as a familiar experience. To frame 




2011), as a dominant experience in the global south, Martin quotes Bayart (2007) 
and Appadurai (2002) in stating the reason behind such an experience: 
The liberalization of national economies in the global south, often in the context 
of donor­led structural adjustment programs often leaves people in a situation of 
limbo. Neoliberal economic reforms have also triggered disinvestment in the social 
welfare state, and, in turn, vast “floating populations” are forced to wait for food, 
shelter, education or health care. (p. 195)
Craig Jeffrey writes about the effects of waiting on the numerous excluded 
individuals and groups who are forced to reside in a state of  indetermination. 
In his book, The politics of waiting, he examines “situations in which people have 
been compelled to wait for years, generations or whole lifetimes, not as a result of 
their voluntary movement through modern spaces but because they are durably 
unable to realize their goals” (Jeffrey, 2010: 3). Examining the problem of “un­
structured time” he analyses the behaviour of unemployed young men aimlessly 
hanging around waiting in Uttar Pradesh, North India. He writes, “Trapped in 
an endless present” enduring “feelings of heightened suspense”, the young men 
spoke of  their  activities  as  “timepass”.  Some even  labelled  them as  “timepass 





the objects of reflection, and in which historical inequalities manifest themselves in 
new ways. (2008,p.957)
The waiting process for the crew of WBI Trinity
Waiting as an event should be conceptualized not solely as an active achievement 
or passive acquiescence but as a variegated affective complex where experience fol­
ds through and emerges from a multitude of different planes (Bissell, 2007, p. 277) 
Borrowing from Bissell’s conceptualization of the waiting period as a time 
period of activity and inactivity and not a dead period of stasis or stillness (Bissell 




‘variegated affective complex’. Expanding on the VAC, Dastur states, “The enact­
ing of a variegated affective complex is a mixture of activity and agitation to the 
world, and conversely a deadness-to-the-world” (Dastur 2000). There exists the 
possibility of rupture that “intimately threatens the synchrony of transcendental 
life or existence” (2000, p. 182). Given the nature of the combination of stillness 
and agitation,  the period of waiting can be viewed as an  ‘embodied corporeal 
experience’ allowing for a ‘renewed focus on the body’ (Bissell 2007, p 279). By 
viewing the crew’s activities under the theme of both ‘corporeal engagement’ 
and ‘withdrawal’, I traced a path of the various activities and in activities to 
portray the experience of ‘being-in-waiting’. Drawing from my field notes and 
observational camera footage the recurring activity that stood out during the re­
search period was that of the men pacing up and down, in small groups or alone, 
during the day and at night. My notes stated:




ning activity for most of the crewmembers”, I was told by the cook on the first day. 
“We don’t go out much but like to walk on the deck every evening.” (Field note 3, 
11/10/2014)
Writing about “transformations in bodily activity” such as “walking–sitting–
walking, sleep–slumber–wake, stasis–activity” Bissell states  that  these “thresh­
olds that frame the experience of waiting” are determined by “the degree of cer­
tainty or uncertainty about the length of the wait” (2007, p 290). The motion of 
pacing up and down enhances the mood of anxiety on the ship. The relentless 
motion of moving up and down within the limited space of the deck of the ship 
forms the symbolic action of what it means to wait indefinitely. My notes further 
read:
I climb up to the topmost section of the ship, the bridge area.  I find the captain 
sitting alone in the dark. The sharp light of the computer screen lights up his face 
as he stares at it. The screen saver has the WBI Trinity as its background image. He 
looks stressed and anxious. He gets up and goes outside to smoke a cigarette. He 
goes down one  level and stands outside staring at  the container  terminal  lights. 






shakes his arms as he walks at times. Perhaps that is his idea of getting some exer­




themselves and their situation” (p. 22). The captain’s actions of switching between 
sitting still and walking up and down exhibit this intrinsic awareness of the slow 
passage of time while enacting a variegated affective complex that we are discuss­
ing here. These acts being active or acquiescent to the world also point towards 
Levinas’s notion of patience as a “combination of urgency and delay” Writing 




further reiterates the activity of constant pacing up and down. It states:
Another person enters the bridge area. It’s Lobo, the boatswain. His job is to keep 
watch. He sits on the chair and stares out of the window. The captain joins him, 
they exchange a few words and both of them stare out of the window. I walk to­
wards them to see what they are staring at. Closer from the window, I look down 
at the deck of the ship and see Abhi pacing up and down, talking on his cell phone, 
going in and out of my sight. (Field note 3, 11/10/2014)
The other activity that allows for social interaction takes place every night in 
the recreation or television room. My notes describe the first time I observed the 
men watching a film:
Jeroni, Sanjiv and Vikramjeet are sitting on the L-shape green leather couch and 
watching a Bollywood film. Abhi joins them on the couch and Sanjiv moves to sit 
on a white plastic chair next to the couch. The four of them greet me and go on 
to watch the film. They tell me that they can’t remember how many times they 
have watched the same film. It’s a comedy and it makes them laugh. (Field note, 
15/11/2014)
Writing about activities people undertake  to kill  time while  they wait,  Jain 
states, “The myriad forms of mundane activity that people may enact while wait­
ing, vary from drinking and eating to reading, talking and listening to music” 





are also  frequently enlisted during  the period of waiting perhaps  through  the 
action of texting or WAP-ping, or even gaming through mobile phones for ex­
ample” (Jain 2006). Along with staying in touch with family via Whatsapp and 
Skype, the crew downloads films through their phone connection to entertain 
themselves. My notes from that evening further state:
Abhi  tells me  that  they were bored of  standing on  the deck  every  evening  and 
watching the same scenery. Instead he tries to “download pirated films from the 
Internet and watch those in the TV room.” He says “from 11pm­7am you get 1 GB 
for R10 so I download films at night. I have created a wifi hotspot. Every night I 
download about five-six films. We connect the laptop to the TV through a HDMI 
cable and so sit and watch till midnight every night.” (Field note, 15/11/2014)
Later  that  evening,  I witnessed a  surge  in aggression and a bout of  anger  from 
Sanjiv, one of the crewmembers while they were watching the film. Highlighted 
as one of the moments of outburst, my notes stated, “Sanjiv looks at me and says 
that there are a lot of Hindi movies being filmed in Cape Town. ‘We have recently 
watched four five Hindi films that were filmed in Cape Town! We have developed 
an allergy towards the name Cape Town! The next time I watch Cape Town on the 
TV screen, I will break the screen!’ He expressed his anger about the fact that they 
had been in Cape Town for four months and could not really enjoy what all Cape 
Town has to offer.(Field note, 15/11/2014). 
Writing about the event of waiting as “not the immobile being­in­the­world 






playing affective intensity” demonstrates well how “waiting could be considered 
in a more transhuman form” (2007, p 291). The ‘inactivity’ or withdrawal for the 
crew involved staring blankly out of the window, long periods of sitting mo­









the heading ‘lingering gazes’ read:
Its Diwali and I visit the crew with a box of Indian sweets. Not seeing anyone on 
the deck or below, I go upstairs to the bridge of the ship. I see three men staring 







texting on his mobile phone too. Their movements seem to be orchestrated-first 
they all looked out of the window in the same direction and then all three fiddle 
with their mobile phones. (Field note, 23/10/2014)
Writing about “corporeal attentiveness” and “how bodies are perhaps more 
highly attuned through stillness” Bissell suggests how “the act of bodily stillness 
through waiting is instrumental in heightening an auto-reflexive self-awareness: 
of attention to the physicality of perception of the body itself ”(Bissell 2007). 
Besides the physical stillness of doing nothing and staring out at sea for long du­
rations, the stillness took another form and that was seen in the behaviour of the 
men towards each other. In different spaces of the ship but especially the dining 
room, I witnessed that the men avoided each other’s gaze so as not to engage 
with each other. Bissell writes, “through this stillness, the strategies involved in 





Down the long corridor, we see a figure coming towards us. The time is 12.30 on 
the dining room clock and the captain is the first person to come down for lunch. 
The captain serves himself a plate of food and sits down at one of the two tables in 
the room. The tables seat four. The plastic covers on the chairs are peeling off. I see 
another man walk in and serve himself food through the camera screen. The second 
person to walk in is Vikramjeet Singh. He sits next to the captain at the same table 







eats. The camera records three men sitting in silence eating. Not once within the du­
ration of the 20­25 minutes do they make eye contact with each other or the camera. 
Lobo, the first to finish, gets up, washes his plate, stacks it back on the pile of plates 
and leaves. He gives me a knowing nod as he exits the room. (Field note, 12/07/2014).
This  asociality of waiting  through acquiescence  is described by Bissell  as  “a 
particular relationship without context that eludes the traditional definition of the 
social” (2007, p 289). This behaviour of the crew in the dining room also relates to 
what Harrison writes about in the context of conduct of people in the most public, 
‘traditionally social’ spaces from “the waiting room to the platform, to the train 
itself” (Harrison 2008). He states “the ‘asocial’ implications or a tendency towards 
withdrawal, disengagement, and acquiescence” exist in the sphere of the social 
(2008, p. 433).
Reflections and conclusions
In this paper, I have drawn attention to the theme of waiting as a space oc­
cupied by not only by migrants and refugees within the mobility paradigm but 
suggested how waiting can be considered a specific subaltern experience. While 
we are aware of the temporal and spatial ruptures that maritime labour at sea 
endures due to processes of neoliberal economic policies, the papers points to the 
politics of waiting. Adding to Ursula Biemann’s notion of the ‘post human space’ 
that constitutes in­between spaces at the border where people are stilled, I would 
like to introduce Rob Nixon’s notion of ‘slow violence’(Nixon 2011) to this period 
of endless waiting. He describes it as:
By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a vio­
lence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional 
violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily con­




effects” on the environment and eco-systems but extends to passive forms of invis­
ible violence such as posttraumatic stress and domestic abuse. I propose to extend 








talism” exacerbates the vulnerability of so called “disposable people” and we need 
to understand the politics within the period of forced waiting (Bales 1999).
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